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1
INTRODUCTION
F
INANCIAL derivatives are contracts or products that derive their
value from their so-called underlyings, which can be any kind of
financially relevant quantity. The widespread use of derivatives in
most areas of finance makes their pricing an important discipline of
financial economics, relevant to financial institutions, investors, and regulators
alike. The central question is “what is the price of a derivative?”.
In an arbitrage-free and complete market, this question can be answered
satisfyingly: there exists a unique no-arbitrage price for every derivative, such
that trading at any other price can be turned into a risk-free profit. If themarket is
incomplete, the no-arbitrage price broadens into a no-arbitrage band bounded by
the super- and sub-replication prices. In empirically supported market models,
the sizes of these bands are often too large to be of practical use and fail to explain
the empirically observed bid-ask spreads. While this justifies the existence of
many derivatives, in that they significantly contribute to market completeness,
it also demonstrates that no-arbitrage arguments cannot adequately answer the
above question.
This dissertation comprises four essays (chapters 2 to 5) on the topic of deriva-
tives pricing in incomplete markets, accompanied by an application of the
proposed methods to so-called sandbox options (chapter 6) and is held together
by this introduction and a conclusion. The first three essays take a theoretical
perspective on the pricing of derivatives with embedded decisions and the
associated aspect of dynamic hedging.
Fueled by the ambiguity introduced by market incompleteness, the field of
derivatives valuation has fragmented into various directions concerned with
different perspectives and interpretations of the initial question. Combined
with the many different sources of market incompleteness and contract features,
we are left with a plethora of—partly incompatible—approaches.
Particularly affected is the treatment of decisions embedded in derivatives
contracts. Such decisions can originate from many different kinds of contract
features and introduce varying degrees of complexity into the valuation prob-
lem. Starting with exercise rights granted to the holder, they range from the
trivial European and the more complex American exercise decisions to contracts
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comprising a multitude of complex decisions by the holder, e.g. options on
the proceeds of the holder’s trading activity. Then, there are contracts— like
callable convertible bonds or callable warrants—which grant exercise rights
to both holder and writer. But what makes decisions by both parties a truly
ubiquitous aspect of derivatives valuation are market frictions and the resulting
need for the hedger to find a balance between risk reduction and transaction
costs. This unavoidable source of market incompleteness implies that, in addi-
tion to the contract’s original payoff, the possibility of a hedging activity and
thus a continuum of hedging decisions need to be considered.
The valuation and hedging literature lacks methods to handle decisions in a
consistent manner. Most contributions take ad-hoc approaches which are tied to
certain types of exercise rights or even specific contracts and often to the market
model. These approaches are not capable of solving problems that include a
combination of decisions by both counterparties. Consequently, they fail even
in seemingly simple and non-exotic cases. As an example, take the very limited
number of articles discussing realistic hedging of American options1. The fact
that none of these contributions sets out to solve the full problem indicates the
conceptual limitations of existing approaches.
The first two essays aim to establish new methods for handling decisions
embedded in derivative contracts that help to overcome the shortcomings of
existing approaches. Thefirst is includedas chapter 2 and currentlyunder review
for publication in Mathematical Finance. It lays the foundation and derives a
pricing principle for options with decisions. The second essay, included as
chapter 3 and accepted for publication in Review of Derivatives Research subject
to minor revisions, extends this principle to the problem of realistic hedging
and applies it to American options. The third essay, included as chapter 4 and
published in International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, addresses
problemswithmany utility functions that are used to derive prices in incomplete
markets; problems encountered during the work on chapter 3.
Chapter 2 starts with a concise formalization of the required concepts: the
decision behavior of both counterparties, payoffs that depend on these deci-
sions, pricing functions acting on such payoffs and acceptance sets consisting of
acceptable payoffs. At the heart of the proposed method lies a duality between
pricing functions and acceptance sets that transforms the pricing problem into
the language of acceptance.
This language is suitable for direct modeling of economic behavior and we
use it to introduce conservative acceptance. This acceptance behavior captures the
assumptions implicit in most of the existing literature and is enough to eliminate
decisions from the pricing problem, resulting in a general pricing principle for
options with decisions by both parties. Conservative acceptance should serve
as a starting point in exploring alternatives and extensions.
Chapter 2 also includes a section motivating the need for time-consistent
pricing functions and acceptance sets. It shows how time consistency further
1Refer to section 3.1 for an overview.
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reduces the argumentative burden needed to eliminate decisions and derives a
time-consistent pricing principle.
Chapter 3 considers the net payoff of a hedging option writer. This payoff is
given by the sum of the option’s premium, the negative of the option’s payoff
and the result of the writer’s hedging activity subject to transactions costs. The
framework of chapter 2 is then applied to this net payoff, which depends on a
continuum of hedging decisions and on all decisions embedded in the original
options contract. The result is a new general pricing and optimal hedging
principle for options with decisions.
The second part of the chapter uses this result to derive a new and optimal
solution to the problem of realistic hedging of American options. Numerical cal-
culations for anAmerican put option are performed, whose results are compared
to classical delta hedging and analyzed along three dimensions: the optimal
hedging strategy of the writer, the pessimal exercise strategy of the holder and
the option’s price. The results show clearly that delta hedging suffers from the
possibility of exercise strategies that produce excessive transactions costs and
that optimal hedging offers a significant improvement over delta hedging.
Chapter 4 reveals severe limitations to the practical applicability of two well-
established parts of the pricing and hedging literature, namely utility indifference
pricing and so-called utility-based pricing. In these strands of literature, utility
functions are used to resolve the ambiguities caused by market incompleteness,
andmathematical tractability is achieved through the assumption of continuous
trading. However, the findings of chapter 4 show that this assumption is not
justified when combined with one of many commonly used utility functions.
The optimal behavior and thus prices and hedging ratios derived from such
combinations are fundamentally different from the results obtained for discrete,
i.e. practicable, trading strategies.
Chapter 4 focuses onhedging strategies involving the continuous rebalancing
of short positions in the underlying, and proves that such strategies possess
infinitely negative utility when approximated using practicable strategies. It
demonstrates that the methods proposed by the literature on utility indifference
and utility-based pricing cannot be applied by real-world hedgers, and thus are
of questionable practical relevance. Affected are all HARA utility functions with
exponents in [−∞,1), including the exponential CARA, and all CRRA utility
functions, and therewith more than 55 published research articles and books
on the topic.
The investigations in chapter 4 are inspired by particularities of the expo-
nential utility function discovered during the preparation of the numerical
calculations for chapter 3. However, it should be noted that the use of this utility
function in the examples given in section 3.5, where the optimal strategy is long,
poses no problems. Furthermore, the findings of chapter 4 do not negatively
affect the results of chapter 3, because the latter does not use the assumption of
continuous trading and is in no way limited to utility-based pricing functions.
Whenworking with discrete trading strategies, unrealistic utility functions yield
unrealistic result,s that can be clearly recognized as such. It is only the assump-
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tion of continuous trading, which bears the risk of unintentionally deriving
results which are disconnected from reality.
The fourth essay is included as chapter 5 and published in Review of Managerial
Science. It takes an empirical perspective on the pricing of exchange-traded
commodities (ETCs). ETCs are a very successful financial innovation, allowing
investors to participate in the commodity markets with fewer hurdles compared
to physically owning commodities or engaging in the commodities futures
markets. Shares of an ETC can be created or redeemed on demand on the so-
called primary market by a small group of authorized parties. Public trading of
ETC shares takes place on the secondary market, usually on securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets.
Calculating an ETC’s no-arbitrage price is simple: it equals the creation/
redemption price, which is contractually specified in the ETC’s prospectus. How-
ever, in reality, there aremarket imperfections likeminimal creation/redemption
block sizes, transaction costs and lack of competition among authorized parties.
These limits to arbitrage between primary and secondary market cause the
secondary marked to deviate from the no-arbitrage price.
Chapter 5 examines daily pricing data of 237 ETCs traded on the German
market from 2006 to 2012 using different measures for price deviations and
pricing efficiency. It is the first study to systematically explore the pricing
efficiency of ETCs and its sample is unique in size and regional focus. It finds
that, on average, ETCs trade at a premium over their fair price. Furthermore,
nine hypotheses on factors that are expected to influence pricing efficiency are
formulated and tested using regression analysis. Statistical evidence is found
for seven of the nine hypotheses.
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2
TIME CONSISTENT PRICING OF OPTIONS
WITH EMBEDDED DECISIONS
(Joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner. Currently under review for publication in
Mathematical Finance.)
v Abstract V
Many financial contracts are equipped with exercise rights or other fea-
tures enabling the parties to actively shape the contract’s payoff. These
decisions pose a great challenge for the pricing and hedging of such con-
tracts. Yet, the literature lacks a consistent way of dealing with these
decisions, and instead only provides methods for specific contracts and
not transferable to other models.
In this paper we present a framework that allows us to separate the
treatment of the decisions from the pricing problem and derive a general
pricing principle for the price of an option with decisions by both parties.
To accomplish this we present a general version of the duality between
acceptance sets and pricing functions, and use it to translate the pricing
problem into the language of acceptance. Expressing certain aspects of
economic behavior in this language is sufficient to fully eliminate the
decisions from the problem.
Further, we demonstrate why time consistent pricing functions are
crucial when dealing with options with embedded decisions and how
the ad-hoc pricing functions used in many contributions can be derived if
time consistency is added to our minimal set of assumptions.
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2.1 Introduction
A theory of option pricing should be a rational theory that tries to explain
more with less by formally deriving far reaching results from a small set of
assumptions—a property that we call scope of a theory. A sharp distinction
between assumptions and results as well as between motivation of the former
and proof of the latter is crucial for the quality of a theory. The pursuit of a theory
with such properties is witnessed by the literature from the past sixty years in
this field, most notably by the titles of important papers such as “Rational theory
of warrant pricing”, Samuelson (1965) or “Theory of rational option pricing”,
and the use of Occam’s razor to “analyze the assumptions to determine which
ones are necessary” (Merton 1973b).
Usually, derivative pricing theories focus on the contingency of the contracts,
while often not applying the same rigor to the decisions embedded in the
contract. Of course, the holder’s decision at expiry of European options is trivial,
yet there exists many contracts that include complex decisions by either one or
both of the parties (i.e warrants). Furthermore, every contract considered from
the point of view of a hedger includes a vast number of non-trivial hedging
decisions. Current option pricing literature does not handle decisions on the
theory level but instead on an ad-hoc basis and—making things worse—in a
way that is tightly entangled with the description and specifics of the model at
hand.
In this paper wewill present the foundation of a pricing theory that is power-
ful enough to abstract over the treatment of decisions in financial contracts and
that can be derived from a small set of easily accessible assumptions and axioms.
It is inspired by the current research on acceptance sets and their connection to
coherent or convex risk or monetary utility functions (Artzner et al. 1999, 2007;
Föllmer and Schied 2002). Even though our pricing functions are more general
and not restricted to convex, coherent measures or monotone measures, we are
able to derive this connection by explicitly employing the notion of an accept-
able opportunity (a generalization of arbitrage opportunities, see Carr et al. 2001).
Furthermore, we do not rely on a specific model for market price dynamics.
The literature on pricing of American options or warrants serves as an illus-
trative example of the problem we are trying to solve. The relevant publications
can be classified into three stages. The first stage lies in the pre-risk neutral
world, with its most prominent representatives being Chen (1970), McKean
(1965), Merton (1973b), and Samuelson (1965). While still struggling from the
lack of a meaningful notion of the price of a derivative security, these authors
simply postulate the properties that the price of an American option should ful-
fill. Samuelson (1965) andMcKean (1965) both postulate that the price cannot be
lower than the values of either the exercised or continued versions of the option.
McKean (ibid.) goes on to define the price as the smallest value that fulfills these
properties. Samuelson (1965) fixes the price to be the maximum value of exer-
cised and continued version of the option. Both authors then derive formulae
for different stochastic market models. Chen (1970) defines the American option
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as a series of European-style compound options, for which the holder at each
time period either receives the exercise price or the next option depending on
which one has a greater value. In his seminal work, Merton (1973b) postulates
the existence of a continuation region of a certain shape within which the price
satisfies the Black-Scholes-Merton equation, and that its boundary be chosen in
a price-maximizing way.
These theories can be considered to be of high quality, as the postulates
and assumptions are clearly introduced as such at the beginning. The fact that
formally complex properties of the price are simply postulated or defined as
opposed to being consequences of simpler assumptions somehow limits their
scope from a theoretical modeling perspective. This of course, does not apply
to the derivation of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation. Instead, it applies to
the situation concerning the theoretical treatment of the early exercise feature
and the resulting decisions embedded in the contract.
Among the noteworthy contributions of the next stage are Brennan and
Schwartz (1977), Cox et al. (1979), Geske and Johnson (1984), and Parkinson
(1977). The aim of these articles is shifted towards providing usable algorithms
to calculate the price of an American option. To this end they merely adopt the
theoretical foundations of earlier contributions, thus inheriting their limited
scope. Also, the quality—from the perspective of the treatment of decisions—
suffers froman obscure use of assumptions, possibly even their complete absence
(e.g. Brennan and Schwartz 1977).
The third stage concludes the development of a theory for the decisions
embedded in American options, providing a basis for subsequent publications.
Bensoussan (1984), like Samuelson (1965), but in a different framework, starts
by postulating a type of complementarity problem for the price and then shows
how the price is the solution to an optimal stopping problem. This is taken
up by Karatzas (1988, 1989), who defines the price as the smallest amount of
capital required to set up a super-replication strategy and is able to arrive at the
same conclusion. In this setup, the explicit distinction between assumptions
and theorems as well as between motivation and proofs warrants the quality.
But more importantly, Karatzas (1989) finally fulfills the requirement of scope:
His analysis opens the door to obtain all previously published results from one
easily accessible definition of the price.1
The academic literature on American options is not an isolated case. The
following shortcomings are equally applicable to the literature on all other
types of options with embedded decisions (chooser, passport, shout, swing
options etc.) as well as many textbooks on derivative pricing. The robustness
and validity of the methods used is hard to verify, often difficult to follow
with rigor, and different approaches are impossible to compare without further
(mathematically involved) investigation. Contributions such as Myneni (1992),
providing adetailed survey andproof of equivalence for thedifferent approaches
1SeeMyneni (1992) for a detailed summary of the derivations and equivalences of the different
formulations for the price of an American option.
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to pricing an American option, show that these problems can be overcome with
time for particular contracts in particular frameworks.
The much larger problem is the lack of any progress towards a coherent
theory for optionswith embedded decisions. This results in a situation, inwhich
the methods developed and the knowledge gained are not transferable; they do
not actually deepen our understanding of the matter and provide no insight into
the nature of the underlying problem. Instead, there remain many unanswered
questions, most importantly: Are the various postulated methods consistent?
Which assumptions about the decision making process are needed to derive
the current results? Is the argumentation also valid in different models? Is an
exclusion of the possibility of clairvoyance (as done by Karatzas 1988) actually
necessary for deriving the pricing equations? Will the calculated price be correct
if this assumption fails to hold?
While it could be the case that answering these questions was not the inten-
tion of earlier constributions, many articles still contain a considerable amount
of argumentation motivating their numerous and, at times, quite obscure and
complex assumptions. To answer these questions, we offer a framework inwhich
all the postulated price properties can be (formally) derived from much simpler
principles. This renders the mostly unsatisfactory explanations superfluous and
dramatically reduces the argumentative burden. As an example we will demon-
strate below, how the arbitrage-free price of an option in an incomplete market
can be formally derived within our theory from a small set of assumption.
section 2.2 commences with the usual probabilistic setting of a filtered prob-
ability space. On top of that we will define decision procedures, which describe
the choices made by the agent or counterparty in every possible evolution of
the world. In the language of probability theory, a decision procedure is a
stochastic process ϕ, where ϕt(ω) stands for the choice made at time t in the
world state ω. With the concept of decision procedures we are able to describe
options with embedded decisions. Traditionally, options are modeled by their
cumulative discounted payoffs expressed as random variables. A natural gener-
alization to options with embedded decisions is to consider an option’s payoff
f as a function that assigns every decision procedure ϕ a random variable
f (ϕ) : ω 7→ f (ϕ)(ω) describing how much is paid out in each world state ω, if
the agent and counterparty follow the decision procedure ϕ.
At the core of our formalism lies a duality between acceptance sets and
pricing functions derived in section 2.3. Acceptance sets are collections of payoffs
that are accepted by the agent as zero cost investments, i.e. option contracts he or
she would enter without any additional payments. Pricing functions convert
future random payoffs into prices known today. The same concept applies to
payoffs describing options with decisions. However, special care needs to be
takenwhen the payoff depends on past decisions, inwhich case the price inherits
this dependence. Our first major result is a characterization of the essential
properties required to derive a bĳection between acceptance sets and pricing
functions.
In section 2.4 we introduce conservative acceptance to eliminate decisions from
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the pricing problem, and give an example deriving the arbitrage-free price.
section 2.5 discusses why time consistency is essential in pricing options with
decisions, provides a characterization of time consistent acceptance sets and
derives the the price of a general option with decisions. section 2.6 concludes
with a general discussion of the results.
2.2 Formal setup
The theory is formulated from the perspective of a singlemarket participant, that
we will refer to as agent, engaging in financial activities and entering contracts
with other agents, called her counterparty.
Assumption 2.1 (Probabilistic world). All possible evolutions of the world, their
physical probabilities and the time-dependence of information about the evolution are
described by a filtered probability space (Ω, {Ft}t∈T ,), where all points of time are
given by the totally ordered set T .
Definition 2.1 (Random variables). Let LGt represent all Ft-measurable random
variables into the setG ⊆ R. Wewill use the abbreviations Lt ≡ L〈−∞,∞〉t , L−t ≡ L[−∞,∞〉t ,
L+t ≡ L〈−∞,∞]t and L±t ≡ L[−∞,∞]t . We will employ the convention∞−∞ ≡ ∞.
Define also the set of positive t-premiums Vt ≡
{
x ∈ L+t
 0 a.s.< x}.
The values∞ and−∞ represent values higher or lower than any possible real
value. Remark 2.3 will provide the rationale for the inclusion of these values.
2.2.1 Decisions
We assume decisions happen at predetermined times. These times are then
used to identify a decision (e.g. when describing a payoff’s dependence on a
decision). This does not prevent us from handling more complex decision for
which the point of time can also be chosen by the agent, for example in contracts
with the so called American exercise feature.
The set of times at which decision are made is called Td ⊆ T . At each
point of time t ∈ Td there can be exactly one decision by either the agent or the
counterparty.
Remark 2.1. This poses no limitation because multiple decisions by one agent
can be combined into one choice tuple and decisions by different agents can-
not be effectively simultaneous in practice: The agent can either react to the
counterparty’s decision or not, implying that a chronological order always exists.
Decisions to be made by the agent happen at times Ta and decisions by the
counterparty at times Tc ≡ Td \ Ta .
The indexed sets Dt contain all possible choices at time t.
The decision behavior of the agents will be modeled by decision procedures,
describing how the choices for a subset of decisions depend on the world state.
9
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The set of decision procedures for decisions at times T ⊆ Td is abbreviated by ΦT
and defined as the set of stochastic processes taking at time t values in Dt :
ΦT ≡
{
ϕ : T ×Ω→
⋃
t∈T
Dt
 ϕt : Ω→ Dt , for all t ∈ T
}
We will use the abbreviation Φ ≡ ΦTd .
2.2.2 Options
Before we can actually describe options (by their payoffs), we need one more
assumption:
Assumption 2.2 (Cash-flows). The timing of discounted payments is irrelevant, i.e.
cash-flows are fully determined by their cumulative discounted values.
A sufficient condition in most theories for this assumption to hold is the
existence of a risk-free investment instrument. The complexity added by the
use of random processes, i.e. cash flows with timing information, instead of
random variables could not be justified within the goals of this work.
By Assumption 2.2 the payoff of an option with embedded decisions can
be described by a function specifying the cumulative discounted cash-flow
to be received by the agent for any possible combination of choices and world
states. Additionally, we need to be able to restrict our considerations to payoffs
that depend only on a subset of decisions. This is provided by the following
definition.
Definition 2.2 (Payoffs). Define XtT as the set of Ft-measurable payoffs that depend
only on decisions made at times T ⊆ T :
XtT ≡
{
f : Φ → L±t
 f (ψ) B f (ϕ), if B ∈ Ft and ψt B ϕt for all t ∈ T ∩ Td}
Putting a set B ∈ F∞ above a comparison operator means conditionally almost surely
equal: x B y ⇔ ({x  y}B)  1, with {x  y} ≡ {ω ∈ Ω  x(ω)  y(ω)}.
We will use the abbreviations XT ≡ X∞T and X ≡ XT .
In other words, the values of a payoff in the set XT are almost surely de-
termined by decisions at times T. Making different choices at times outside T
does not lead to different cash flows. As an important example, consider the set
X[t ,∞〉 containing all payoffs with no decisions before t.
Some further remarks on payoffs and their definition are as follows:
Remark 2.2. This definition gives an indirect description of payoffs. It allows
payoffs (as functions from Φ to L±∞) to show arbitrarily complex and non-local
dependence on the decision procedure, only to restrict this freedom at the
same time. A more straightforward approach would be to define the cash flow
described by payoff f for a given decision procedure ϕ in the world state ω
10
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by something like f (ϕ(ω))(ω). However, this ω-by-ω definition would be too
limiting. As an example, take stochastic integrals, which are used extensively in
the financial modeling of portfolios, trading gains and hedging. They cannot be
defined in a pathwise manner (as the limits involved diverge for almost any ω)
and thus cannot be handled by this naive approach. Definition 2.2 alleviates this
problem and Corollary A.4 shows that the stochastic integral is in fact included
in the definition.
Remark 2.3. The definition uses the set L±t and thus allows ±∞ in payoffs. This
is required to assure that the price of an option can again be treated as a payoff
and to enable iterative application of pricing functions. Both aspects will be of
importance when dealing with time consistency (section 2.5). The same could
be achieved with a restriction to bounded payoffs. However, this limitation
would exclude too many important applications of practical relevance.
Remark 2.4. If a random variable x ∈ L±∞ is used in the context of payoffs, it is
understood as the corresponding constant payoff given by ψ 7→ x, which is an
element of XØ, and vice versa.
Remark 2.5. If not stated differently, all operators, relations and also suprema
and infima used on payoffs are the pointwise versions of their L±∞, -almost
sure variants: fRg ⇔ ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : f (ϕ) a.s.R g(ϕ)
Finally we need a way to consider the effective payoff that results if an agent
or counterparty follows a decision procedure for a certain subset of decisions.
These decisions can be considered fixed and the effective payoff does not depend
on them anymore. We introduce the following notation:
Definition 2.3 (Effective payoff). For any payoff f ∈ X and decision procedure
ϕ ∈ ΦT define the effective payoff, f
[
ϕ
] ∈ XT\T by
f
[
ϕ
](ψ) ≡ f (ϕ1T + ψ1Td\T), for all ψ ∈ Φ.
2.3 From acceptance to pricing
2.3.1 Acceptable opportunities
In their ground-breaking work Artzner et al. (1999) “provide [...] a definition of
risks [...] and present and justify a unified framework for the analysis, construc-
tion and implementation ofmeasures of risk”. Theymake the “acceptable future
random net worths” the center of attention and postulate four economically
motivated axioms for acceptability, leading to coherent risk measures, which
posses a general representation using “generalized scenarios”. Their framework
enjoys great popularity andwas generalized to convex (Föllmer and Schied 2002)
and dynamic risk-measures(Artzner et al. 2007; Cheridito et al. 2006; Cheridito
and Kupper 2011).
Carr et al. (2001) use this notion of acceptability to address the shortcomings
of many pricing theories, which either require the existence of complete markets
11
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(a questionable requirement) or are unable to predict the smallness of observed
spreads, “by expanding the role played by arbitrage opportunities to acceptable
opportunities”.
The problem with these contributions is that it is hard to see which axioms
are actually needed to ascertain the connection between acceptance sets and
pricing functions. Acceptance sets are introduced as black boxes lacking any
inner structure. The desired structure is then superimposed using axiomswhich
can be too restrictive (as in the case with coherent risk-measures, that had to
be generalized to convex risk-measures by Carr et al. 2001; Föllmer and Schied
2002).
Our approach is slightly different. We begin one step earlier by formalizing
the acceptable opportunity directly and motivate its properties. The properties of
the acceptance set can then be formally derived. This is not only more natural,
but also reduces the number of axioms needed to derive the desired properties
to one. Properties and connections that finally lead to a better understanding of
what prices and risk premiums are and how they can bemodeled and calculated.
First, two remarks about our terminology must be made:
Remark 2.6. We will use premium to describe the discounted net amount that is
paid by the agent upon entering the option’s contract. We will often use the set
of positive t-premiums Vt from Definition 2.1.
Remark 2.7. Payoffs and the options they describe should be understood in the
sense of zero cost investments or opportunities, i.e. for the question of acceptance
an option’s premium is understood to be already included in the payoff (which
is possible due to Assumption 2.2).
The introduction of acceptable opportunities is based on the following as-
sumption:
Assumption 2.3 (Acceptable opportunity). For every payoff with no past decisions it
can be answered in everyworld and at every point of time using only information available
at that time, whether the agent accepts it (making it an acceptable opportunity) or
not.
Thus, for each time t and option f there exists an event αt
(
f
) ∈ Ft , which
encodes the acceptability of f at time t. We impose only property upon αt :
Axiom 2.1. For all B ∈ Ft and f ∈ X[t ,∞〉 the following holds:

(
αt
(
f
) B)  1⇐⇒ ((αt (g) B)  1, if g B f + x for some x ∈ Vt)
The “⇒” directionof this axiom is economically uncontroversial: If an
option f is accepted in an event B, then any option is accepted whose payoff in
the eventB is higher than f ’s by apositivepremium. Theotherdirection is simply
there to exclude the pathological case in which an unacceptable opportunity
can become acceptable by adding an arbitrarily small premium. As we shall see
in Example 2.2, this property is especially important in the context of options
with decisions.
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Now we can define acceptance sets and derive their properties. We will call
any set of payoffsA ⊆ X[t ,∞〉 a t-acceptance set.
An acceptance set should contain all acceptable payoffs. Thus, from a given
function αt we can derive the corresponding t-acceptance set
A ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  (αt ( f ) )  1}. (2.1)
In the following sections we will work directly with acceptance sets, or
more specifically proper acceptance sets, which have the same properties that
Axiom 2.1 induces inA (cf. Corollary 2.1):
Definition 2.4 (Proper acceptance sets). A t-acceptance setA is called proper if it
is t-compatible (see below) and
A  { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  { f + x  x ∈ Vt} ⊆ A}. (2.2)
Properness uses the following definition of t-compatibility:
Definition 2.5 (t-compatibility). A non empty set X of functions from some set G
into L±t is t-compatible, if for all {xn} ⊆ X and mutually disjoint {Bn} ⊆ Ft with
(⋃n Bn)  1 it holds ∑∞n xn1Bn ∈ X, where 1Bn is the indicator function of the set
G × Bn .
Corollary 2.1. If αt satisfies Axiom 2.1 andA from eq. (2.1) is not empty, thenA is
a proper acceptance set.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1. 
2.3.2 The price of an option
Formally, we will call any function pi : X[t ,∞〉 → L±t , from the set of options with
no decisions before t to the set of t-measurable random variables, a t-pricing
function. It is our aim to construct a t-pricing function for a given t-acceptance
set. The intuitive characterization of the price of an option could be summarized
as the highest premium the agent would accept to pay for entering the contract.
More precisely this describes the agent’s bid price. If an option’s ask price is
wanted, it is given by the negative of the bid price of the reversed option.
One possible formalization of this description of the bid price is given by:
Definition 2.6 (Associated pricing function). For any t-acceptance setA define its
t-pricing function P[A] by
P[A]( f ) ≡ sup{x ∈ L−t  f − x ∈ A} for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉 ,
where sup stands for the essential supremum.
It is easy to see that this definition actually specifies a t-pricing function,
as the supremum always exists in L±t (Theorem A.1). But instead of the highest
acceptable premium, which does not exist in general, this definition uses the
13
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supremum. Random variables and thus premiums are not totally ordered
and the supremum of such sets can be far away from its elements. Figure 2.1
illustrates how the supremum of the set of acceptable premiums is in general
not acceptable. However, Corollary 2.2 will ensure that for properA the use of
the supremum is justified.
x(ω1)
x(ω2)
Q
supQ
Figure 2.1: Example of a set of accepted premiums Q 
{
x ∈ L−t
 f − x ∈ A} taking
into account eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4 in a probability space with Ft 
P({ω1 , ω2}) and no decisions. A premium x can be visualized by a 2D-point
(x(ω1), x(ω2)).
In section 2.5 we will use the term normalized pricing function:
Definition 2.7 (Normalized pricing function). A pricing function pi is called nor-
malized, if pi(0)  0. Every pricing function pi with |pi(0)| < ∞ has a normalized
version x 7→ pi(x) − pi(0).
We do not require pricing functions to be normalized, as this would unnec-
essarily restrict the following results and make them more complicated without
providing additional value.
2.3.3 The duality
In the this section we present an important connection between pricing func-
tions and acceptance sets. Similar relationships have been derived in previous
literature (Artzner et al. 1999; Cheridito et al. 2006; Detlefsen and Scandolo 2005;
Föllmer and Schied 2002). However, these relationships are formulated only for
specialized versions of risk measures and acceptance sets.
Our work uses acceptance sets as the starting point of a pricing theory for
options with decision and therefore deeply relies on this relationship, whose
generality will carry over to the generality of our results. Thus, our focus lies in
finding the most general relationship that still permits a sensible definition of
14
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the price of an option, i.e. solving the problem of the existence of the maximum
and the associated question of validity of Definition 2.6 from the last section.
The relationship we will use, is a duality between proper acceptance sets
and cash invariant pricing functions:
Definition 2.8 (Cash invariance). A t-pricing function pi is called cash invariant if
for each f ∈ X[t ,∞〉 and x ∈ L+t it holds: pi
(
f + x
)
 pi
(
f
)
+ x
Cash invariance ensures that adding a premium to any option simply in-
creases its price by that amount. This clearly is a desirable property for any
theory and, as Theorem 2.1 will show, holds for P[A] ifA is proper.
The inverse duality operation, which derives an acceptance set from a pricing
function, is the literal translation of “the agent accepts any option he would pay
a non-negative premium for”:
Definition 2.9 (Dual acceptance set). For any t-pricing function pi define its dual
t-acceptance set
A[pi] ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  0 ≤ pi ( f )}.
Now, the complete duality can be formally stated:
Theorem 2.1 (Duality). For any t, a bĳection between the set of cash invariant t-
pricing functions and the set of proper t-acceptance sets exists. The bĳection and its
inverse are given by Definitions 2.6 and 2.9. I.e. for any cash invariant t-pricing
function pi: (1) A[pi] is a proper t-acceptance set, and (2) P[A[pi]]  pi and for
any proper t-acceptance setA: (3) P[A] is a cash invariant t-pricing function, and
(4) A[P[A]]  A.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2. The key step, which exploits the inner structure
of acceptance sets and enables us to arrive at these new results, is found in
Lemma A.3. 
With this theorem we can answer the question of the previous section:
Corollary 2.2. For any proper acceptance setA and option f ∈ X[t ,∞〉 it holds:
P[A]( f )  max {x ∈ L−t  f − x ∈ A} , if P[A]( f ) < ∞
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3 
But beyond this, the duality proves that our formalization is consistent
with our intuition. And more importantly, it provides the justification for
using the two notions, acceptance sets and pricing functions, interchangeably
in developing an axiomatic option pricing theory. Properties that are best
expressed for one of the two can be easily translated for the other.
Furthermore, it can be used to prove the important property of locality for
any cash invariant pricing function.
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Corollary 2.3. Any cash invariant t-pricing function, pi, is also local, i.e. pi
(
f
) B

pi
(
g
)
, if f B g and B ∈ Ft .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4. 
2.4 Decisions
The aim of this work is the development of a pricing theory for options with
embedded decisions. The duality result from the previous section enables
us to develop our theory in terms of the more directly accessible language of
acceptance sets. The derivation of the pricing function then merely becomes a
mechanical exercise.
2.4.1 The counterparty’s decisions
What is the agent’s price of a contract whose payoff depends on a decision by
the counterparty? First we give an intuitive answer to the question, when does
the agent accept such a contract, and then derive the pricing function using the
duality from the last section.
The agent has neither previous knowledge about nor influence on the coun-
terparty’s decision. The counterparty has to be considered completely free in its
choice. This suggests the following acceptance set, which is employed implicitly
in most of the option pricing literature: The agent accepts an option if and only
if the option is acceptable for any possible behavior of the counterparty. It is
important to understand, that this presumes nothing about the counterparty’s
actual behavior.
To formalize this we need a given set of admissible decision procedures S for
decisions by the counterparty, which, at this point, does not need to be specified
further:
Definition 2.10. For a given t-acceptance set A and a set of admissible decision
procedures S define the conservative acceptance set for counterparty decisions:
A∀S ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  ∀ϕ ∈ S : f [ϕ] ∈ A}
The agent’s price corresponding to this acceptance set is given by the lowest
price attainable by any decision procedure in S:
Theorem 2.2. If A is a proper t-acceptance set with pricing function pi, then A∀S
also is a proper t-acceptance set and its pricing function is given by
P[A∀S]( f )  inf
ϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉
Furthermore, the agent’s price for any actual decisions procedure followed by the
counterparty is in general equal to or higher than this price. The difference adds to the
agent’s profit. However, the counterparty can make this profit arbitrarily small (if the
infimum is finite).
16
Chapter 2. Time consistent pricing of options with embedded decisions
Proof. See Appendix appendix A.1.6. 
This type of acceptance is called conservative because it involves no estimate
of the counterparty’s behavior.
For more complex and realistic problems this kind of acceptance can be too
limiting. In these cases non-conservative acceptance sets, that by definition
cannot insure against every possible behavior of the counterparty, are needed.
They are of interest if the counterparty is somehow limited in his or her actions,
acts upon a different maxim (like maximization of another objective function,
like a utility function or the value of some larger portfolio) or in cases of market
access or information asymmetries, e.g. retail banking customers.
The concepts introduced in this section could be extended by a probabilistic
description of the counterparty’s behavior used to formulate non-conservative
acceptance, where the effective payoffs are accepted in some statistical sense.
A less intrusive way to introduce non-conservative acceptance is to declare
certain procedures by the counterparty that are theoretically admissible as
practically impossible. Formally, this can be achieved by simply restricting
the set of admissible decision procedures to a subset of S′ ⊂ S. In this case
the acceptance set would be A∀S′ and Theorem 2.2 applies analogously. An
important application of such non-conservative acceptance arises for problems
of aligned interest between agent and counterparty as in the case of the following
example.
Example 2.1. Aminority share of common stock issued by a company can be un-
derstood as a call option on the company’s assets. The “payoff” crucially depends
on decisions by the counterparty, i.e. the majority owner andmanagement of the
issuing company. In this example, the boundaries of the applicability of conser-
vative acceptance become obvious: even if prohibited by law, management of the
company could deliberately steer into bankruptcy. By the admissibility of this
procedure, the conservative stock price as given by Theorem 2.2 would be zero.
The situation is more accurately described by a smaller set of admissible proce-
dures incorporating the fact that such behavior would hurt the counterparty’s
own interests.
The remainder of this work is limited to conservative acceptance, which is
the predominant—albeit implicitly used—method to handle decision in the
current pricing literature. While beyond the scope of this article, one of the
motivations for this work is to enable the development of non-conservative
models.
2.4.2 The agent’s decisions
The agent’s decisions can be handled analogously by first formulating the
conditions for acceptance and then deriving the price. As it is now her decision,
the only rational conduct is to accept the option if and only if there exists at least
one decision procedure that makes the option acceptable.
17
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Unlike in the counterparty case, a naive translation of this behaviorwould not
in general produce a proper acceptance set—as demonstrated by Example 2.2.
This can be cured by loosening the requirement of acceptance of f
[
ϕ
]
to the
acceptance of f
[
ϕ
]
+ x for any positive premium x:
Definition 2.11. For a given t-acceptance setA and set of admissible decision proce-
dures S define the conservative acceptance set of agent decisions:
A∃S ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  ∀x ∈ Vt , ∃ϕ ∈ S : f [ϕ] + x ∈ A}
In contrast to the counterparty case, we also need to place a restriction on
the set S in order to be able to derive an analogous dual pricing function. S has
to be t-compatible (Definition 2.5). If this is the case, then the agent’s price is
given by the highest effective price attainable by any decision procedure:
Theorem 2.3. If S is t-compatible and A is a proper t-acceptance set with pricing
function pi, thenA∃S is also a proper t-acceptance set and its pricing function is given
by:
P[A∃S]( f )  sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉
Furthermore, while this price will in general be higher than the price for any actual
decision procedure followed by the agent, she can make this loss arbitrarily small (if the
supremum is finite).
Proof. See Appendix appendix A.1.7. 
Example 2.2. This demonstrates why a simpler definition ofA∃S, analogous to
A∀S’s definition, does not ensure properness.
Define a simple (t  0)-acceptance setA ≡ { f  f ≥ 0}, an option f : ϕ 7→ ϕ
with ϕ ∈ S ≡ 〈−∞, 0〉 paying an arbitrary negative number of the agent’s
choosing at time t  0.
It is clear to see, that no decision procedure exists, such that the payoff be-
comes non-negative and thus accepted. Consequently, f would not be in the fol-
lowing alternative version ofA∃S: f < B ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  ∃ϕ ∈ S : f [ϕ] ∈ A}.
However, if we add any positive value x (∈ V0) to f , then there exists a decision
procedure, which makes f + x acceptable (of course ϕ  −x) and thus f + x ∈ B.
This is a violation of eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4 and thus B is not proper.
An undesirable consequence of this fact is that f is not acceptable, yet it has
price zero and thus violates Theorem 2.1.4:
P[B]( f )  sup{x ∈ L−0  ∃ϕ ∈ S : ϕ ≥ x}  sup{x ∈ L−0  0 > x}  0
2.4.3 Arbitrage-free pricing
In this section, we present a derivation of the arbitrage-free price in incomplete
markets (which includes the complete market as a special case) for options
without decisions using our framework and the above introduced concepts.
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The discounted price processes of the market’s assets are modeled by an
N-dimensional semi-martingale X  (Xt)t≥0. Furthermore, this example only
makes sense in an arbitrage-free market or, more precisely, in a market with no
free lunch with vanishing risk. By the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, derived
for general processes (with unbounded jumps) by Delbaen and Schachermayer
(1998), absence of arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a sigma-martingale
measure:
M ≡ {Q ∼   X is a Q sigma-martingale} , Ø.
The agent is allowed to hedge against her risk exposure by continuously
trading in the markets. To translate this into our framework, we need to model
the proceeds of the hedging activity. Let the decision procedure ϕ describe the
number of shares of each asset held in the agent’s hedging portfolio at different
points of time (formally, Ta ≡ [0,∞〉 andDt ≡ RN for any t, see subsection 2.2.1).
The payoff describing the proceeds of a strategy is defined as the stochastic
integral with respect to X (the · denotes scalar product between two vectors):
H(ϕ) 
∫ ∞
0
ϕt · dXt
A strategy is admissible, i.e. in S ⊆ Φ[0,∞〉, if this stochastic integral is well
defined and bounded from below. The last requirement excludes so-called
doubling strategies and the possibility of infinite wealth generation by trading
(see Delbaen and Schachermayer 1994, and references therein).
The agent is infinitely risk averse and will only accept investments that
almost surely do not loose any money. Using Definition 2.11, her acceptance
set is thus given by
{
f
 f ≥ 0}∃S. Because she will not only receive the option’s
actual payoff, but also the proceeds of her hedging strategy, this set equals the
sum of the acceptance set of actual option payoffs,A, and H, { f + H  f ∈ A},
and leads to the following price:
Theorem 2.4. In an arbitrage-free market (M , Ø) the bid price of an upper-bounded
option f ∈ L∞ for an agent with
{
f + H
 f ∈ A}  { f  f ≥ 0}∃S is given by
P[A]( f )  inf
Q∈M
Q
[
f
]
,
also known as the super-replication price.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.8. 
2.4.4 Pricing options with decisions
The last section was an example that used the new formalism to derive a well
known result. In this section we will demonstrate how to use Theorems 2.2
and 2.3 to solve the problem of pricing options with decisions by reducing it to
the classical pricing of options without decision.
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Our starting point is classical option pricing. We presume the existence of a
t-pricing function pi0—with dualA0—defined for options without decisions,
i.e. for Td  Ø in our formalism. The aim is to develop a theory with an
even number of decisions, n ∈ N, taking place at times given by an increasing
sequence (τi)i≤n alternating between counterparty, Ta ≡ {τ1 , τ3 , . . . , τn−1}, and
agent, Tc ≡ {τ2 , τ4 , . . . , τn}. As in the previous sections, we first construct the
acceptance set and then derive the price.
To build the full acceptance set fromA0, we will handle one the decision
at a time, each with its own set of admissible decision procedures denoted
by Si ⊆ Φ{τi} for each i ≤ n. It is clear that the temporal order of a contract’s
decisions plays an important role in accepting or pricing it. While later decisions
can react to decisions made earlier, earlier decisions are fixed and have to take
different possible later decisions into account. As a consequence, the reasoning
behind the acceptance sets introduced in subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 can only be
meaningfully applied to the earliest decision in the contract.
This suggests the following recursive extension of the acceptance set A0.
LetDi be the acceptance set for options with decisions at or after time τi . For
an agent’s decision at τi an option is in Di if and only if it is in D∃Sii+1 . For a
counterparty decision we have Di  D∀Sii+1 . This scheme stops at Dn+1 ≡ A0
and the full acceptance set is given byD1, which expands to
D1  A0,∃Sn ∀Sn−1 ... ∃S2 ∀S1 . (2.3)
Equipped with this full acceptance set we can now calculate prices for options
with decisions:
Theorem 2.5. If Si is t-compatible (Definition 2.5) for every i with τi ∈ Ta and
A0 ⊆ XØ is a proper t-acceptance set, then A0,∃Sn ∀Sn−1 ... ∃S2 ∀S1 also is a proper t-
acceptance set. Its dual pricing function is given by
pi
(
f
)
 inf
a1∈S1
sup
a2∈S2
. . . inf
an−1∈Sn−1
sup
an∈Sn
pi0
(
f
[
a1][a2] . . . [an
] )
for f ∈ X[t ,∞〉.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.9. 
As motivated above, the order of decisions is important. Using an order
different from that in eq. (2.3) can lead to a different price. For example, it is
worth a non-negative premium to be able to react to the counterparty’s decision,
due to supx infy f (x , y) ≤ infy supx f (x , y) for any f : X × Y 7→ Z.
2.5 Time consistency
So far, the acceptance and thus price of an option is based on today’s assessment
of effective payoffs corresponding to different future decision procedures. In
general, there is no guarantee that this assessment remains valid over time.
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2.5.1 Problems with time inconsistency
A family of pricing functions at different times exhibiting this inconsistency is
called time inconsistent. Using a time inconsistent family of pricing functions
introduces an ambiguity into the handling of options with decisions; the result
will depend on the point of time at which the effects of different choices are
assessed. There is, however, no valid argument to choose one point of time over
the other. We will describe the shortcomings that come with each possibility,
and thereby make a strong point against the use of time inconsistent methods.
Consider the case, in which the agent buys at time t1 an option f ∈ X{t2} with
one decision by the agent at time t2 for a price pa  supϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
calculated
using Theorem 2.5. pa is as high as possible, with the restriction that at least one
decision procedure ϕ∗ for her exists that makes the option acceptable today (at
time t1). However, when the time comes for her to actually face the decision, the
only rational choice is to choose a ϕ thatmaximizes the option’s present (i.e. time
t2) value. For time inconsistent pricing functions, this procedure will generally
be different from ϕ∗. The problem is that the effective option resulting from this
behavior has a t1-price p′a lower than pa , due to pit
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) ≤ supϕ∈S pi ( f [ϕ] )
and in retrospect the agent paid too much.
Now consider the case with a counterparty decision at t2. The agent accepts
the price pc  infϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
for any possible future behavior of the counter-
party. However, at time t2, the worst case behavior of the counterparty would
be to follow the decision procedure ψ that minimizes the option’s present (i.e.
time t2) value. For time inconsistent pricing functions, the resulting effective
option f
[
ψ
]
has a time t1-price higher than the infimum pc . The agent did not
pay her highest price and could have offered a more competitive bid price.
On the other hand, if the agent based her prices on ϕ and ψ from above, the
resulting prices p′a and p′c would have the following deficiencies: She could force
herself at time t1 to stick to the decision procedure ϕ∗ and consequently offer the
more competitive bid price pa ≥ p′a . In the counterparty case, she paid toomuch,
because there are adverse decision procedures by the counterparty that only
justify the lower price pc ≤ p′c and thus leave her with a strictly unacceptable
position at time t1.
These shortcomings strongly suggest the use of time consistent families of
pricing functions.
2.5.2 Time consistent acceptance and pricing
In this section we extend our framework to express time consistency of pricing
functions and acceptance sets and derive a duality between the two, required to
obtain the time consistent price of a general option with decisions in the next
section. To do this conveniently we formalize the concept of a family:
Definition 2.12 (Families). A time indexed set {xt}t , also written as x•, is called
pricing family or acceptance family, if every xt is a cash invariant t-pricing function
or proper t-acceptance set, respectively.
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The duality from Theorem 2.1 extends to families. A•’s dual is written as P[A•]
and pi•’s dual is written as A[pi•].
In the simplest case, the acceptance family is time independent. As an
example take subsection 2.4.3, where a payoff without decisions is accepted, if
and only if it is non-negative. This behavior is clearly independent of time and
consequently all acceptance sets of the corresponding family would be given
by { f | f ≥ 0} and contain the same payoffs. In general, acceptance families
exhibit more complex time dependency. For example, it could be argued that an
option’s acceptance in all possible states at a future time implies its acceptance
today, i.e. As ⊆ At , for all s ≥ t, which is called weak acceptance consistency
(Artzner et al. 2007).
So far, pricing functions were only defined for options with no past decisions
(cf. subsection 2.3.2). However, working with pricing families to express time
consistency requires an extension to general payoffs. The price of an option with
past decisions does also depend on these past decisions, i.e. is again a payoff in
the sense of Definition 2.2. The following lemma shows how this extension can
be defined formally and that it works as expected when based on cash invariant
pricing functions:
Lemma 2.1 (Extended cash invariant pricing function). Let ϕ
〈−∞,t〉 denote the
restriction of ϕ to past decisions. Then for any f ∈ X and cash invariant t-pricing
function pi, the mapping ϕ 7→ pi
(
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ) is a payoff with no present or future
decisions, i.e. element of Xt〈−∞,t〉.
From here on we identify pi
(
f
)
with this payoff, giving rise to an extended version
of cash invariance:
pi
(
f + g
)
 pi
(
f
)
+ g , for any g ∈ Xt〈−∞,t〉 with g > −∞ (2.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.11. 
A notion of time consistency we can use within our minimalist setting is
the so called recursiveness. The price of an option equals the price of any other
option paying the first option’s normalized price (c.f. Definition 2.7) at some
future point of time:
Definition 2.13 (Time consistent pricing family). A pricing family pi• is called time
consistent if for all s ≥ t and f ∈ X:
pit
(
pis
(
f
) − pis(0))  pit ( f )
There is another, more intuitive characterization of time consistency: If at
some future point of time one option costs more than another option in every
world state, the same should be true today (see also Detlefsen and Scandolo
2005, and the references therein). These two definitions are equivalent if we
impose more restrictions on the pricing family:
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Corollary 2.4 (Alternative time consistency formulation). A pricing family pi•
with |pi•(0)| < ∞ consisting of monotone pricing functions, i.e. for all t and f , g ∈ X
f ≥ g ⇒ pit ( f ) ≥ pit (g) ,
is time consistent if and only if for all s ≥ t and f , g ∈ X
pis
(
f
) ≥ pis (g) ⇒ pit ( f ) ≥ pit (g) . (2.5)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.10. 
A time consistent acceptance family can be characterized as follows: The
agent accepts an option if and only if she accepts any option, which pays the
first option’s normalized price calculated at some future time. This definition is
equivalent to Definition 2.13:
Theorem 2.6 (Time consistent acceptance family). pi• is time consistent, if and only
if its dual acceptance family,A•, is time consistent, which is defined by:
f ∈ At ⇐⇒ pis
(
f
) − pis(0) ∈ At , for all s ≥ t . (2.6)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.12. 
2.5.3 Application to options with decisions
A time consistent theory does not suffer from the problems outlined in subsec-
tion 2.5.1. As we will demonstrate, there is no ambiguity in handling decisions
and as a consequence, pricing options with decisions requires far less argumen-
tation compared to the general (time inconsistent) case from subsection 2.4.4.
We will work in the same setting as in subsection 2.4.4, consisting of n
decisions at times Td  (τi)i≤n with the corresponding admissible decision
procedures Si ⊆ Φ{τi} for each i, a proper acceptance familyA0• ⊆ XØ for options
without decisions and its dual pricing family pi0• . In contrast to subsection 2.4.4,
the complex construction of the full acceptance family, which includes imposing
the specific order of decision elimination, will not be necessary. It suffices to
specify howoptionswith present timedecisions are handled by the full acceptance
familyA•. Following the reasoning from subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, we assume
the following conditions for all i ≤ n:
Aτi  A∃Siτi and Si is τi-compatible if τi ∈ Ta , (2.7)
Aτi  A∀Siτi if τi ∈ Tc
This fully determinesA• and thus the price of an option with decisions:
Theorem 2.7 (Time consistent conservative price). IfA0• is time consistent, it has
only one extension A•, i.e. A• ∩ XØ  A0• that is also time consistent and satisfies
eq. (2.7). If pi0• is normalized, thenA•’s dual pricing family is given by
pit
(
f
)
 pi0t
(
inf
ai∈Si
pi0τi
(
sup
ai+1∈Si+1
pi0τi+1
(
. . . inf
an−1∈Sn−1
pi0τn−1
(
sup
an∈Sn
pi0τn
(
f [ai] . . . [an]))))) ,
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for all f ∈ X and t with τi−1 < t ≤ τi and τi ∈ Tc . If τi < t ≤ τi+1, then pit ( f ) is
given by the same expression but without the first infimum.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.13. 
Compared to Theorem 2.5, this pricing function is more suitable for actual
calculation. The recursive structure can in many interesting cases be used to
separate the n optimization problems, therefore removing the n-exponent in the
time complexity dependence on the size of Si and enabling numeric calculations.
Classic examples would be the valuation of American options (as limiting case
of the Bermudan option) or options on trading gains.
2.6 Discussion
To illustrate how our results can be applied and to round up the discussion
initiated in section 2.1, we will interpret two common approaches to the pricing
of American options within our framework.
One approach lies in the derivation of an optimal stopping problem from
economically justifiable principles. For example, Karatzas (1988) defines the
price of an American option as the minimal initial capital required to set up a
portfolio never worth less than the exercise value, g•, and then shows that it is
given by
sup
τ∈S

[
gτ
]
, where S denotes the set of stopping times. (2.8)
Despite its advantages, this approach still suffers from the same problem of a
very indirect treatment of the decision. The American exercise feature is deeply
intermingledwith the pricingmodel and thus thismethod of handling decisions
in an option contract is neither extensible nor transferable to other problems.
These shortcomings are overcome in our framework. In the most straight-
forward formulation the decision of the holder lies in choosing the (stochastic)
exercise time and the option’s payoff is given by f : ϕ 7→ gϕ0 . For an infinitely
risk averse agent that uses conservative acceptance and is continuously hedging
in an arbitrage free market, Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 yield eq. (2.8).2 This modular
approach provides the flexibility to experiment with different acceptance mech-
anism and other than the arbitrage-free pricing functions, like e.g. good-deal
bounds.
Another popular approach is based on dynamic programming. Early, note-
worthy contributions were Chen (1970) or the binomial method from Cox et al.
(1979). The American exercise feature is approximated by a finite number of
exercise dates. Following an ad-hoc argument, the price at each decision is
defined as the maximum of the exercise and continuation value, which in turn
2While the theorem gives an infimum, following our sign conventions in subsections 2.2.2
and 2.3.2, the price for the writer is given by the negative price of − f , and thus by the infimum-
supremum duality equals the supremum.
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depends on the price at the next decision. This approach bears no resemblance
to the above approach and it does not answer the question as to why it gives
the right answer either.
This can be directly translated into our framework by setting Dt  {1, 0},
where 1 stands for “exercise” and 0 for “do not exercise”. The payoff then takes
the form f : ϕ 7→ gmin{ t |ϕt1} and the dynamic programming problem follows
directly from Theorem 2.7. In addition to conservative acceptance, it requires
the pricing function pi0 to be time consistent, a crucial but not usually explicitly
mentioned property.
The same result can be derived from our formulation of the first approach.
The bĳection between stopping times ϕ0 that take only finitely many values
and the set of discrete-time adapted processes taking values in {0, 1}, leads to
the above formulation and makes the relationship and compatibility of the two
approaches obvious.
2.7 Conclusion
In this article we close the argumentative gap between pricing theories for
classical payoffs and a theory for options with decisions.
This is accomplished in two steps. The first step lies in the derivation of a
duality between between cash invariant pricing functions and so called proper
acceptance. Proper acceptance sets unite some meaningful properties, but are
more general than coherent or convex acceptance sets. This duality effectively
shows that acceptance sets and pricing functions contain the same information.
In the second step, it allows us to solve the problem of pricing options with
decisions. As acceptance sets are best suited tomodel agent behavior, we provide
a characterization of acceptance of options with decisions corresponding to
what is implicitly performed in the option pricing literature, and which we
call conservative acceptance. Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 2.7 then translate these
acceptance sets via the duality into pricing functions for options with decisions.
Conservative acceptance, however, fails to capture more complex real world
situations. For example, alignment of interests between agent and counterparty
(as in Example 2.1) demands a different kind of acceptance. Our contribution
consists of a concise framework and a precise characterization of the status
quo, i.e. conservative acceptance, implicitly assumed in today’s pricing theories.
Our aim is to enable further research and the development of non-conservative
pricing theories.
As demonstrated in the previous section, our results enable a consistent and
modular treatment of the decisionswithin option contracts. Instead of constantly
reinventing the wheel, it suffices to motivate how options with decisions are
accepted and then use the duality and our formalism to determine the price.
This minimizes the argumentative burden and provides a basis to investigate
new ways of treating decisions. Furthermore, the modular nature ensures that
different approaches can be transferred to a wide variety of pricing methods
and models.
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One underdeveloped area that will significantly benefit from these methods
is the pricing and hedging of options with complex decisions for both holder and
writer. In this area, in which existing approaches fail, our framework proves
most fruitful and can be used to generate new insights. Gerer and Dorfleitner
(2016a) apply our results to the problem of pricing and realistically hedging
American options featuring a complex interplay between exercise and hedging
decisions. Based on the results provided in this article, they provide the optimal
solution to the full problem, which is—to our knowledge—the first of its kind.
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OPTIMAL DISCRETE HEDGING OF
AMERICAN OPTIONS
USING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO OPTIONS
WITH COMPLEX EMBEDDED DECISIONS
(Joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner. Accepted for publication in Review of
Derivatives Research subject to minor revisions.)
v Abstract V
In order to solve the problem of optimal discrete hedging of American
options, this paper utilizes an integrated approach in which the writer’s
decisions (including hedging decisions) and the holder’s decisions are
treated on equal footing. From basic principles expressed in the language
of acceptance sets we derive a general pricing and hedging formula and
apply it to American options. The result combines the important aspects
of the problem into one price. It finds the optimal compromise between
risk reduction and transaction costs, i.e. optimally placed rebalancing
times. Moreover, it accounts for the interplay between the early exercise
and hedging decisions.
We then perform a numerical calculation to compare the price of an
agent who has exponential preferences and uses our method of optimal
hedging against a delta hedger. The results show that the optimal hedging
strategy is influenced by the early exercise boundary and that the worst
case holder behavior for a sub-optimal hedger significantly deviates from
the classical Black-Scholes exercise boundary.
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3.1 Introduction
Whenever an option writer hedges an option, their net payoff is given by the
option’s premiumminus the tracking error of the hedging activity. For European
options and in a completemarket, there is one hedging strategy that will turn the
random future tracking error into a constant known at inception, rendering the
pricing problem trivial. In reality, markets are neither complete nor friction-less
and there are options and other claims whose payoff can be modified by the
holder. Thus, in practice, the tracking error is random and can depend on a
time-continuum of decisions by both the writer (deciding whether to change
the current hedging position) and the holder (e.g. in the case of the American
option, deciding whether to exercise or not).
While both aspects enjoy extensive treatment in scientific publications, most
contributions only look at one aspect in isolation from the other, i.e. they focus
either on realistic (discrete) hedging or on exercise features. The common ad-hoc
approach to decisions embedded in option contracts is stretched over its limit,
when applied to a complex combination of decisions by both counterparties.
This issue concerns, among other fields, the literature on the realistic hedging
of American options, which despite its practical relevance comprises only a
handful of contributions. These contributions provide important groundwork,
and satisfy many requirements that are in our view desirable for a solution of
the problem. This paper’s aim is to improve on existing work by combining all
these requirements. Table 3.1 contains the requirements numbered from one
to eight in the column headers and provides an overview of the requirements
satisfied by each contribution.
Due to the limited number of contributions we also include two notable,
newer contributions on optimal hedging of European options, that therefore
violate requirement 1.
Contributions failing the second requirement assume some externally given
exercise strategy of the holder. As an example take Constantinides and Za-
riphopoulou (2001), who state that “[the holder’s exercise time is given by some
predetermined stopping time τ, which] may be the optimal exercise time [...] in
the absence of transaction costs”, or Coleman et al. (2007) claiming that “[t]he
holder will choose an exercise strategy to maximize the option value to him;
hedging decisions of the writer are irrelevant to his exercise decision.” This
view neglects the existence of a possible exercise strategy of the holder which is
more expensive to hedge and which would thus lead to too low selling prices
and insufficient insurance against all possible holder behaviors.
The third requirement is violated if rehedging times are somehow restricted
by an external mechanism e.g. by a predetermined number of hedges, or if
rebalancing is only allowed after some risk measure exceeds a certain threshold
(e.g. as in Ahn and Wilmott 2009). Such a restriction is always sub-optimal,
because it ignores the fact that at any given point of time, rebalancing is optimal
if and only if the reduction in risk does outweigh the cost associated with
rebalancing. This kind of sub-optimality implies unrealistic behavior: if a
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Chalasani and Jha (2001) 3 3 3 3 3
Bouchard and Temam (2005) 3 3 3 3 3
Tokarz and Zastawniak (2006) 3 3 3 3 3
Coleman et al. (2007) 3 3
De Vallière et al. (2008) 3 3 3 3 3
Roux and Zastawniak (2009) 3 3 3 3 3
Roux and Zastawniak (2014) 3 3 3 3 3
Roux and Zastawniak (2016) 3 3 3 3 3
Constantinides and
Zariphopoulou (2001)
3 3 3 3 3 3
Constantinides and Perrakis
(2007)
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 n.a.
Bayraktar et al. (2015) 3 3 3 3
Ahn and Wilmott (2009) n.a. 3
Gobet and Landon (2014) n.a. 3 3
Table 3.1: Requirements satisfied by relevant contributions
trade leads to a more favorable hedging position now, why should any past
consideration stop the hedger from executing it?
These considerations also originate the need to include transaction costs
(requirement 4)—be it traditional transaction fees, spreads or opportunity costs.
Without transaction costs, the optimal hedging strategy always consists of quasi-
continuous rebalancing, i.e. rebalancing to the optimal hedging position as fast
as practically possible, which is simply unrealistic.
As mentioned above, deriving an optimal hedging strategy means weighing
risk against transaction costs (requirement 5).
Requirement 6 might seem superfluous as it could be argued that the deriva-
tion of a super-hedging price actually satisfies requirement 5. However, the
underlying risk-measure is too risk-averse to be realistic. Option writers do
accept the risk of hedging losses, hence requirement 6.
Requirement 7 demands the remaining risk and transaction costs to actually
contribute to the final option price. This requirement is for example missed by
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Gobet and Landon (2014). They minimize the product of the number of hedges
and the quadratic variance of the hedging error, two quantities undoubtedly
influencing the bottom line of a real-world hedging activity. However, their
combination into a product is completely arbitrary and does not translate into a
consistent option price, for there will always exist hedging strategies that do
not optimize the above product and still lead to a lower selling price.
Time consistency (requirement 8), which is neglected in many contribu-
tions, is an important property, especially in the context of pricing options with
complex decisions. Results obtained by time-inconsistent methods will either
assume sub-optimal future choices or do not give the optimal solution from
today’s perspective (see Gerer and Dorfleitner 2016b, for more details on the
relation of decisions and time consistency in option pricing).
The article of Constantinides and Perrakis (2007) actually satisfies nearly all
of our requirements, yet their contribution consists of the derivation of stochastic
bounds on option prices for utility maximizing agents and thus has a different
focus.
The isolated treatment of the two decisions by the holder and the writer com-
pletely ignores one of the core aspects of realistically hedged options, namely
their interplay. Questions about the possibility of a holder’s strategy that explic-
itly exploit e.g. a fixed number of hedges by the writer or makes the original
hedging strategy inhibitingly expensive due to transactions costs are not even
considered.
This paper solves the problem of realistically pricing and hedging an Amer-
ican option. It is based on the insight that a realistic hedging theory is always
a theory of hedging with transaction costs: it is not the physical impossibil-
ity of continuous trading that needs to be addressed. With today’s trend to
sub-millisecond order execution, continuous hedging could be approximated
sufficiently if there were no transaction costs. Instead, we allow continuous
trading (in the limit), but acknowledge that there is some kind of cost associated
with each trade. This cost is weighed against the remaining hedging risk. Ex-
pressing both risk and transaction costs monetarily, gives rise to an optimization
problem whose solution is a finite number of optimally placed hedging trades
and a consistent option price.
Our approach is motivated by the understanding of a “price” as an intrinsi-
cally one-dimensional quantity, which does not leave much conceptual freedom.
The results from Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b) imply, that under mild assump-
tions, the decisions can be formally eliminated from the problem in a consequent
manner without the need to resort to external concepts and without any fur-
ther motivating argument. Our analysis differs from others in that we seek to
calculate the agent’s indifference or reservation price in an uncompromising
fashion.
In section 3.2, we summarize the formalism and results from Gerer and
Dorfleitner (ibid.) used in this paper. In section 3.3, a general duality between
pricing functions and acceptance sets for payoffs with decisions is applied to
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derive a general pricing and hedging principle for options with decision by
both parties. Section 3.4 specializes this principle to a formula for American
options, which is then numerically solved in section 3.5. Conclusions are given
in section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical fundament
The theory is formulated from the perspective of a singlemarket participant, that
we will refer to as agent, engaging in financial activities and entering contracts
with other agents, collectively called her counterparty.
All possible evolutions of the world, their physical probabilities and the
time-dependence of information are described by a filtered probability space
(Ω, F, {Ft}t∈T ,), where all points of time are given by the totally ordered set
T .
Let LGt represent all Ft-measurable random variables into the set G ⊆ R.
We will use the abbreviations Lt ≡ L〈−∞,∞〉t , L−t ≡ L[−∞,∞〉t , L+t ≡ L〈−∞,∞]t and
L±t ≡ L[−∞,∞]t , and employ the convention∞−∞  ∞ on R.
We assumedecisions happen at predetermined times,Td ⊆ T . Aswewill see
later, this does not prevent us from describing more complex decision for which
the point of time can also be chosen by the agent, like options with American
exercise. At each point of time t ∈ Td there can be exactly one decision by
either the agent or the counterparty. This poses no limitation, as instantaneous
decisions by the same agent can be merged into a tuple of decisions and it
ensures that there is always a well-defined order between decisions by different
agents, even if the physical time between them can be infinitesimally short.
Decisions to be made by the agent happen at times Ta and decisions by the
counterparty at times Tc ≡ Td \ Ta .
The decision behavior of the agents will be modeled by decision procedures,
describing how the choices for a subset of decisions depend on the world state.
The set of decision procedures for decisions at times T ⊆ Td is abbreviated by
ΦT and defined as the set of stochastic processes whose values at time t are
elements of Dt :
ΦT ≡
{
ϕ : T ×Ω→
⋃
t∈T
Dt
 ϕt : Ω→ Dt , for all t ∈ T
}
(3.1)
Dt contains all possible choices at time t. We will use the abbreviation Φ ≡ ΦTd .
The payoff of an option with embedded decisions is described by specifying
the cumulative discounted cash-flow to be received by the agent for any possible
combination of choices and world states:
Definition 3.1 (Payoffs). Define XtT as the set of Ft-measurable payoffs that only
depend on decisions made at times T ⊆ T :
XtT ≡
{
f : Φ → L±t
 f (ψ) B f (ϕ), if B ∈ Ft and ψt B ϕt for all t ∈ T ∩ Td}
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Putting a set B ∈ F∞ above a comparison operator means conditionally almost
surely equal: x B y ⇔ ({x  y}B)  1, with {x  y} ≡ {ω ∈ Ω  x(ω)  y(ω)}.
We will use the abbreviations XT ≡ X∞T and X ≡ XT .
Remark 3.1. If a random variable x ∈ L±∞ is used in the context of payoffs, it is
understood as the corresponding constant payoff given by ψ 7→ x, which is an
element of XØ, and vice versa.
If not stated differently, all operators, relations and also suprema/infima
used on payoffs are the pointwise versions of their L±∞, -almost sure, variants:
fRg ⇔ ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : f (ϕ) a.s.R g(ϕ)
Furthermore, we provide an operation to produce the effective payoff, that
results if an agent or counterparty follows a decision procedure for a certain
subset of decisions. These decisions can be considered fixed and the effective
payoff does not depend on them anymore:
Definition 3.2 (Effective payoff). For any payoff f ∈ X and decision procedure
ϕ ∈ ΦT define the effective payoff, f
[
ϕ
] ∈ XT\T by
f
[
ϕ
](ψ) ≡ f (ϕ1T + ψ1Td\T), for all ψ ∈ Φ.
The framework aims to provide the tools to build and analyze pricing theories
for options with decisions. This is achieved by providing a minimal characteri-
zation of acceptance sets and pricing functions, proving their equivalence, and
thus making these concepts usable interchangeably.
A t-acceptance set contains the agent’s acceptable opportunities at time t, i.e.
payoffs without decisions before time t that she accepts as zero-cost investments.
We require the following property to ensure that an acceptance set can serve as
modeling tool for pricing theories:
Definition 3.3 (Proper acceptance sets). A t-acceptance setA is called proper if it
is t-compatible (see below) andA  { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  { f + x  x ∈ Vt} ⊆ A}, where Vt
is the set of positive t-premiums Vt ≡
{
x ∈ L+t
 0 a.s.< x}.
Definition 3.4 (t-compatibility). A non empty set X of functions from some set G
into L±t is t-compatible, if for all {xn} ⊆ X and mutually disjoint {Bn} ⊆ Ft with
(⋃n Bn)  1 it holds ∑∞n xn1Bn ∈ X, where 1Bn is the indicator function of the set
G × Bn .
Remark 3.2. In this framework, the result of a pricing function is understood as
the highest premium the agent would accept to pay for entering the contract,
or her bid price. If a contract’s ask price is wanted, it can be calculated by the
negative of the bid price of the reversed contract.
A t-pricing function is any function pi : X[t ,∞〉 → L±t .
Remark 3.3. For a general option f ∈ X—possibly including decisions before t—
and a t-pricing function pi, we use pi
(
f
)
to denote ϕ 7→ pi
(
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ) , which
is a payoff in the sense of Definition 3.1.
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For pricing functions, the property corresponding to properness is cash
invariance.
Definition 3.5 (Cash invariance). A t-pricing function pi is called cash invariant
if for any payoff f ∈ X and payoff g ∈ Xt〈−∞,t〉 with no present or future decision and
g > −∞, it holds pi ( f + g)  pi ( f ) + g.
We will also use the term normalized pricing function:
Definition 3.6 (Normalized pricing function). A pricing function pi is called nor-
malized, if pi(0)  0. Every pricing function pi with |pi(0)| < ∞ has a normalized
version x 7→ pi(x) − pi(0).
As proved in Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b, Theorem 3.1) there exists a one-
to-one correspondence between the set of cash invariant t-pricing functions
and the set of proper t-acceptance sets. The duality operations are given in the
following definition and correctly replicate the description of pricing functions
in Remark 3.2:
Definition 3.7 (Duality operations). For any t-acceptance setA define its dual t-
pricing function P[A] by P[A]( f ) ≡ sup{x ∈ L−t  f − x ∈ A} for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉.
(The sup operator denotes the essential supremum.)
For any t-pricing function pi define its dual t-acceptance set A[pi] ≡{
f ∈ X[t ,∞〉
 0 ≤ pi ( f )}.
This duality enables us to develop our pricing theory for options with deci-
sions in terms of themore directly accessible language of acceptance. Specifically,
we will use conservative acceptance, which is employed implicitly in most of the
option pricing literature. For a given t-acceptance setA and a set of admissible
decision procedures S,A∀S andA∃S represent the conservative acceptance sets
for decisions by the counterparty or the agent, respectively. A∀S includes an option
if and only if for every possible decision procedure by the counterparty the
resulting effective option is acceptable:
A∀S ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  ∀ϕ ∈ S : f [ϕ] ∈ A} (3.2)
It is important to understand, that this presumes nothing about the counter-
party’s actual behavior. For her own decisions,A∃S contains an option if and
only if there always is at least one decision procedure the agent could follow to
make the effective option almost acceptable, as indicated by the +x:1
A∃S ≡ { f ∈ X[t ,∞〉  ∀x ∈ Vt , ∃ϕ ∈ S : f [ϕ] + x ∈ A} (3.3)
In order to talk about acceptance sets and pricing functions at different times,
we introduce acceptance families as time indexed families of proper acceptance
1See Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b, Example 4.2) for why this definition needs a more compli-
cated form than eq. (3.2)
33
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
sets {At}t written as A• and pricing families, as time indexed families of cash
invariant pricing functions written as pi•.
An especially important property of such families is time consistency (re-
quirement 8 in Table 3.1). By Theorem B.3, the following definitions are equiva-
lent:
Definition 3.8 (Time consistency). A proper acceptance familyA• with a normalized
dual pi• is called time consistent if f ∈ At ⇐⇒ pis
(
f
) ∈ At , for all s ≥ t.
A normalized pricing family pi• is called time consistent if for all s ≥ t and f ∈ X:
pit
(
pis
(
f
) )
 pit
(
f
)
.
3.3 Optimal hedging—the general formula
Wewill treat the hedging activity as decisions within our theory of options with
decisions. Between rehedges there can be further decisions for both the agent
and its counterparty.
This approach will produce the pricing function for the hedging agent as
well as the optimal hedging ratios, i.e. optimally placed rehedgings, without the
need to formulate an exogenous optimization problem. Instead these results
are direct consequences of the construction and imposed properties of the
acceptance set and their relation to pricing functions.
We impose no practical limitation on the number of rehedgings the agent
can perform. For formal reasons, we approximate the set of hedging decisions
using a finite, increasing sequence (τi)i≤n , where the hedging position is closed
on the last date τn .
Remark 3.4. While this introduces a dependency of the results on the particular
choice of this sequence, the time intervals can bemade smaller than any physical
time scale of our world and thus its practical influence eliminated. Numerical
calculations typically will be feasible only for much larger intervals.
The actual number of performed rehedgings will usually be smaller than n,
as at each time τi the agent can decide not to rebalance her hedging portfolio.
The discounted price processes of the assets available for hedging are mod-
eled by an N-dimensional adapted process X  (Xt)t with finite components.
A hedging decision consists of choosing the amount of shares to hold from each
asset, which we will model using N-dimensional vectors, i.e. Dτi ⊆ RN for all
i ≤ n.
Given a decision procedure ϕ ∈ Φ, the future cash-flow of a hedging activity
started with an initial position ϕτi−1 at a time t ∈ (τi−1 , τi] is given by
Ht(ϕ) ≡
n+1∑
j≥i
ϕτ j−1 ·
(
Xτ j − Xmax{τ j−1 ,t}
)
− C j(ϕ). (3.4)
The·marks scalar product between twovectors. Thefirst term calculates the gains
from market price movements, and C j(ϕ) stands for the finite, Fτ j -measurable
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transaction costs associated with changing the portfolio from ϕτ j−1 to ϕτ j at
time τ j . Cn+1 corresponds to the special case of liquidating the last position ϕτn
at τn+1. It is easy to see that Ht depends on decisions at time τi−1 and later, i.e.
Ht ∈ X{τ j}ni−1 .
In order to derive the general pricing function of the hedging agent for
options with decisions, we employ the method of Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b,
subsection 4.3) to derive the super-replication price for continuous trading.
We start with the agent’s internal acceptance family, A•, containing payoffs or
zero-cost investments she accepts “as is”, i.e. payoffs that cannot be modified
by her beyond the decisions contained in the payoff, especially not be hedged
against. A• needs to capture the agent’s risk aversion, business model and
regulatory requirements. In this section we treat it as given, for it is completely
independent from the aspect of hedging; a separation of concerns made possible
by the development of the proposed framework.
Next, this acceptance family is transformed into the agent’s external acceptance
family, B•, by subtraction of any modifications, which are not part of the original
contract specifications. In the current setting thismeans subtracting the proceeds
of her hedging activity:
Bt(ϕ) ≡
{
f
 f + Ht [ϕ〈−∞,t〉] ∈ At} (3.5)
Bt depends on the decision procedure ϕ, because Ht depends on past
decisions, more specifically on the most recent hedging decision. Making this
dependency explicit ensures, that Bt(ϕ) itself contains only options with no
past decisions.
Equation (3.5) can also be read in the following way: The agent accepts a
contract with another party, if and only if, she internally accepts the contract’s
payoff plus the result of her hedging activity.
Through the duality we know that these acceptance sets uniquely define
the hedging agent’s prices – denoted by η•, which can be calculated using the
duality operation from Definition 3.7:
ηt
(
f
)(ϕ) ≡ P[Bt(ϕ)]( f )(ϕ) (3.6)
for any option with decisions f ∈ X and decision procedure ϕ ∈ Φ.
Of course, η• can also be expressed usingA•’s dual pricing family pi•  P[A•]:
Lemma 3.1. ηt
(
f
)
 pit
(
f + Ht
)
for all t and f ∈ X.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1. 
This is in agreement with the expected result that the price of an option is
given by the internal price of the hedged option.
Remark 3.5 (Normalization). The above construction of η• will in general not
yield normalized pricing functions, i.e. the price of the zero payoff is different
from zero: ηt(0)  pit(Ht) , 0. Depending on the specific nature ofA• and pi•,
it is possible that the agent assigns a positive net present value to the proceeds
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of the trading activity Hi , i.e. piτi (Hi) ≥ 0. This can happen for example, if
pit(Xs) > Xt (for s > t), i.e. buying or selling the market assets represents an
acceptable or even arbitrage opportunity.
If the market is arbitrage free, or the agent’s transaction costs destroy any
acceptable or arbitrage opportunity, then piτi
(
Hτi
)(ϕ) is zero, if ϕτi−1  0 and
even negative for ϕτi−1 , 0, due to the unavoidable costs for closing the current
position eventually.
Economically meaningful prices are obtained from the normalized version:
f 7→ ηt ( f ) − ηt(0)
This calibration ensures that the price of any sure payoff equals the payoff itself
(ηt
(
g
)
 g if g ∈ L+t , which follows from cash invariance), and it is plausible
with the two cases described above: If the agent would pay a positive amount
ηt(0) > 0 for the situation he already is in, normalization decreases all bid prices
by that amount, which could be interpreted as compensation for giving up
the current favorable position upon entering the new contract. In other words,
normalization erases the additional value ηt
(
f
)
assigns to the possibility of
trading in the market, which the agent can also do without f and whose value
is thus given by ηt(0).
For an initial unfavorable position ϕτi−1 , 0, ηt(0)
[
ϕ
]
would be a negative
number representing the negative of the cost associated with optimally closing
that position. In this case normalization would increase the agent’s naked bid
price ηt
(
f
)
, because entering and optimally hedging f would spare her the cost
of closing her current position. 
In addition to the hedging decisions, we explicitly add times for general
counterparty decisions, which will then be used for the early exercise decision in
the next section. Between any two hedging times τi and τi+1 there is a decision
of the counterparty located at si :
τi < si < τi+1
Furthermore, for each decision we need a set of admissible decision procedures,
denoted by Ri ⊆ Φ{τi} and Si ⊆ Φ{si} for all i ≤ n.
The general result needs the following axioms. The first assures that hedging
decision cannot see in the future. The additional requirement of t-compatibility
derives from the technical differences between conservative acceptance for the
agent and the counterparty (cf. Theorems B.1 and B.2):
Axiom 3.1. For all i ≤ n, Ri contains only Ft-adapted decision procedures and is τi-
compatible (cf. Definition 3.4).
The second axiom specifies how decisions are treated. We use conservative
acceptance (as defined in eqs. (3.2) and (3.3)) at the time of each particular
decision. This, together with time consistency, will be enough to eliminate all
future decisions from the pricing problem.
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Axiom 3.2 (Conservative acceptance). Aτi  A∃Riτi andAsi  A∀Sisi for all i ≤ n.
Feeding all this into our formalismyields the pricing formula for an optimally
hedged option:
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal hedging). Let aA• be a time consistent internal acceptance
family with a normalized dual pricing family pi• and assume Axioms 3.1 and 3.2. At the
end of the hedging activity, the price of an option f ∈ X can be calculated directly by
ητn+1
(
f
)
 piτn+1
(
f
) − Cn+1 , (3.7)
and earlier prices for i ≤ n can be calculated recursively:
ητi
(
f
)
 sup
ϕ∈Ri
piτi
(
inf
ψ∈Si
pisi
(
ητi+1
(
f
) [
ϕ
] [
ψ
]
+ ϕτi ·
(
Xτi+1 − Xτi
) ) ) − Ci [ϕ] (3.8)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2. 
For a hedging strategy a and decision procedure of the counterparty b, the
net payoff of the whole hedging activity is given by the difference of the realized
tracking error and the option’s upfront premium:
δ ≡ ( f + Ht)
[
a
] [
b
] − ηt ( f )
Conservative acceptance ensures, that for any decision procedure b and  ∈ Vt
there exists a hedging strategy a such that δ +  is acceptable.
3.4 Optimal hedging of American options
In this section we specialize the results from the previous section in order to
price and hedge an American option from the perspective of the writer. The
holder of an American option with discounted exercise value process g has the right
to exercise it at any time t prior or equal to the expiration date T and receive
the amount gt .
This exercise right gives rise to infinitely many decisions: At every instant
the holder can decide to exercise or not to exercise. To model these decision we
use the finite set of decision times {si} introduced in the last section, with sn ≡ T.
Following the reasoning from Remark 3.4 this implies no loss of generality. We
define
Dsi ≡ {1, 0}, where 1 stands for “exercise” and 0 for “do not exercise”, (3.9)
for all i. The payoff of an American option that has not been exercised before
time si is then for any ϕ ∈ Φ and ω ∈ Ω given by:
fi(ϕ) ≡ gt∗ with the stopping time t∗(ω)  min
{
t ∈ Ta
 t ≥ si ∧ ϕt(ω)  1}
(3.10)
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This definition shows the expected behavior, if the current decision is fixed
using a constant decision procedure:
fi
[
si 7→ 1
]
 gsi for exercise, and fi
[
si 7→ 0
]
 fi+1 for continuation. (3.11)
Basic theory of stochastic processes ascertains that f is measurable if g is pro-
gressively measurable and ϕ is adapted. And thus due to Corollary B.1 and
fi’s pointwise definition it is a payoff according to our Definition 3.1, or more
precisely fi ∈ X{s j}nji , as it only depends on decision at times {si , . . . , sn}.
While we restrict the admissible hedging procedures through Axiom 3.1
from the last section, the only restriction placed on exercise procedures is their
being adapted:
Si ≡ Φ{si} ∩
{
ϕ
 ϕ is adapted to F} , for all i. (3.12)
So far the optimizations in Theorem 3.1 have to be performed over random
variables making a direct numerical implementation infeasible. However, as
they are limited to “current time” decisions, they can be simplified. We give
sufficient (but not necessary) conditions under which the essential supremum
over the set of procedures can be simplified to a pointwise supremum directly
over the set of choices:
Lemma 3.2 (Countable present time decisions). If Dt or Ω is countable and S ≡
Φ{t} ∩
{
ϕ
 ϕ is adapted to F}, then for every cash invariant t-pricing function pi and
f ∈ X it holds:
sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
 sup
a∈Dt
pi
(
f
[
t 7→ a] )
Proof. See Appendix B.2.3. 
As the payoffs involved do not have any decisions besides the hedging and
exercise decisions, we can give a result that reduces the pricing problem to clas-
sical option pricing theory for options without decisions. To make this explicit
we will useA0• and pi0• to denote the restrictions ofA• and pi• to options without
decisions. Formally, we define A0• ≡ A• ∩ XØ and pi0•  P[A0• ]. Lemma B.1
proves the expected connection between pi0• and pi•.
Furthermore, we assume for all i that the agent’s hedging decision at τi+1
happens instantly after the exercise decision si . Formally, these two times
collapse for quantities that do not depend on the decision at si , i.e.
gsi  gτi+1 , and pisi ( f )  piτi+1( f ), if f ∈ X[τi+1 ,∞〉 . (3.13)
Now we can derive the main result:
Theorem 3.2. Given X, C,A•, {Ri} and η• as in Theorem 3.1, {Si}, f ,A0• and pi0• as
defined above, we define pi as the ask price (cf. Remark 3.2) at time τi of an optimally
hedged American option:
pi ≡ −ητi
(− fi ) , for all i ≤ n.
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The price after expiration is given by
pn+1  Cn+1 , (3.14)
and earlier prices for i ≤ n can be calculated recursively:
pi  inf
ϕ∈Ri
−pi0τi
(−max{gτi+1 − ητi+1(0), pi+1} [ϕ] + ϕτi · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) ) + Ci [ϕ]
(3.15)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.4. 
As expected, the writer chooses the most favorable hedge and it is most
expensive for her if the holder exercises as soon as the payoff exceeds the price
of the continued option.
The terms Cn+1 and −ητi (0)  −pi0τi (Hi) occurring above could be identified
with the cost of optimally closing the current hedging position. As already
discussed in Remark 3.5, they are non-negative in a market without acceptable
opportunity and thus add to the payment of gτi faced by the hedging option
writer upon exercise by the holder.
Their appearance is a consequence of the fact that η• is not normalized
(in general) and it can be trivially checked, that normalizing the result— i.e.
calculating pi + ητi (0)—would remove both terms, whilst introducing a similar
term in the continuation value. We did not state the normalized result, as it
would complicate the recursive calculations, which aremore naturally expressed
in unnormalized values.
3.5 Numerical demonstration
In this section we produce numerical results from Theorem 3.2. We will use
a simple market model consisting of a riskless money market account with
interest rate r and a single stockwhose discounted price processX• is a geometric
Brownianmotion with drift µ > r and volatility σ. Besides analytical tractability
and intuitiveness, it reveals interesting features of the pricing and hedging
problem. It should be noted that our hedging formula can be applied to any
model for the price process X.
We are pricing an American put with strike K, i.e. a payoff f as defined in
eq. (3.10) with discounted exercise value written as gt(Xt)  Xt − Ke−rt .
The transaction costs consist of a fixed component k0 and a component
proportional to the transaction value (with factor k1). Its discounted value is
calculated as follows:
Ci(ϕ) ≡ ci(ϕτi − ϕτi−1 ,Xτi )with ci(q , x)  e−rτi k0 1q,0 + k1x |q | (3.16)
3.5.1 Selecting a pricing function
Before we can actually implement a numerical program, we need to devise the
agent’s internal pricing family for options without decisions, pi0•
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Let us first state the requirements to be met by pi0• . There is, of course cash
invariance (requirement I), the basic property imposed by our formalism, and
time consistency (requirement II) upon which the results of the previous section
rely.
In addition to these two requirements concerning pi0• directly, we place three
further restrictions on the resulting external pricing family η• (cf. Lemma 3.1). To
ensure consistencywith existing resultswe require thatwithout transaction costs
and in the limit of infinitely many hedging times the well-known arbitrage-free
prices, i.e. risk-neutral expectation values, are obtained for continuously replicable
payoffs (requirement III).
As noted in Remark 3.5, η• is not normalized. Thus, ηt(0)  pit(Ht) can be
negative due to transaction costs for closing the current position or positive, if
trading in the market constitutes an acceptable opportunity for the agent. While
these effects can be handled satisfactory by normalizing the result, normalization
is only meaningful if |ηt(0)| < ∞, or informally stated, if the agent cannot extract
infinite wealth from his trading activity (requirement IV).
Besides these theoretical requirements, for the purpose of this demonstration
we need readily implementable, numerical algorithms (requirement V).
To satisfy requirement V we exclude all pricing functions or risk-measures
whose calculation relies onMonte Carlo methods. We are aware of the existence
of Monte Carlo methods suitable for American options, but extending and
implementing them for our problem—while deemed possible—would go
beyond the scope of this paper. This excludes all candidates containing the value-
at-risk and its variants or derivatives like the expected shortfall or conditional
value-at-risk, most of which also violate requirement II, time consistency (cf.
Cheridito and Stadje 2009).
We use
pi0t
(
f
) ≡ −1
γ
ln
(

[
e−γ f
Ft ] ) , (3.17)
for some positive degree of risk aversion γ. This function is the indifference
price of the exponential utility function, also known as the negative of the
conditional entropic risk measure and has gained much attention in the field of
utility indifference pricing, among others.
For the remainder of this paper we use the pricing family η• as defined in
eq. (3.6) for an acceptance familyA• satisfying Axiom 3.2 andA• ∩XØ  A
[
pi0
]
with pi0• as defined above in eq. (3.17). We also define the normalized pricing
family η
•
:
ηt
(
f
) ≡ ηt ( f ) − ηt(0), for all f ∈ X
It is well-known (see e.g. Cheridito and Kupper 2009, eq. 3.3) that pi0• is cash
invariant (requirement I) and time consistent (requirement II). It also satisfies
requirement V, because PDE discretization methods for the calculation of condi-
tional expectations are widely-used and can be applied directly to solve eq. (3.15)
from Theorem 3.2.
We do not present a formal proof of requirement III for η
•
, but instead
point out two supporting facts. First, for continuous trading strategies without
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transaction costs it has been shown that η
•
yields the risk-neutral expectation
value (cf. Davis et al. 1993, Theorem 1, or for amore recent presentation Becherer
2003, eq. 3.8, who calls this elementary no-arbitrage consistency). Secondly, we
confirmed by numerical calculations thatmaking the time between two rehedges
short enough will result in prices sufficiently close to the Black-Scholes price
and optimal strategies coinciding with the Black-Scholes delta.
Again without a formal proof, requirement IV follows from another well-
known result (see e.g. Henderson and Hobson 2002b, eq. 2): In the case of
continuous trading without transaction costs, it holds that ηt(0) < ∞ and the
optimal strategy is given by:
Zt(Xt) ≡ µ − r
γσ2Xt
(3.18)
Due to the monotonicity of the supremum in Theorem 3.1 and the monotonicity
of pi0, restricting to discrete strategies and introducing transaction costs results
in even smaller prices.
3.5.2 Translating Theorem 3.2 into a computational procedure
In order to perform the hedging optimization numerically we only consider a
finite number of different hedging positions, i.e. Dτi finite for all i ≤ n. Then
Lemma 3.2 and the Markov property of X• enable us to write Theorem 3.2
in a form suitable for numerical calculation. Using the ordinary functions
zi(h ,Xτi ) ≡ −ητi (0)
[
τi−1 7→ h
]
for the price of the zero claim and
vi(h ,Xτi ) ≡ max
{
gτi (Xτi ) + zi(h ,Xτi ),−ητi
(− fi ) [τi−1 7→ h]}
for the price of the optimally hedgedoption, bothwith a current hedgingposition
h, we get:
vn+1(h , x) max
{
gτn+1(x), 0
}
+ cn+1(h , x)
zn+1(h , x) cn+1(h , x)
Conti(h , x , b , q) ≡ 1γ ln t
[
eγ(bi+1(q ,Xτi+1 )−qXτi+1)
Xτi  x] + q x + ci(h − q , x)
q∗τi (h , x) ≡ argminq∈Dτi
Conti(h , x , v , q) (3.19)
vi(h , x) max
{
gτi (x) + zi(h , x),Conti(h , x , v , q∗(h , x))
}
(3.20)
zi(h , x)  min
q∈Dτi
Conti(h , x , z , q)
We are going to compare the price obtained under the optimal hedging
strategy q∗ with classical delta hedging. Let d represent the ask price of an agent
who rebalances daily to the optimal continuous, zero-transaction costs strategy
given by the sum of the option’s Black-Scholes delta, ∆t(x)  ∂∂xBSt(x), and the
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utility optimizing strategy from eq. (3.18), Zt(x):
dn+1(h , x)  vn+1(h , x) (3.21)
di(h , x)  max
{
gτi (x) + zi(h , x),Conti(h , x , d ,∆bτic(x) + Zbτic(x))
}
bτic rounds down τi to the beginning of the most recent day.
Our numerical program written in C++ is a direct translation of the above
equations. The conditional expectations are calculated using a finite difference
method with optimal spatial finite difference weights à la Ito and Toivanen
(2009) and Crank-Nicolson time-stepping with Rannacher startup (Giles and
Carter 2006; Rannacher 1984). The expectation values in Conti(h , x , b , q) are
calculated for all pairs (b , q) ∈ {v , z , d} × Dτi in parallel, achieving quasi-linear
speedup on multi-core CPUs.
We will write normalized prices as v ≡ v − z and d ≡ d − z.
3.5.3 Numerical results
We now present the results of the calculation using the following specifications.
The American put has a strike price K  100, volatility σ  50% p.a., drift
µ  10% p.a., risk-free rate r  5% p.a., where one year consists of 252 business
days. We assume very moderate transaction costs, with a fixed component of
k0  0.001 and proportional component of k1  0.025%. The writer’s coefficient
of constant absolute risk aversion is γ  0.001.
We use 8 hedging and exercise decision times per day, i.e. τi+1 − τi  1/8 day.
There are 150 allowed hedging positions, Dτi  {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 5} with δ  5/149 ≈
0.0336. Using a higher numbers of daily decisions and possible hedging posi-
tions does not significantly change the calculated values.
The results comprise three aspects: the writer behavior, the holder behavior
and the option price.
The writer’s optimal hedging position is given by q∗t(x , h) from eq. (3.19)
and depends on current stock price x and hedging position h. Figure 3.1 plots
two examples for fixed values of h. Instantly after rebalancing to this optimal
position, h′ ≡ q∗t(x , h), the current stock price x will lie in one of possibly several
plateaus where x 7→ q∗t(x , h′) is constant with value h′. As soon as the stock
price leaves this plateau, it is again optimal to rebalance.
The information contained in q∗t canbe completelydescribedby two corridors,
the no-trading and the rebalancing corridor. They are depicted in Figure 3.2
for two different times t and have the following interpretation: it is optimal to
rebalance to the nearest point of the rebalancing corridor, but only if the stock
price leaves the no-trading corridor. The spikes visible in Figure 3.2 in both
corridors occur in the vicinity of the optimal exercise boundary of the holder.
An effect, of course only revealed by solving the full optimization problem.
Based on experiments with different values of k0 and k1, we make the follow-
ing numerical observations. The rebalancing corridor is always fully contained
within the no-trading corridor, its width is monotonically increasing in k1, the
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proportional component of the transaction costs, and it collapses for k1  0. The
space between the two corridors exhibits an analogous relationship with k0, the
fixed component. The delta hedging position lies within the no-trading corridor
and for stock prices above the exercise boundary also within the rebalancing
corridor. Without transaction costs both corridors collapse to the delta hedging
strategy.
The exercise behavior of the holder is characterized by the exercise bound-
ary, which separates the continuation regions from the their complement, the
exercise regions. With conservative acceptance the writer is insured against the
worst possible or pessimal exercise strategy. The corresponding continuation
regions consist of states where the maximum in eq. (3.20) or eq. (3.21) equals
the continuation value.
Figure 3.3 shows the holder’s pessimal exercise boundaries against different
writers. Against the optimal hedger the continuation region is only slightly
larger than in the Black-Scholes case. The most striking finding is that the holder
could in fact harm the delta hedger. The boundary against the delta hedger
clearly exhibits a daily recurring pattern lining up with her daily rebalancings.
As expected, the continuation region is much larger than in the optimal case,
which can be explained by the fact that continuing the claim means more
hedging costs for the (sub-optimal) delta hedger. This holds true as long as
the delta hedger actually rebalances and thus incurs transaction costs. If the
delta hedger’s current position equals the next delta hedging position, there are
no transactions costs and thus at these points (also marked in Figure 3.3) the
extended continuation region stops.
This shows that for a delta hedger the common assumption of a Black-
Scholes exercise boundary will result in an underestimation of risk caused by
the interplay of American exercise feature, discrete hedging and transaction
costs.
Holder and writer behavior are by-products of the main result: the price.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 provide two different perspectives on the put’s normalized
ask prices of an optimally hedging writer, v, and a delta hedging writer, d.
Figure 3.4 shows how the absolute difference v − d depends on the current
hedging position for fixed stock prices. As is expected, once it is optimal to
rebalance, the additional transaction costs of both optimal and delta hedging
will be equal, making the difference between the two independent of the current
hedging position.
For a fixed current hedging position and varying stock prices the difference
between both prices and the Black-Scholes price are reflected in Figure 3.5. It
also contains the relative price reduction to be achieved by optimal hedging,
calculated as d/v − 1.
Both figures demonstrate that the writer can always offer a more competitive
price or make a sure profit by optimal hedging instead of delta hedging. This
profit increases with decreasing moneyness. For example, 63 days before expi-
ration at a stock price of 145.3, the optimal-hedging price is v ≈ 0.787, which is
10.3% lower than the delta-hedging price.
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Last, reducing the risk aversion increases both the optimal-hedging and the
delta-hedging price. However, the effect on the delta-hedging price is weaker
and consequently, the profit from optimal hedging will be larger for a less risk-
averse agent. In the above example, if we change γ to γ/2  0.0005, v will be
17.3% lower than d.
3.6 Conclusion
Applying the methods of Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b) to the problem of
hedging options with decisions allows us to derive a general hedging principle
in a rigorous but straight forward manner, starting from a small set of clearly
stated assumptions. This principle is then further specialized to a formula for
realistically hedging American options; a formula that is not conjectured, but
formally derived and proved in non-preexisting fashion.
To demonstrate how to turn this completelymodel-independent formula into
actual numbers, we fix a market model, a pricing function and transaction costs
and perform numerical calculations. The results of these numerical experiments
show that when compared to the delta hedger, the optimal hedger can offer a
significantly better price or make a sure profit. Further, they reveal that indeed
there is a complex interaction between hedging decisions and the early exercise
decisions.
In addition to the conceptual and theoretical advantages demonstrated by
our holistic approach to decisions embedded in option contracts, these results
prove the usefulness of our method in realistic applications.
We leave it to further research to apply our methods more realistic models
than the above example and to overcome the challenge of a numerical imple-
mentation of our results for these models.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal hedging position at time t  T − 11 days, q∗t(x , h), for different
stock prices x and two different current positions h. It is optimal not to
rebalance if the stock prices stay in regions with q∗t(x , h)  h.
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Figure 3.2: The two graphs consolidate the optimal hedging behavior at two different
times. Only when the stock price leaves the no-trading corridor, it is optimal
to rebalance. The new optimal position is then given by the nearest point
of the rebalancing corridor. For comparison the delta hedging strategy,
∆t(x) + Zt(x), is also shown.
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4
A NOTE ON UTILITY INDIFFERENCE
PRICING
(Joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner. Electronic version of an article published in
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 19(6), 2016, p.
1650037, doi:10.1142/S0219024916500370 ©World Scientific Publishing Com-
pany. http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/ijtaf .)
v Abstract V
Utility-based valuation methods are enjoying growing popularity among
researchers as a means to overcome the challenges in contingent claim
pricing posed by the many sources of market incompleteness. However,
we show that under the most common utility functions (including CARA
and CRRA), any realistic and actually practicable hedging strategy in-
volving a possible short position has infinitely negative utility. We then
demonstrate for utility indifference prices (and also for the related so-called
utility-based (marginal) prices) how this problem leads to a severe divergence
between results obtained under the assumption of continuous trading
and realistic results. The combination of continuous trading and common
utility functions is thus not justified in these methods, raising the question
of whether and how results obtained under such assumptions could be
put to real-world use.
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4.1 Introduction
In recent years, utility indifference pricing, initially proposed by Hodges and
Neuberger (1989) and refined by Davis et al. (1993), has gained much attention
in the literature on pricing and hedging contingent claims (see Henderson and
Hobson (2009) for a survey). Utility indifference pricing employs the tools of
continuous time finance, combining the ideas of Black and Scholes (1973) and
utility theory. However, as we will demonstrate, the assumptions used by many
contributions miss an important step in the link between the idealistic model
and reality. Their results cannot be applied practically and it is unclear what
insight they could provide for practical problems.
There are several sub-strands of literature which are affected by our findings,
namely indifference pricing and hedging in incomplete markets in general,
including Barrieu and El Karoui (2009), Biagini and Frittelli (2005), Collin-
Dufresne and Hugonnier (2007, 2013), Duffie et al. (1997), Frei and Schweizer
(2010), Grasselli and Hurd (2007), Henderson and Hobson (2011), Henderson
et al. (2014), Hu et al. (2005), Kramkov and Sîrbu (2006), Malamud et al. (2013),
Mania and Schweizer (2005),Musiela andZariphopoulou (2004a,b), Rheinländer
and Steiger (2010), and Svensson andWerner (1993), and the dualitymethods for
the underlying optimization problem, including Becherer (2004), Delbaen et al.
(2002), Frittelli (2000a,b), İlhan et al. (2005), İlhan and Sircar (2006), Kabanov
and Stricker (2002), Kallsen and Rheinländer (2011), Monoyios (2006), and
Rouge and El Karoui (2000). Also contributions on trading restrictions and
substitute hedging, like basis risk, basket/index options, and real options,
including Becherer (2003), Davis (2006), Frei and Schweizer (2008), Henderson
(2002, 2007), Henderson and Hobson (2002a,b), Karatzas and Kou (1996), and
Monoyios (2004b) are subject to our results, as well as studies on employee
stock options (Grasselli and Henderson 2009; Henderson 2005; Leung and Sircar
2009a,b; Rogers and Scheinkman 2007) and on transaction costs in derivatives
pricing (Barles and Soner 1998; Constantinides and Zariphopoulou 1999; Davis
et al. 1993; Davis and Yoshikawa 2015; Davis and Zariphopoulou 1995; Hodges
and Neuberger 1989; Mohamed 1994; Monoyios 2003, 2004a).
Inspired by indifference pricing, and likewise affected, are contributions
on so-called utility-based prices, also known as neutral or shadow prices, and
their marginal version. Contributions not already mentioned above include
Hugonnier et al. (2005), Kallsen andKühn (2004, 2006), Kramkov andHugonnier
(2004), and Owen and Žitković (2009).
The assumption of continuous trading allowed Black and Scholes (1973)
to derive a unique option price based on arbitrage arguments that make no
assumptions about the market participants’ preferences. This ground-breaking
idea was developed further towards the concept of a complete market, in which
any derivative can be perfectly replicated by continuously trading in the under-
lyings and thus uniquely priced by arbitrage arguments (see e.g. Delbaen and
Schachermayer 1994).
Of course, in practice the time between two hedges is finite. Let us assume
50
Chapter 4. A note on utility indifference pricing
that for a practicable trading strategy, this time cannot be shorter than some δ > 0.
The idealistic assumption of continuous trading is justified by the fact that
a continuous strategy H can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy through
practicable strategies Hδ with smaller and smaller δ. The proceeds of the self-
financing strategy H in a market with discounted price process S are given by
the stochastic integral H ·S , whose mere definition (see e.g. Bichteler 2002)
guarantees the existence of Hδ with Hδ ·S → H ·S as δ tends to zero. However,
stated differently, for very small values of δ the results do not depend on the
particular value of δ and its influence can be neglected. Therefore, working
in the limit δ → 0 is a justified means to achieving clearer and more general
results.
Another classical problem in quantitative finance is that of optimal intertem-
poral portfolio selection. What is optimal is determined by the investor’s prefer-
ences—even in complete markets—and is usually modelled using von Neu-
mann–Morgenstern utility. Following the same rationale as above, the assump-
tion of continuous trading is still very appealing and thus in widespread use
in the field initiated by Merton (1969, 1971)1, who pioneered in solving the
problem for continuous consumption and trading.
These two areas of research have long been considered as being quite distinct
from each other. However, in reality markets are not complete and the unique
price broadens into an entire range of arbitrage-free prices. It has been shown
in many cases, Davis and Clark (1994) and Soner et al. (1995) for proportional
transaction costs and Cvitanić et al. (1999) for unbounded stochastic volatility
that this range includes the trivial buy-and-hold strategy that dominates the
claim. These examples show that arbitrage-free pricing fails to explain the
substantially lower prices observed in options markets and a different pricing
methodology is needed.
Acknowledging that pricing of unhedgeable risk has to take the agent’s
preferences into account, Hodges and Neuberger (1989) proposed combining
the two above methods. After Davis et al. (1993) gave a rigorous treatment of
their idea, it slowly gathered traction and matured into what is known today as
(utility) indifference pricing and hedging. The agent following a hedging strategy
H assigns the expected utility
U(X;H) : [u(H ·S + X)]
to every final wealth X, where u is her utility function. Being able to choose
hedging strategies from a given set of admissible strategies H the highest
achievable utility is:
U(X;H) : sup
H∈H
U(X;H).
Most of our results do not depend on a specific definition of H . We will
indicate whenever a specific definition is required.
1See Merton (1973a) and Sethi and Taksar (1988) for errata.
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The indifference buy price p  p(X,W ;H) ∈ R for a claim X is defined such
that the hedging agent with initial random endowmentW is indifferent between
doing nothing and buying the claim for that price:
U(W + X − p;H)  U(W ;H). (4.1)
A number b ∈ R is in the set of utility-based prices, B(X,W ;H), if it is optimal
not to trade the claim at price b:
U(W ;H) ≥ U(W + q(X − b);H), for all q ∈ R. (4.2)
One typically looks at B(X, x + qX;H) with initial wealth x ∈ R and initial
quantity q ∈ R in the claim X. Elements of B(X, x;H) are called marginal prices
of X.
The contribution of this work is to raise and answer the question of whether
the assumption of continuous trading is still justified in this setting. As we will
argue in the next sections, the answer is no if u is exponential or u′ approaches
∞ at some finite wealth. This concerns, for example, large part of HARA utility
functions (including the logarithmic limiting case) and thus a vast amount of
published literature on the topic. The results raise doubts about the use of such
utility functions for indifference pricing and related fields in general.
In section 4.2 we show that the assumption fails in cases where the opti-
mal strategy includes shorting one or more assets. Interestingly, this is also
what differentiates Merton’s portfolio problem from indifference pricing: when
solving the problem of “lifetime portfolio selection”, negative excess returns or
negative equity risk premiums for risky assets would be considered implausible.
Thus, the optimal strategy is long. However, in indifference pricing the optimal
hedging strategy against a shorted put is short—in accordance with intuition
and other theories. Even though, both areas exhibit this problem on the formal
level, it only negatively impacts the practical relevance of the more recent theory
of indifference pricing.
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 use the example of a dynamically replicable claim to
demonstrate how indifference pricing and utility-based pricing, respectively, are
affected by the results in section 4.2. Section 4.5 discusses some failed resolutions
attempts and gives a first characterization of utility functions not suffering from
these difficulties. We conclude with section 4.6.
4.2 Failure of the continuous trading assumption
The discounted price process of the risky asset is given by S, a real valued semi-
martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, {Ft}t≥0 ,)with F0  {Ø,Ω}.
A trading strategy H is an element of L(S), the set of predictable S-integrable
processes. The self-financing result of H is given by the stochastic integral H ·S .
Payoffs of claims are modeled by F-measurable random variables. Comparison
operators on random variables are understood in the -almost sure sense. We
will need the set of practicable hedging strategies P, where rebalancing happens
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at a finite number of fixed times and positions have to be closed if the wealth at
the time of trade drops below a certain negative threshold.
Definition 4.1 (Practicable hedging strategies). A strategy H ∈ L(S) is in P, if
there exists an increasing finite sequence of fixed times {ti} ⊂ [0,∞) and an M ∈ R,
such that
H 
∑
i
hi 1(ti ,ti+1] ,
where for any i, hi is an Fti -measurable random variable, and
H ·S ti ≤ −M ⇒ hi  0 (4.3)
holds almost surely. (S tit : Smin(ti ,t) is the price process stopped at ti .)
By keeping in mind that the above definition includes strategies of several
billion possible trades per second, it is obvious that our definition of practicable
strategies is in no way a restriction of what is actually possible in practice.
It is also this concept of practicable strategies that is used in academic
publications and text books to motivate the definition and use of continuous-
time concepts.
Remark 4.1. We leave it to future research to extend the following arguments to
handle a more general definition of P, where trades happen at stopping times
and the minimal time between two trades is finite.
The restriction in eq. (4.3) was introduced to exclude so-called doubling or
martingale strategies. It is far less restrictive than margin requirements found
in practice which are constantly monitored and enforced and usually limit the
position size to a multiple of the available collateral.
Remark 4.2. Pricing theories, where continuous trading is allowed, exclude such
unwanted strategies by the definition of H , which usually requires H ·S t to
be bounded from below for all t. For practicable strategies, however, this is
too restrictive, as it would disallow any short position. Only the (unrealistic)
assumption of continuous trading makes it possible to limit the unbounded risk
of a short position.
Furthermore, we define the set S of practicable hedging strategies that
include a possible short position.
Definition 4.2. S  {H ∈ P | ∃ t : (Ht < 0) > 0}
For the rest of this section, we make the following assumption about the
utility function and market model which covers many common settings and is
enough to prove the failure without much effort.
Assumption 4.1. We assume the utility function, u : R → R, is a concave and
non-decreasing function. Furthermore, we assume one of the following cases:
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Case 1. (a) u(x)  −e−γx for some γ > 0 and
(b) the distribution of the stock price has heavy right tails, i.e.
lim
x→∞ e
λx(St > x |Fs)  ∞, for any λ > 0 and t > s .
Case 2. (a) u satisfies the Inada condition
lim
x↓B
u′(x)  ∞ for some B ∈ R
and (b) St − Ss is unbounded for any t > s > 0.
Remark 4.3 (Case 1). Condition (b) is even satisfied for log-normally distributed
St . As a consequence, practically all continuous-time models and models for
stock returns used in literature possess heavy tails in the sense of Case 1(b).
Empirical evidence suggests (Ibragimov et al. 2015) that the distributions
of the logarithms of returns are heavy tailed, a requirement going much further
than the above condition.
Remark 4.4 (Case 2). Utility functions covered by Case 2(a) include, among
others, all utility functions with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) and
exponent γ ∈ (−∞, 1):
u(x)  1
γ
((x − B)γ − 1). (4.4)
In the limit γ → 0, this also includes the logarithmic utility function u(x) 
ln(x − B). Setting B  0 yields utility functions with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), also called isoelastic utility functions.
All of these functions have domains D ⊆ [B,∞). We will use their unique
concave extensions given by u  −∞ on R\D. Without extension, the original
utility functions could not be used at all due to the possibility of unbounded
losses incurred by short positions in the underlying. Of course, such an extension
does not alter any pre-existing results.
The core of the problem is that under Assumption 4.1, any practicable
strategy with possible short positions has infinitely negative utility.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a payoff X, bounded from above, and a strategy H ∈ S. If
U(X;H)  [u(H ·S + X)] exists, then its value is −∞.
Proof. The expectation of a random variable Y taking values inR is defined (e.g.
byDoob1994, VI.4.) as[Y+]−[Y−], if one of these non-negative expectations is
finite, where Y± : max(±Y, 0). Thus, it suffices to show [u(H ·S + X)−]  ∞.
Without loss of generality, we assume the strategy is short on (0, τ], with
Hτ  −h for some real h > 0. Other cases can be handled by taking expectations
conditioned on the instant of time of opening the first short position.
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Now take an arbitrary real number x > M/h+S0 withM fromDefinition 4.1
and prove:
[u(H ·S + X)−] ≥  [1Sτ>x u(h(S0 − Sτ) + X)−]
≥  [1Sτ>x u(h(S0 − x) + supX)−]
 u
(
h(S0 − x) + supX)−(Sτ > x). (4.5)
The first inequality uses the fact that Y ≥ 1Sτ>x Y for any positive Y. Further-
more, it applies the restriction from eq. (4.3): If Sτ > x, thenH·S τ  h(S0−Sτ) <
−M and thus all hedging positions after τ are zero. The second inequality uses
the monotonicity of u− together with X ≤ supX and h(S0 − Sτ) < h(S0 − x), if
Sτ > x.
Taking the limit x →∞ of eq. (4.5) in Case 1 yields due to supX < ∞:
[u(H ·S + X)−] ≥ e−γ(hS0+supX) lim
x→∞ e
γhx(Sτ > x)  ∞.
InCase 2due to supX < ∞, we can choose an x such that h(S0−x)+supX < B
and thus u(h(S0 − x)+ supX)−  ∞ by u’s concavity (see also Remark 4.4). The
unboundedness of Sτ implies (Sτ > x) > 0 and consequently eq. (4.5) proves
[u(H ·S + X)−]  ∞. 
Remark 4.5. Theorem 4.1 considers only X that are bounded from above, which
includes, for example, the common cases of long or short put options and short
call options.
A more general version would complicate the proof. In particular applica-
tions, however, the requirement of boundedness can be significantly relaxed
withoutmuch effort. Theorem 4.1 holds as long asX does not exhibit asymptotic
long exposure in the asset S, ensuring that X does not effectively neutralize a
short hedging position for large values of S.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1 is that short strategies are prac-
tically forbidden for the agent and excluded from the utility optimization over
any setH of hedging strategies, that is
U(X;H)  U(X;H \ S). (4.6)
Theorem 4.1 contradicts the fact that short positions are used in practice and
consequently Assumption 4.1 has to be rejected.
Furthermore, it implies that the assumption of continuous trading is not
justified: Consider a continuous strategyH ∈ L(S) that has a positive probability
of a short position. Any sensible practicable approximationK ∈ P of this strategy
will then be an element of S and thus have infinitely negative utility.
This affects, for example, the standard approximation for strategies with
continuous paths, as used in Monoyios (2004b):
K ·S 
∑
i
Hti
(
Sti+1 − Sti
)
, for some (ti) ∈ Rn .
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In fact, approximating the optimal continuous-time strategy has strictly lower
utility than the zero strategy:
U(X; 0) > U(X;K), ( −∞, by Theorem 4.1).
Or stated differently: the agent will always prefer not to hedge at all.
In summary, results obtained under Assumption 4.1 and the assumption of
continuous trading are disconnected from what is possible in reality.
4.3 Implications for indifference pricing
In this section, we give simple examples that explicitly demonstrate how things
can go wrong under Assumption 4.1 and why neither the price nor the hedging
strategy derived under the continuous trading assumption have any meaning
for an agent limited to practicable strategies.
For demonstration purposes, we price and hedge dynamically replicable
contingent claims. It is well known, that under the assumption of continuous
trading (with a suitableH ) the utility indifference price of a replicable claim
equals the arbitrage-free price for a broad range of utilities.2
In this section, we will use the optimal strategy with claim, H∗(X;H) and
without a claim, Z(H), defined by
U(0;H)  U(0;Z(H))  U(X − p(X, 0;H);H∗(X;H)).
4.3.1 General observations
The following notationwill be employed: the replicable claim’s payoff is given by
∆·S + q, where q is the arbitrage-free price and ∆ the replicating strategy, which
is an element of the set of admissible continuous trading strategiesH ⊆ L(S).
We assume that q equals the continuous-trading utility indifference price.
Physical reality and eq. (4.6) limit the set of admissible strategies to a subset
of practicable long-only strategiesK ⊆ H ∩P \S. ReplacingH byK in eq. (4.1)
will yield practicable optimal strategies and prices that substantially differ from
their theoretical counterparts.
The following examples need a simple consequence of Jensen’s inequality.
Lemma 4.1. For any setA ⊆ {H ∈ L(S) | [H ·S ] ≤ 0} it holdsU(0; 0)  U(0;A).
Proof. U(0; 0) ≤ U(0;A)  supH∈A [u(H ·S )] ≤ supH∈A u([H ·S ]) ≤ u(0) 
U(0; 0). 
In our first example, we assume zero initial wealth, W1 : 0, and a claim
X1 : ∆·S + q bounded from above, ∆ ≥ 0 and that the stock has zero excess
return. Lemma 4.1 entails Z(H)  Z(K)  0 and thus H∗(X1;H)  −∆, which
2For an early proof see Davis et al. (1993, Theorem 1), or for a more recent presentation
Becherer (2003, eq. (3.8)), who calls this elementary no-arbitrage consistency.
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is negative and by Theorem 4.1 every practicable approximation will have
infinitely negative utility. Therefore, in practice it is favorable not to hedge at all.
Furthermore, due to this impossibility to hedge, p1 : p(X1 ,W1;H)  q is too
high. If u is strictly concave, the agent pays too much and strictly decreases her
utility when buying the option. We state this result which follows from eq. (4.6)
and a strict version of Jensen’s inequality without proof:
U(X1 − p1;K)  sup
H∈K
[u((∆ + H)·S )] < u(0)  U(0;K). (4.7)
However, the continuous-trading buy price is not always too high. Take, for
example, the indifference price for closing the current risky position X1. In this
case, we have an initial portfolio W2 : X1 − p1 and a payoff X2 : −X1. The
continuous-trading price is of course p2 : p(X2 ,W2;H)  −p1. For the realistic
agent, this price is too low. By closing the position, she is able to eliminate the
unhedgeable risk in her current portfolio. With eq. (4.7), we can see that buying
X2 for p2 strictly increases the agent’s utility:
U(W2 + X2 − p2;K)  U(0;K) > U(X1 − p1;K)  U(W2;K).
Another example, where buying a claim for the continuous indifference
price improves the realistic agent’s situation, i.e. where the continuous-trading
price is again too low, is that of negative excess returns of the stock.
In this case, the optimal continuous strategy Z(H) is short and the optimal
practicable strategy is Z(K)  0 by Lemma 4.1. Now consider the claim with
payoff X3 : Z(H) · S . Of course, its arbitrage-free price is zero and thus
p(X3 , 0;H)  0. However, buying this claim for 0 establishes the optimal short
exposure which was not previously available to the practicable agent and thus
strictly increases her utility. See Example 4.2 for concrete results in a log-normal
model.
The assumption of continuous trading does not fail in situations in which
the optimal continuous strategy on both sides of eq. (4.1) is long. One example
is the situation where one put is sold from a portfolio whose optimal hedging
position is long and only slightly reduced by the sale of one put. See Example 4.3
for concrete results in a log-normal model.
4.3.2 Concrete examples
For all of the following examples, we assume a risk-free rate of zero (r  0), an
agent with exponential utility (u(x)  −e−γx , with γ  0.01), no initial portfolio
(W  0) and that the asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion with
return µ:
St  S0 exp
((
µ − σ
2
2
)
t + σBt
)
.
We use the usual H  {H ∈ L(S) | H ·S bounded from below} and K 
H ∩ P \ S. This market is arbitrage-free with a unique martingale measure 
and the corresponding risk-neutral expectation .
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Example 4.1. In the first example, we calculate the sell price of a put on GOOGL
with payoff X  (550 − ST)+ at a current stock price of S0  600, with µ  0 and
σ
√
T  0.25. Lemma 4.1 implies Z(H)  Z(K)  0. The continuous-trading
indifference sell price is given by the risk-neutral expectation of the payoff,
−p(−X, 0;H)  [X] ≈ 35.61, and the optimal strategy −∆ is given by the
Black and Scholes (1973) delta for a put, i.e. short. Hence as in eq. (4.7), the
optimal practicable strategy is zero and the indifference sell price is:
− p(−X, 0;K)  1
γ
ln U(−X;K)
U(0;K) 
1
γ
ln U(−X; 0)
U(0; 0) 
1
γ
ln
[
eγX
] ≈ 58.50.
Example 4.2. In the second example, we assume that every trading strategy
H ∈ H is constant after a fixed time T, and take a look at the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation for U(0;H). Davis et al. (1993, eq. (4.30)) derive the optimal
strategy:
Z(H)t  µ
γσ2St
. (4.8)
This strategy replicates a claim with payoff X : Z(H)·S  µγ
(
T
2 +
1
σ2
ln STS0
)
and
optimal practicable utility U(X;K)  U(X; 0), which can be seen from:
U(X; 0) ≤ U(X;K) ≤ U(X;H)  U(0;H)  U(0;Z(H))  U(X; 0).
The continuous indifference price of this claim is p(X, 0;H)  [X]  0.
However, in the case µ < 0 and thus Z(H) < 0 and by Lemma 4.1 Z(K)  0, its
practicable indifference price is strictly positive:
p(X, 0;K)  −1
γ
ln U(X;K)
U(0;K) 
−1
γ
ln U(X; 0)
U(0; 0) 
−1
γ
ln
[
e−γX
]

µ2T
2σ2γ
> 0.
Example 4.3. This time we assume a positive excess return µ > 0. According
to eq. (4.8), the optimal strategy without any payoff is positive. The optimal
continuous trading strategy after selling x put options with exercise price K
is given by H : H∗(−x(K − ST)+;H)  Z(H) − xδ, where δ is the Black and
Scholes (1973) delta of the put. Simple analysis shows that H ≥ 0 if and only if
x ≤ µ
γσ2K : x
∗. Consequently, only then can both Z(H) and H be approximated
by practicable strategies and the results obtained under the assumption of
continuous trading carry over to the practicable case.
Assuming µ  5%, σ  25%, and K  550, we obtain x∗ ≈ 0.15, i.e. when
selling more than that fraction of a put, the continuous trading price will differ
from the practicable price.
We conclude with the observation that optimal continuous strategies and
the corresponding indifference prices are not relevant for a realistic agent.
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4.4 Implications for utility-based pricing
As in the previous section, we will look at dynamically replicable claims. Under
the continuous trading assumption (with a suitableH ) the utility-based price
of a replicable claim X is unique and given by the claim’s arbitrage-free price
(c.f. Kramkov and Hugonnier 2004):
B(X,W ;H)  {[X]}.
UnderAssumption 4.1, this theoretical result is violated for a practical hedger,
with strategiesK ⊆ P ∪ {0}, in various settings, two of which we will give here
as examples. In the first setting, let us assume that the optimal hedge against a
non-negative number of claims with payoff given by X is not to hedge at all, i.e.
U(x + qX;K)  U(x + qX; 0), if q ≥ 0. (4.9)
Then, the following Theorem proves that utility-based prices for realistic agents
with strictly concave u holding positive quantities of a claim are strictly lower
than the claim’s physical expectation value and thus for replicable claims strictly
lower than the continuous trading result from above, whenever [X] ≤ [X].
Theorem 4.2. If a claim X satisfies eq. (4.9), then for any real x and q > 0 it holds
sup B(X, x + qX;K) ≤ c with
c ≡ 1
q
(
u−1
(

[
u(x + qX)] ) − x) ≤ [X].
If u is strictly concave, the last inequality becomes “<”.
Proof. c ≤ [X] holds due to Jensen’s inequality or the corresponding strict
version for strictly concave u. Using eq. (4.9) and u’s strict monotonicity, we
can for any b > c derive a violation of eq. (4.2), which proves that (c ,∞] *
B(X, x + qX;K):
U(x+qX;K)   [u(x + qX)]  u(x+qc) < u(x+qb)  U(x+qX−q(X−b);K).

Example 4.4 (Closing a short put position). In the exponential utility setting
from Example 4.1 consider an agent holding one shorted put. The marginal
price with continuous trading is B(X,−X;H)  {[X]} ≈ {35.61}. Yet, using
the substitution X → −X, Theorem 4.2 provides a lower bound for B(X,−X;K)
of c ≈ 58.50. The exact value (given without proof) is significantly higher:
B(X,−X;K)  {[u′(−X)X]/[u′(−X)]} ≈ {87.95}.
In the second setting, we assume negative excess returns of all market assets,
a certain smoothness of u at the currentwealth level and a given set of practicable
strategies, K ⊆ P ∪ {0}. The following theorem and example show that in
this case the marginal price of any bounded (not necessarily replicable) claim
is given by its physical expectation, which is again a large deviation from the
continuous trading result.
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Theorem 4.3. If [H ·S ] ≤ 0 for all H ∈ K , and u′ exists at x, then B(X, x;K) 
{[X]} for all bounded X.
Proof. Due to [H ·S ] ≤ 0, Jensen’s inequality and u’s monotonicity, we have
U(x + q(X − b);K) ≤ u(x + q([X] − b)), for all q ∈ R,
and U(x;K)  u(x). This shows, that b  [X] fulfills eq. (4.2). Now define
f (q) ≡ U(x + q(X − b); 0). Boundedness of X allows us to interchange limit and
expectation:
lim
q→0
f (q) − f (0)
q
 
[
d
dq
u(x + q(X − b))q0]  u′(x)([X] − b).
For every b , [X] this limit is different from 0. Hence, there is some q, such that
U(x+q(X−b);K) ≥ f (q) > f (0)  U(x;K), proving that b violates eq. (4.2). 
Example 4.5 (Marginal put price under exponential utility). Due to Theorem 4.1,
a realistic agent cannot short the stocks and thus cannot profit from falling
stock prices. However, she can achieve short exposure through put options, and
consequently purchasing them even for considerably more than the arbitrage-
free price will improve her situation. In the setting of Example 4.4, but with
µT  −0.08, the marginal price with continuous trading is again B(X, x;H) 
{[X]} ≈ {35.61}, yet Theorem 4.3 gives B(X, x;K)  {[X]} ≈ {52.99}.
In analogy to the last section, we demonstrated utility-based prices obtained
under the assumption of that continuous trading are too far off to be relevant
for realistic agents.
4.5 Discussion
In this section, we address the question of whether there is an easy solution to
the problem and give the answer: No.
The first attempt is to employ an economic argument to make the region
in which the net position is never short—as in Example 4.3—large enough to
cover the cases of interest. Still, outside this region it will always abruptly fail,
even in dynamically complete markets. For a pricing and hedging theory this is
not satisfactory.
Another attempt is to limit the unbounded losses of short positions through
some stopping mechanism. If a stopping time τ exists such that the stopped
process Sτ is bounded, then any practicable strategy in Sτ would have finite
utility. How can the agent trade in the Sτ? Of course, it can be replicated using
a continuous trading strategy and its arbitrage-free price at time t equals Sτt .
However, under Assumption 4.1 such a strategy is not practicable, neither for
the agent nor for the possible issuer of Sτ. The reason for this is that τ can be
shorter than any fixed time which also lies at the heart of the problem discussed
in this paper. While such products exist in practice (like guaranteed stops or
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barrier options with knock-out features), they do not resolve the issue. The only
scenario in which the spread offered on Sτ enables the agent to approximate
a continuous strategy in S, is one where Assumption 4.1 does not hold for the
issuer of Sτ. Thus, nothing is gained and the problem not resolved.
x
u(x)
Figure 4.1: Capped exponential utility function.
If limiting the losses is not possible, one alternative could be arguing the fact
that an upper bound on the losses always exists, e.g. through limited liability
cooperations. Thus, the actor’s utility cannot fall below a certain level which
effectively corresponds to the situation depicted in Figure 4.1. Such a bound,
however, breaks the concavity of the utility function and thus contradicts the
risk aversion of the agent, as shown in the following example.
Assume a non-hedging agent is pricing a payoff f with a rare but severe
possible loss event, ( f  10.010)  99.9% and ( f  −10 000)  0.1%. Al-
though f has zero expectation, its indifference price under a utility function
u(x)  −e−(x+) is p  10.010.
One might ask why the existence of numerical algorithms for continuous
trading results does not contradict our findings. After all, most numerical
methods like PDE or tree methods somehow discretize the trading strategy (e.g.
with mesh size δt) and thus describe a practicable hedging strategy, yet they
yield finite results contrary to Theorem 4.1. The reason lies in the additional
discretization of the state space (δS) which implies that cases 1(b) and 2(b)
from Assumption 4.1 do not apply and the infinities of Theorem 4.1 do not
occur. The finite continuum value is then obtained through a simultaneous limit
(δS, δt) → 0. Applying such methods to the practicable case requires keeping
δt fixed in the limit δS→ 0. This limit diverges for short strategies and thus the
numerical scheme will again produce the analytically correct, albeit problematic
result of −∞.
Last, wewould like to address the reports of the seemingly goodperformance
achieved by hedging strategies obtained under Assumption 4.1 (e.g. Mohamed
1994; Monoyios 2004a,b). In these studies, the distribution of the hedging error
of different hedging strategies is compared on the basis of statistics such as
mean, standard deviation and median. However, first optimizing the utility
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of the strategy and then looking at another performance measure defeats the
purpose. Even if a utility optimizing strategy outperforms others, there will
always be a better strategy: the optimal strategy under the measure of interest.
Besides this fundamental problem, the strategies considered in these studies
are practicable approximations to the optimal continuous strategy. By The-
orem 4.1, such a strategy has infinitely negative utility, if it contains a short
position. Still, considering the implementation of such a strategy—e.g. as sug-
gested by the studies above—implies that the agent simply does not have the
postulated utility function.
We deem the transition to more suitable functions inevitable. More specif-
ically, a utility function u should not exclude realistic behavior and ideally
allow results obtained under the assumption of continuous trading to be ap-
plied practically. Obviously, to fulfill these requirements, u must not satisfy
Assumption 4.1.
In addition to this necessary condition, we provide a sufficient condition
in a simple setting. In accordance with intuition, u has to be defined on R and
should not fall too fast as the wealth approaches negative infinity. Indeed, if S
is a square integrable martingale, e.g. a geometric Brownian motion with no
drift, it is sufficient for u to have a bounded left derivative. In this case, for any
square integrable, replicable claim X there exists a sequence of simple processes
{qn}n that achieve the expected utility of a perfect hedge:
U(X; qn) −−−−→
n→∞ u([X]). (4.10)
To see this, we resort to the definition of the stochastic integral, which ensures the
existence of a sequence of simple processes {qn}n such thatYn ≡ X−[X]+qn·S
converges in mean square to zero. Now, if the upper bound of u’s left derivative
is given by C, then due to u’s concavity and monotonicity, we get |u(a) − u(b)| ≤
C |a − b | and thus
|U(X; qn) − u([X])| ≤ 
[|u(X + qn ·S ) − u([X])|] ≤ C[|Yn |] −→ 0.
One utility function with a bounded derivative is u(x)  kx − √1 + (kx)2
for any k > 0. The parameter k determines the absolute risk aversion at x 
0. This function exhibits a growing relative risk aversion for positive wealth,
asymptotically approaches a constant relative risk aversion coefficientwith value
2, and thus makes an economically viable candidate.
4.6 Conclusion
While utility indifference pricing and hedging as well as the so-called utility-
based pricing are fruitful approaches in conquering the challenges of incomplete
markets, we believe this work demonstrates that the use of utility functions that
satisfy Assumption 4.1 contradicts even the most basic practical observations.
This has demonstrable consequences for the practical applicability of results
obtained under the assumptions of continuous trading. Even if mathematically
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elegant results rely on the simplicity of these utility functions, we plead for a
replacement by more realistic ones.
While the last section should serve as a starting point in that matter, the
broader question of general practical applicability of indifference and utility-
basedpricingwill intimately depend on the combination of admissible strategies,
the utility function, the price dynamics, the payoff and finally the kind of result
to be applied and is left to further research.
We conclude with the managerial implication that the practical implemen-
tation of hedging strategies derived from continuous-time utility indifference
pricing under Assumption 4.1 leads to far from optimal behavior.
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THE PRICING EFFICIENCY OF
EXCHANGE-TRADED COMMODITIES
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11846-016-0221-0)
v Abstract V
Exchange-traded commodities (ETCs) open the commodity markets to
both private and institutional investors. This paper is the first to examine
the pricing efficiency and potential determinants of price deviations of
this new class of derivatives based on daily data of 237 ETCs traded on the
German market from 2006 to 2012. Given the unique size of the sample,
we employ the premium/discount analysis, quadratic and linear pricing
methods, as well as regression models. We find that the ETCs incur, on
average, price deviations in their daily trading and are more likely to trade
at a premium from their net asset values than at a discount. In addition,
we examine the influence of certain factors such as management fees,
commodity sectors, issuers, spread, assets undermanagement, investment
strategies, replication and collateralization methods on quadratic and
linear price deviations.
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5.1 Introduction
Exchange-traded commodities (ETCs) have evolved into a significant financial
instrument within the commodity asset class. They were first introduced by
Investor Resources Limited under its founder Graham Tuckwell in 2003 and
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. Marking a cornerstone for the
development of commodity investing, they are designed to provide both institu-
tional and private investors with exposure to a range of investment possibilities,
from well-known commodities, such as gold, silver, or platinum, over exotic
ones, such as lean hogs (e.g. Brooks 2008), to commodity futures or commodity
indices. ETCs are open-ended passive derivative instruments that are listed on
an exchange and traded like shares. This article is the first to explore the pricing
efficiency of ETCs and to examine potential determinants of price deviations
for the case of the German market which is the most important one for ETCs in
Europe.
ETCs undoubtedly belong to the group of exchange-traded products (ETPs),
which also include exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and exchange-traded funds
(ETFs). ETCs, that sometimes are also called commodity ETFs, all share the
following features: First, they are open-ended investments that are listed and
continuously traded like shares on a stock exchange. Second, they are passive
investments that track the performance of a given benchmark. Third, they
use either a physical or synthetic replication method. Despite these common
characteristics and the grouping as “exchange-traded” to increase the popu-
larity of ETCs and ETNs in light of the success of ETFs, a clear distinction
has to be made due to many structural and regulatory differences. ETCs are
debt securities that enable investors to gain exposure to commodity markets
without the requirement of physical delivery or futures trading. According to
Lang (2009), they are undated and normally secured zero-coupon notes from
a legal point of view. ETNs are also debt securities based on the performance
of references outside the commodity sector, such as currencies or volatilities;
however they are, unlike ETCs, generally non-collateralized and therefore bear
the default risk of the issuer. By contrast, ETFs are collective investment funds,
based on the performance of literally all held assets and are subject to strict
regulatory requirements of the UCITS1, which do not permit the replication of
single commodities or less diversified indices.
For investors, ETCs are a means of gaining exposure to commodity returns.
Therefore, the classification of ETCs with regard to investable resources may be
based on the common classification of commodities. Even though commodities
share unique investment characteristics separating them as a distinct asset class,
there is a notable lack of homogeneity among the different types of commodities.
In accordance with Engelke and Yuen (2008) and Fabozzi et al. (2008), commodi-
ties can traditionally be summarized as hard or soft commodities depending on
1The acronym UCITS stands for “Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities” directive and is the regulatory framework for an investment vehicle that can be
marketed across the European Union.
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their degree of availability and perishability and further be categorized into five
commodity sectors (agriculture, livestock, precious metals, industrial metals,
and energy).
The first two sectors, agriculture and livestock, are among the soft com-
modities, which can be characterized as renewable, perishable, non-limited in
quantitiy and typically grown products for consumption. In terms of ETCs, the
agricultural sector comprises diverse sub segments such as corn, wheat, cotton,
coffee, soybeans, soybean oil, cocoa, and sugar, whereas the livestock sector
mainly bifurcates into live cattle and lean hogs.
The latter three sectors, precious metals, industrial metals and energy, can
be considered as hard commodities which are non-renewable, non-perishable,
limited in quantity, and typically extracted by amining process or obtained from
a non-agricultural source. Examples of investable precious metals are mainly
gold, palladium, platin, rhodium, and silver. Moreover, industrial metals can be
split into aluminium, lead, copper, nickel, zinc, and tin while the energy sector
provides gasoline, fuel oil, crude oil, natural gas, and electricity as subsegments.
It is not only the limited attention of the academic literature to date, but also
the positive outlook for the market of passive investment and the commodity
sector in general (ibid.) which provide a motivation for our comprehensive
analysis of ETCs. By identifying the reasons for the expected ongoing popularity
of ETCs and other ETPswith regard to the investment horizon, Bienkowski (2007)
mentions the easy access to the commodity markets previously reserved for
sophisticated investors, the high liquidity, flexibility, transparency and appealing
cost structure as major drivers.
A key consideration in the investigation of ETCs is the creation/redemption
mechanism and the unique trading mechanism that ETCs have in common with
ETFs and ETNs, which require a distinction between primary and secondary
markets. In the primary market, ETC shares can be created and redeemed on an
on-demand basis by the so-called authorized participants (APs). The issuer of
an ETC is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in the legal form of a limited liability
company or a limited partnership created for the sole purpose of issuing ETCs
and liable under the law of its incorporated country. APs are large financial
institutions, brokers, or approved market makers that are contractually entitled
to solely serve this role and directly operate with the SPV. For the creation of ETC
units, the APs transfer securities or cash at the issuer’s deposit in exchange for a
block of a given number of ETC shares, often called “creation unit”, which they
split for a secondary market sale. The subscription price per unit is determined
by the intrinsic value, the net asset value (NAV), which is calculated on a daily
basis depending on the official price of the underlying asset. The process
operates in reverse if ETC shares are redeemed. Due to this on-demand creation/
redemption mechanism, ETCs can be defined as open-end investments.
The secondary market mainly takes place on stock exchanges2 where the
APs purchase and sell the ETC shares. Investors can trade and settle them at a
2Besides a stock market trading, over-the-counter (OTC) trading may also be possible.
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price determined by the best bid and best ask within a defined spread during
trading hours while market makers provide liquidity all day.
The existence of the creation/redemption process ensures that the price of
the ETC shares is close to the NAV of the primary market (see Borsa Italiana
2009). Otherwise, Gastineau (2001) suggests the APs could exploit arbitrage
opportunities. When ETC prices are lower than their respective NAVs, the APs
will acquire the underlying securities and redeem ETC shares and vice versa.3
However, as in reality market imperfections exist, the factual pricing effi-
ciency of theses derivative instruments is an important issue for investors and
researchers. In our analysis we determine whether there are deviations between
the prices of ETCs and their respective NAVs and consider 237 ETCs traded in
Germany, which is the largest market for such ETCs in the euro zone.
Compared to previous studies on ETPs, this is one of the largest samples to
analyze. Thus, we contribute to the literature not only by introducing a new
asset class, but also by providing a data set of unique size and regional focus to
further extend existing research of exchange-traded products. Despite its short
market history of about six years and the occurrence of the financial crisis, we
can identify a tremendous growth in the ETC assets under management (AUM)
by more than a factor 10 from EUR 164million up to EUR 23 096million as well
as in the number of products increasing by eight times from 31 to 276 products
from November 2006 to June 2012.4 With regard to the European ETC AUM by
the end of 2011, we find a market share of nearly 70% of the German market
with AUM of EUR 19 951million. In terms of turnover as of 2012, the German
stock exchange “Deutsche Börse AG" is also the market leader with a turnover
of EUR 7598million for ETCs in the Euro area (Lan et al. 2013), followed by the
“Börse Stuttgart AG”.
Given these facts, we concentrate on the Germanmarket for the investigation
of the ETCs from the perspective of a euro investor. We employ a number of
various approaches: the premium/discount analysis (PD analysis), quadratic
and linear pricing efficiency measures, and regression analysis. We first in-
vestigate the existence of price deviations based on daily figures of the ETCs
under consideration and subsequently analyze potential influencing factors
of these deviations. We find, on average, for all different price measures sig-
nificant pricing deviations from theoretical fair values in the daily trading of
ETCs. Aiming to detect influencing factors of the pricing mismatch, we run
several multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions which could explain
the potential arbitrage opportunities of investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We commence with a
discussion of related literature, and then describe the data and methodology
3Thus, the APs operate as an important link between the secondary and primary market
from which retail investors are usually excluded. The settlement by an independent clearing
and settlement organization takes place on a normal T + 2 or T + 3 basis. In summary, a clear
distinction between the primary and the secondary market including its market participants is
crucial for a correct understanding of the whole ETC structure.
4The above given information are provided by the German stock exchange “Deutsche Börse
AG".
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we use in our empirical analysis. The next section introduces the variables
and hypotheses developed as part of the regression analysis. Subsequently, we
present and discuss our empirical results. Finally, a conclusion completes the
paper.
5.2 Related literature
Since a number of studies is relevant for our analysis, we next discuss a selection
of publications in the fields passive management, commodities in general, and
ETPs.
Many authors are concerned with a general discussion about active and
passive management approaches. Major studies by Jensen (1967), Lehmann and
Modest (1987), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), and Rompotis (2011a) are not able
to find an outperformance of active investment solutions when compared to
market indices, passively managed mutual funds or exchange-traded products.
With a particular focus on commodities, Mankiewicz (2009) undertakes a com-
parative analysis between the active and passive management of commodity
indices with regard to pension funds and discusses the suitability of passive
financial instruments such as ETCs as alternative sources of return in a theo-
retical framework. Plante and Roberge (2007) describe the benefits of passive
commodity investing relative to active approaches and find that theoretical
sources of returns such as return on collateral and excess return of the GSCI
index between 1970 and 2006 can be realized as actual returns.
Another fast-growing class of literature has shown substantial interest in
commodities since the beginning of an increasing investor demand due to fi-
nancial and sovereign crises and inflation fears. Fabozzi et al. (2008) as well
as Anson et al. (2011) identify investment characteristics of commodities differ-
entiating them from traditional asset classes like stock or bonds. Gorton and
Rouwenhorst (2006) examine both a negative correlation between commodity
futures and other asset classes like shares and bonds due to different behavioral
patterns in the business cycle as well as a positive correlation with expected
and unexpected inflation and changes in expected inflation. Several authors
investigate the diversification benefits of commodities in a traditional portfolio
consisting of stocks and bonds using different methods with different findings
(e.g. Anson 1999; Belousova and Dorfleitner 2012; Bodie 1983; Stoll and Whaley
2010).
The literature has begun to cover the topic of exchange-traded products as
financial innovations. Laying the foundations for further research approaches,
Gastineau (2001) is the first to analyze ETPs in his study about the characteristics,
mechanics and benefits of ETFs. Other follow-up studies provide an overview
of ETFs (e.g. Deville 2008; Gastineau 2010) and ETNs (e.g. Wright et al. 2010)
in great detail.
Since before the advent of ETPs, there has been another class of investment
instruments that provide exposure to indices or other difficult-to-trade underly-
ings or with exotic features like principal protection or discounts. Structured
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products, like market-index certificates of deposits, discount certificates and
reverse convertibles, which are issued by financial institutions, are derivative
products, that are made up from more basic assets and derivatives. The liter-
ature concerned with the pricing of such products looks at deviations from
the fair price, which is given by the capital required to set up a static hedge
in exchange-traded derivatives. Chen and Kensinger (1990) were the first to
note the severe mispricing, which could be traced back to the profit maximizing
behavior of issuers that make rational use of their quasi monopoly (Grünbichler
andWohlwend 2005; Muck 2006; Wilkens et al. 2003). Another driver is hedging
difficulty, which is for example higher for single stock underlyings compared
to index underlyings, that have more liquid derivatives markets (Stoimenov
and Wilkens 2005). Wallmeier and Diethelm (2009) also provided evidence for
behavioral effects, like the irrational preference for overpriced products as long
as they offer high coupons.
From the investor’s perspective, structured products andETCs serve a similar
purpose, and pricing efficiency is an important topic in both classes. While the
characteristics and drivers of the pricing anomalies are expected to be similar, the
innovative, simpler and more transparent structures and mechanisms behind
ETCs—devised in part to overcome the shortcomings of structured products—
create the need for studies devoted to the peculiarities of ETCs.
However, we can only find incomprehensive studies that either focus on
individual characteristics or are insufficient in terms of an in-depth review. Bi-
enkowski (2010), for example, mainly presents a description of the development
of commodity investments and addresses ETCs, especially oil ETCs and their
various product strategies (long, short, forward, and leveraged positions) very
briefly. In a further study with a sole focus on ETCs, Bienkowski (2007) depicts
the backgrounds of the origins, the main advantages, and the general market
development of ETCs based on assets under management and the number of
existing products. In a similar introduction of ETCs, Brooks (2008) finds the
predominance of precious metals ETCs in his global market analysis by sector
and highlights the revolutionary role of ETCs in the opening of commodity
markets to all investors. Despite the limited research on ETCs, many proper-
ties relating to ETPs, such as the creation/redemption process for the issuance
and redemption of units (e.g. Gastineau 2001, 2010) are well explained in ETP
literature. So far there is no study exploring the pricing efficiency of ETCs
systematically.
The literature, then taking an empirical perspective on passive financial
instruments, is often dedicated to various forms of price differences. Charupat
andMiu (2011) distinguish between pricing efficiency and tracking errors in their
study on leveraged ETFs. They describe pricing efficiency as the relationship
between an ETF’s prices and its respective net asset values while tracking errors
refer to the ability of an ETF to replicate the underlying benchmark’s return
in the ETF’s NAV return. In the view of ETFs, authors (e.g. Aber et al. 2009;
Charupat andMiu 2011; Engle and Sarkar 2006; Jares and Lavin 2004; Kayali and
Ozkan 2012; Lin and Chou 2006) analyze the relative price differences between
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the price and its net asset value in the so-called PD analysis.
Other publications by Kostovetsky (2003), Gallagher and Segara (2006),
Rompotis (2008), Shin and Soydemir (2010), and Tzvetkova (2005) use quadratic
and linear deviation measures based on the concepts developed by Roll (1992)
and Rudolf et al. (1999) in their determination of deviations. Especially the
few studies related to ETNs are important for our analysis. Wright et al. (2010)
find, in their investigation of 65 globally traded ETNs in the period from 2008 to
2010, significant price deviations between the prices and their respective NAVs.
By contrast, Diavatopoulos et al. (2011) suggest that the prices of 93 ETNs are
significantly higher than their indicative prices due to a less liquid creation/
redemption process. Aroskar and Ogden (2012) employ five different measures
to analyze both pricing efficiency and tracking errors in their sample of 25 ETNs
divided into four categories in the period from 2008 to 2011; however, they find
different results in their descriptive analysis of price deviations depending on
the respective subcategory. Leung and Ward (2015) and Guo and Leung (2015)
examine tracking errors of leveraged ETCs and demonstrate how a dynamic
replication portfolio built from futures yields smaller tracking errors.
The literature about determinants of ETF tracking errors identifies several
factors influencing the magnitude of errors. These are, among others, AUM,
ETF trading volume (Buetow andHenderson 2012), management fee (Chu 2011),
number of overlapping market hours as well as return differences between US
and foreign markets (Johnson 2009), ETF age and standard deviations of returns
(Rompotis 2011b). Physically replicating ETFs have smaller tracking errors
than synthetically replicating ETFs (Fassas 2014). Schmidhammer et al. (2010)
find that the tracking error of ETFs on the German stock index (DAX) is highly
correlated with the price differences between DAX and DAX futures.
5.3 Data and methodology
5.3.1 Data
The data for our research covers 237 ETCs, with total assets under management
exceeding EUR 21 billion as of June 2012, which are listed on the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange on Xetra of Deutsche Börse AG or on regional stock exchanges, such
as Stuttgart, and can be traded within trading hours of 9.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. on
business days. The sample period of our daily data beginswith the initial trading
date of each ETC, the earliest with the start of the ETC trading in Germany on
03 November 2006, and ends on 25 July 2012. We constructed our dataset by
comparing the 276 listed products of the German stock exchange to the product
data available in Bloomberg, which only included prices and NAVs for 237
ETCs. The dataset analyzed differs from comparable studies of ETFs or ETNs
in two ways. First, we focus on the German ETC market or, from a broader
perspective, on the European market, which have not yet been investigated
in academic literature. Second, by covering nearly all products available on
the German market, the size of our dataset is significantly larger than that of
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comparable studies of other ETPs, which mostly include a range of between 5
and 100 investigation units (see Aber et al. 2009).
For the first part of our investigation, the ETC data consist of historical
mid-prices as the average of bid and ask closing prices and of their net asset
values (NAVs) as published by the issuers in euro currency for each ETC from its
respective initiation date until 25 July 2012. The bid prices describe the highest
prices a dealer will be prepared to pay whereas the ask prices are the lowest
prices a dealer will be prepared to sell a security on a given day at. In accordance
with Aroskar and Ogden (2012), we use mid-prices at closing of ETCs as they
reflect more clearly the daily price movements of ETCs. Observations missing
either bid price, ask price or NAV are removed from the respective ETC’s data
set.
TheNAVs are computed by subtracting the liabilities from the portfolio value
of the securities and dividing that figure by the number of outstanding shares.
These are calculated once a day for each ETC, providing another argument for
using mid-prices of ETCs. In the subsequent analysis, our computations are
based on both prices and log returns5 of mid-prices and NAVs.
For the second part of our empirical analysis, we extended our database by
collecting additional information from stock exchanges, issuers’ publications
and Bloomberg. For each ETC, we gathered data on the following categories:
Management fees, bid-ask-spreads, assets under management, age, issuers,
commodity sectors, single versus broad-based ETCs, investment strategies,
replicationmethods, and collateralization. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a summary
of our database for the categorical and the metric variables, respectively.
5.3.2 Methodology
In accordance with Tzvetkova (2005), due to the unique features of ETCs—
and ETPs in general—their assessment as suitable investment vehicles to gain
exposure to the underlying has two aspects. The first is usually measured by
the tracking error (TE), which indicates how well the ETP’s assets replicate the
underlying benchmark (see e.g. Engle and Sarkar 2006; Frino and Gallagher
2002). The TE is predominantly determined by the way the ETC is set up and
the execution skill of the management.
The second aspect is pricing efficiency. It measures how efficient the sec-
ondary market prices the ETC. Shares of an ETC can be bought (or created)
on the primary market in exchange for its NAV per share and are basically—
through the redemption mechanism or at termination or maturity—claims to
the NAV per share. Consequently an ETC’s fair value, and thus the comparison
price for pricing efficiency is given by its NAV.
While both aspects are important, this study is concerned with the second
aspect, which especially for ETCs deserves special attention. The reason for
5We use log returns instead of simple returns which are also widespread in the context
of passive financial instruments in the academic literature and in practice, as the reliance on
continuously compounded returns is more valid and suitable in the context of our further
statistical computations.
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Table 5.1: Frequency tables for categorical data. The data describe the sample of 237
ETCs traded on the German market.
Category N
Issuer Issuer 1 124
Issuer 2 25
Issuer 3 9
Issuer 4 28
Issuer 5 12
Issuer 6 39
Sector Precious metals 54
Livestock 11
Agriculture 52
Industrial metals 38
Energy 66
Cross-sectional 16
Category N
Single vs. broad Single-commodity 165
Broad-commodity 72
Investment strat. Long 128
Short 42
Leveraged Long 52
Leveraged Short 15
Replication Physical replication 19
Synthetic replication 218
Collateralization Coll. by securities 199
Physical coll. 27
No collateralization 9
Third party coll. 2
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for metric variables of our sample of 237 ETCs traded
on the German market. Management fees represents the average annual
management fees as reported by the issuers, Rel. Bid-ask spread is the mean
over each ETC’s entire lifetime of the daily relative spreads between bid
and ask closing prices, Age is measured as the difference between the initial
trading date of the relevant ETC and the end of the investigation period.
AUM market share is the mean over each ETC’s quaterly share of AUM of all
276 listed ETCs.
Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max SD
Management fees / % 0.20 0.49 0.49 0.66 0.98 0.98 0.23
Rel. bid-ask spread / % 0.19 0.69 1.25 1.54 2.19 8.90 1.21
Age / years 0.36 0.79 3.26 3.04 4.14 5.72 1.75
AUMmarket share / % 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.40 0.07 23.00 2.05
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this is found in the way most ETCs are structured. For physically replicated
ETCs—all of which are ETCs on preciousmetals or chopper—shares are created
or redeemed in exchange for the physical underlying and thus ETCs do not
engage in trading for tracking purposes (ETFS Metal Securities Ltd. 2016). As a
consequence the NAV will always equal the underlying’s spot price after fees,
which is exactly the benchmark for these types of ETCs.
Then there are synthetically replicated ETCs that track their benchmark with
the help of derivatives. For many of these ETCs (e.g. the largest synthetic ETC
in our sample, the ETFS Agriculture, cf. ETFS Commodity Securities Limited
2016) the issuer enters into a swap agreement guaranteeing that on creation and
redemption of ETC shares swap positions with predetermined conditions are
automatically opened and closed. As in the case of physical replication, there is
no actual tracking activity required. Therefore, the NAV equals the accumulated
cash flows from the swap position, which is contractually specified to equal the
benchmark.
Summing up, as the tracking error between the NAV and the underlying
can be regarded as a minor issue for ETCs, we identify pricing efficiency as the
primary concern for investors looking to participate in the commodity markets
via ETCs.
Premium/discount analysis The objective of our study is to determine the
daily pricing efficiency of ETCs before we identify potential factors influencing
the pricing of ETCs in the German market. Therefore, we first apply specific
quantification concepts that are able to measure potential differences between
the price (yield) performance of ETCs and their respective benchmarks.
Consistent with past research on ETFs (e.g. Aber et al. 2009; Charupat and
Miu 2011; Elton et al. 2002; Jares and Lavin 2004) and ETNs (e.g. Aroskar and
Ogden 2012; Diavatopoulos et al. 2011), we measure the daily price deviations
using PD analysis. In accordance with Aber et al. (2009), the relative price
deviations are calculated for each ETC as follows:
pit 
Pt −NAVt
NAVt
, (5.1)
where pit is the ETC’s price deviation on day t, Pt is the midprice on day t, and
NAVt is the official net asset value on the same day t. When this deviation is
positive (negative), the ETC is traded at a premium (discount). In case of pit  0,
the pricing is perfect and, thus, the creation/redemption process does not allow
arbitrage opportunities. The PD analysis serves well as a first indicator of the
pricing deviation but due to its limited interpretation further methods must be
implemented for a more thorough analysis.
Quadratic and linear pricing efficiency analysis The quadratic and linear
pricing measures focus on return-based deviations as opposed to absolute
deviations of the PD analysis (e.g. Roll 1992). We will analyze the pricing
efficiency of the ETCs by means of different discrepancy measurement called
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the pricing efficiency (PE) methods. In general, the methods aim to reflect the
extent to which a security’s price deviates from its target value over a certain
period of time (e.g. Frino and Gallagher 2002) and may be regarded as a form
of quality measurement of a security. They are not only commonly used for
a posteriori analysis of pricing and tracking errors, but also for tracking error
minimization (see e.g. Gharakhani et al. 2014; Rudolf et al. 1999, in the context
of index tracking). Therefore, we choose these measures over different methods,
like regression approaches (e.g. Shin and Soydemir 2010).6
The quadratic pricing masures have been heavily discussed in the academic
literature and been implemented in the expression of various statistical forms
(e.g. Ammann and Tobler 2000; Roll 1992). Consistently with Ammann and
Tobler (2000) we implement the pricing error volatility as the square root of
the non-central second moment of the deviations in the framwork of quadratic
pricingmethods. As a first pricingmeasure, we define the pricing error volatility
PEVOL as:
PEVOL 
√√
1
T − 1
T∑
t1
(
RP,t − RB,t )2 , (5.2)
where RP,t denotes the log return of the ETC’s midprice in period t, RB,t the
log return of the NAV as benchmark B in period t, and T the sample size.
This quadratic error definition is themost common quadratic pricing error in
the academic literature due to its advantageous statistical properties. The PEVOL
reflects both random positive or negative deviations and a constant under- or
outperformance of the underlying index. However, Rudolf et al. (1999) criticize
the fact that eq. (5.2) is difficult to interpret from an investor’s perspective and
does not reflect investment objectives in an adequate way. Therefore, they
suggest four linear error definitions as being more appropriate alternatives
for the purpose of exemplifying an investor’s risk attitude. The proposed
alternative definitions are based on absolute deviations between the security’s
price and its target value instead of squared deviations. In addition, these
pricing errors provide both consistency with expected utility maximization
and explicit solutions. Considering all these benefits, we apply the following
four linear pricing models in our empirical analysis. The PEMAD captures the
mean absolute deviations of the ETC’s mid-price and its NAV by calculating
the average of the absolute deviations between the mid-price returns and the
NAV returns as follows:
PEMAD 
1
T
T∑
t1
RP,t − RB,t ,
6In our framework, it would be necessary to aggregate α, β and standard errors into one
deviation measure. Since there is no straight forward way to do this, we used the more proven
concepts defined above.
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where RP,t is the log return of the ETC’s mid-price in period t, RB,t the log
return of the NAV as benchmark B in period t, and T the sample size.
The PEMAX, as our second linear pricing error, method focuses on the maxi-
mum deviation between the return differences and can be expressed as:
PEMAX  max
t∈{1,...,T}
RP,t − RB,t .
The measure PEMAX characterizes a worst-case-scenario in which greater devi-
ations are to be expected compared to the two other PE concepts. Obviously,
PEMAD and the PEMAX are symmetrical pricing error methods as neither distin-
guish between positive and negative deviations by only calculating absolute
values. However, investors may also be interested in assessing the downside
risk, i.e. the risk of mid-price returns being below the NAV returns. Conse-
quently, we use two asymmetrical linear models as analogs to PEMAD and
PEMAX, but with a restriction to negative deviations. For a proper notation, we
define the set of all instants of time at which the return deviation is negative, i.e.
N : {t |RP,t < RB,n} with cardinal number N : |N |
The PEMADD is the mean absolute downside deviation, i.e. deviations where
the mid-price returns are less than the NAV returns, by the following formula:
PEMADD 
1
N
∑
t∈N
RP,t − RB,t .
Analogously, PEMAXD is defined by:
PEMAXD  max
t∈N
RP,t − RB,t .
Wewill use the two abbreviationsMeMs, short formean-basedmeasures (PEVOL,
PEMAD and PEMADD) and MaMs, short for maximum-based measures (PEMAX
and PEMAXD).
5.4 Regression variables and hypotheses
Unlike other studies, we do not confine ourselves to measuring the different
pricing error measures for all of the examined ETCs and listing the results in a
table. In aiming to identify determining factors influencing the pricing efficiency,
we go one step further. To this end, we regress all five pricing error measures
of every one of the 237 ETCs—each calculated over the whole available time
series—on several explanatory variables. These are operational ETC character-
istics and general market factors comprising management fees, bid-ask-spreads,
market share of assets under management, age, issuers, commodity sectors,
single versus broad-based ETCs, investment strategies, replication methods,
and collateralization forms. All of them could have an influence on pricing
efficiency. Therefore, we formulate nine hypotheses (numerated H1 through
H9), proposing expectable relationships of the explanatory variables on the
pricing error measures. As many of the variables are categorial (with, say, c
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categories), we use the standard approach of setting up c − 1 dummy variables
for each category with one value being the reference category.
5.4.1 Costs
The cost analysis of ETCs plays a vital role in the investment decision of investors.
ETCs as passive financial instruments are a relatively simple and inexpensive
means of participation in the commodity markets compared to other products.
On the contrary, a physical acquisition of commodities, if at all feasible, involves
substantial costs due to storage, transportation and insurance and commodity
futures are associated with considerable margin and rollover costs. Due to their
passive investment structure, ETCs limit management costs for complex analysis
tasks as well as transaction and distribution costs. Depending on the particular
structure of the ETC, different cost components are to be distinguished and the
individual investor may incur both direct and indirect costs.
One type of direct primary cost applying to all ETC structures is the manage-
ment fee which covers management and administrative services of the issuer.
These costs are often incorrectly stated as total expense ratios (TER), a term
summarizing all cost components of ETFs. Since the management fee is to be
specified explicitly in the issuers’ publications and prospects and is applicable
to all ETC products, it represents an appropriate basis for comparison. The
management fee indicated as an annual percentage fee is deducted in equal
parts from the ETC assets and varies according to different products and issuers.
Besides these costs, physical ETCs may charge fees for storage and custody
whereas derivative-based ETCs carry swap, collateral, index or licensing costs.
However, these cost components are variable over time and, thus, often not
clearly defined by the issuer. In addition to these primary costs, transaction
fees7 may be levied in the acquisition or selling process by brokers, custodian
banks, or states. Some issuers charge varying ancillary fees for the creation and
redemption of ETC units which are not applicable to investors in the secondary
market and exchange markets. These fees increase if predefined threshold val-
ues of ETC units are not reached and are usually higher for the redemption than
the creation of new shares.
Thus, the average annual management fees provide a proper basis for the
cost analysis of ETCs as they are incurred for all products and are to be reported
explicitly by the issuers. In our sample, management fees are rather low (with
a median value below 5%, cf. Table 5.2), with a tendency of lower values for
plain vanilla ETCs. Therefore, we can view management fees as a proxy for the
exoticness of the respective ETC as they are positively correlated with the effort
in product management.
Moreover, in their analyses of ETF tracking errors, Chu (2011) and Rompotis
(2011b) find a negative influence of management fees on pricing efficiency. The
perspective taken above leads us to the same conclusion. Our first hypothesis
7Brokerage commissions, market fees, clearing and settlement costs as well as taxes and
stamp duties are examples of direct or explicit trading costs (see D’Hondt and Giraud 2008).
77
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
(H1) conjectures a negative influence of management fees on the pricing effi-
ciency because with more complex products arbitrage opportunities are harder
to exploit, which is essentially a basic transaction costs argument.
5.4.2 Spread
Despite their difficult determination, indirect or implicit costs in the form of
bid-ask spreads are also important in the cost analysis. We calculate the average
relative bid-ask-spreads as the mean of the differences between the daily closing
ask and bid prices divided by the closing mid prices.
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) interpret the bid-ask spread as a measure-
ment of liquidity or, to be more precise, as the cost of immediate execution. The
spread calculated between the ask (offer) and bid (sell) prices are to be as tight
as possible and significantly influence the asset return. The bid-ask-spreads
represent transaction costs imposed bymarket makers, which may negatively af-
fect pricing. Delcoure and Zhong (2007) emphasize that higher bid-ask spreads
could harm the effectiveness of the creation/redemption process by making
arbitrage activities less attractive. In contrast, Buetow and Henderson (2012)
use another variable as proxy for second market liquidity, namely ETF trading
volumes, and also find a negative effect on the magnitude of tracking errors.
Therefore, we hypothesize a positive effect of the relative spread on the
magnitude of pricing errors (H2).
5.4.3 Market share of assets under management (AUM)
Based on quarterly AUM data of all 276 listed ETCs, also extracted from Bloom-
berg, we calculate the quarterly market share of each ETC, by dividing the ETC’s
AUM by the sum of all ETCs’ AUM. This number is then averaged over all
quarters of the considered time period. We choose market share as dependent
variable in the sense of the relative AUM, to exclude the influence of the rapid
overall growth of the ETCs market in terms of AUM, from 0 in 2006 to EUR 23.1
billion in the second quarter of 2012.
A higher market share is expected to indicate a more mature, possibly more
liquid, and above all more lucrativemarket for a potential arbitrageur. This effect
can be explained by the fixed costs of implementation and monitoring, which
are independent of the size of the market. This economies of scale argument is
also used by Buetow and Henderson (ibid.) and Chu (2011), who suggest that
ETF fund size has a positive effect on pricing efficiency.
Thus, our third hypothesis can be stated as follows: the relative AUMmarket
share has positive effect on pricing efficiency (H3).
5.4.4 Age
The age, measured as the time in years between the initial trading date of the
relevant ETC and the end of the investigation period, is used as a proxy for the
age of a product and its market maturity.
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To explain the overpricing of structured products in the German market,
Wilkens et al. (2003) propose a life cycle hypothesis, conjecturing “that issuers
orient their pricing toward the expected volume of purchases and sales.”. It is
indeed confirmed by numerous studies that overpricing is highest at initiation
when the products are sold by the issuers and vanishes over the lifetime of
the product, or even becomes negative, when the product is sold back to the
issuer. ETFs are open ended, yet it is still expected that excess demand creates
overpricing for younger products and we conjecture the variable to have a
negative relationship with the mean based pricing errors (H4).
This reasoning cannot be applied to MaMs, which monotonically increase
with the number of observations. Thus, we expect the opposite effect, in which
age has a positive influence of the magnitude of the (maximal) pricing errors
(H5).
5.4.5 Single-commodity versus broad-based ETCs
Through the usage of ETCs, investors gain exposure to one single commodity
or to a basket of multiple commodities. Taking a position in single-commodity
ETCs allows investors to invest in certain commodity markets without having
to adhere to a certain level of diversification to meet regulatory requirements
as is the case with ETFs. In addition, single-commodity ETCs are often used
for short-term investment strategies and require a precise knowledge about the
opportunities and risks associated with the respective commodity. By contrast,
broad-based commodity ETCs offer the possibility of diversified investments in
all commodity sectors, in combinations of commodity sectors, and in combi-
nations of two or more or even all commodities of a sector through one single
trade. These types of ETCs are more suitable for long term investment motives.
Single-commodity ETCs only replicate one underlying commodity whereas
broad-based ETCs cover two or more commodities. Therefore, single-commod-
ity ETCs may incur smaller replication costs compared to broad-commodity
ETCs. In contrast, for structured products with equity underlyings, Stoimenov
and Wilkens (2005) expect the opposite effect, as indices can have a more liquid
derivatives market compared to single stocks. Even if the liquidity argument
cannot be transferred to ETCs in general, there can be effects that make replica-
tion of broad underlyings less costly, namely lower volatility and lower average
roll-yield effects due to diversification.
As it is possible for each of both effects to dominate the other, we conjecture
an effect of the variable on the pricing efficiency (H6), but we do not have an
ex-ante expectation on the direction.
5.4.6 Investment strategies
With regard to investment strategies, investors implement long, short, leveraged
long, and leveraged short positions with or without currency hedging through
the acquisition of ETCs. A long ETC, the simplest andmost intuitive type of ETC,
closely tracks the daily performance of its underlying. As with stocks, investors
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generate profits if the underlying’s prices rise and, vice versa, losses if prices
fall. Forward long ETCs, whose underlying are composed of longer-maturity
forwards, are counted among the long-investment products as well. Short ETCs
as counterparts to long ETCs are aimed to reflect the daily performance change
of the respective underlying times minus one and, thus, behave inversely to
their target benchmarks. Consequently, an investor profits from falling prices
and loses in case of increasing prices.
However, the losses are limited to the amount invested, constituting a major
difference to the classical short sale transactions with theoretically uncapped
losses.
Leveraged long and leveraged short ETCs are relatively new types of ETC
investments and are more suited to risk-taking investors for the purpose of
speculating or hedging. A leverage of two to four leads to an above-average
participation in value changes of the underlying on a daily basis.
For longer holdingperiods than oneday the realized returndoes not necessar-
ily correspond with the indicated leverage over the same period. As with short
ETCs, the potential losses are limited to the investment total which illustrates a
significant advantage of ETCs.
We propose that the investment strategies may also play a crucial role as de-
terminants of the pricing error. Leung andWard (2015) find that leveraged ETFs
have significant tracking errors stemming from imperfect replication (they give
an improved tracking performance by dynamic portfolios of futures). Moreover
and Guo and Leung (2015) postulate the so called volatility decay, arising due to
the convexity of the ideal leveraged underlying. Extending this argumentation,
we expect the greater difficulty in performing leveraged and short strategies
and the associated higher costs, to have a positive impact on the magnitude of
the pricing errors (H7). In our regression models, the investment strategy Long
serves as a reference category.
5.4.7 Replication methods
As passive financial instruments, ETCs use either a physical or synthetic ap-
proach to replicate the underlying benchmark accurately. Physical replication
is achieved by buying the physical commodities or the securities of the relevant
index. Physical ETCs often relate to spot prices of commodities or commodity
baskets of precious metals, such as gold or silver, as they are relatively homoge-
neous, easy to standardize, and non-perishable. In comparison, the physical
replication is less frequently applied in other commodity sectors as these in-
vestments are largely either unprofitable due to storage, transportation and
insurance costs, or practically unimplementable. Ramaswamy (2011) empha-
sizes that the physical replication strategy can prove to be very costly especially
in case of less liquid or broad-market underlyings with a daily change in their
composition.
As a result, synthetic replication strategies are often employed to minimize
costs and deviations from the underlying benchmark. In contrast to holding the
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underlying commodities directly, these derivative-based ETCs adopt both total
return swaps and futures to gain exposure to their target commodities. The
synthetic approach is usually effected by means of bilateral total return swap
contracts in which generally the two parties exchange the total return of two
designated financial instruments. At maturity, the ETC issuer transfers not only
its assets in the form of cash or baskets of securities, which significantly deviate
from the composition of the underlying benchmark to the swap counterparties
but also the risk of deviations from the benchmark. The swap counterparties,
which are often parent companies of the ETC issuer, in return transfer the
respective total return of the ETC underlying for a given nominal exposure.8
The daily offsetting of the swap transactions aims to mitigate the incurring
exposure risk. Besides an issuer risk, the ETC investor bears a counterparty risk
which describes the risk of insolvency of the swap counterparty.
An alternative synthetic replication method involves the use of futures
contracts. Here, the ETC issuer acquires or sells futures contracts from a third
party when units of ETCs are created or redeemed. This ETC structure can
be found in the energy sector, in which the third parties are multinational oil
companies with direct exposure to the relevant commodity and try to hedge
their risk through the trading of futures.
The synthetic replication method is marketed by issuers as the superior
replication method for tracking error minimization. Consequently, Fassas (2014)
hypothesizes higher pricing efficiencies for synthetically replicated ETFs. How-
ever, he cannot confirm this statistically, possibly due to his small data set,
which is less comprehensive than ours. Therefore, we expect a negative relation
between the synthetic replication dummy and pricing efficiency (H8).
5.4.8 Collateralization
Due to their structure as debt notes, ETCs are subject to issuer credit risk. Issuers
are special purpose vehicles (SPVs), corporations in the form of a limited liability
company or a limited partnership, which are created for the sole purpose of
issuing ETCs and are normally not rated by external rating agencies. Hence,
ETCs are collateralized by physical holdings, securities pledging, or coverage by
an independent third party to reduce the risk of an issuer’s insolvency whereas
only few ETCs dispense with collateral. For comparison with other exchange-
traded products, ETFs are structured as funds whose assets invested are not
part of the liquidation assets in the event of an issuer’s bankruptcy. ETNs as
debt notes are only backed by the credit-worthiness of their issuers which are
mostly big financial institutions and hold more types of debt obligations.
One popular ETC structure comprises the collateralization through physical
holdings, such as precious metals which are simple to be stored, standardized
and associated as safe investments by investors. The posted collateral (e.g. gold,
silver, or platinum) is equal to at least 100% of the value of the issued ETC
units calculated on each business day. They are stored in a certificated vault
8See Ramaswamy (2011) for further information.
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of an eligible custodian and regularly audited in terms of available amounts
or compliance with quality standards at the issuer’s discretion. Furthermore,
an independent security trustee receives a primary security interest and is
allowed to take control of the vault in the case of a credit event. The investors
themselves only have a limited right of recourse and may incur losses in the
event of insolvency.
The collateralization by securities is based on the pledging of stocks, cash,
money market funds, or fixed-income securities with excellent credit ratings.
These are transferred to a pledge account of a custodian and safeguarded by
an independent trustee. In addition, the collateral is subject to a daily mark-
to-market evaluation ensuring that their target value reflects the value of the
issued ETC units plus a security surcharge of up to 10%. If the collateral value
is less or certain collateral criteria are not met, the issuer will be requested to
deposit additional funds. However, the pledging of securities is more risky
for investors as the posted collateral may become worthless in extreme market
conditions or not cover all liabilities due to changes in asset values.
A less common type of collateralization is the coverage by an independent
third party with best credit ratings. The eligible collateral targeting at least
100% of the issued ETCs fulfills the same requirements as before with the sole
exception of bearing the credit risk of the third party.
The explanatory variables collateralization by securities, physical collater-
alization as well as collateralization by third parties are included as dummies
to explicate the pricing of ETCs whereby the lack of collateralization is re-
garded as reference category. On the one hand, positive coefficients of the
three explanatory variables could be expected due to higher costs related to
the collateralization of securities. On the other hand, a lack of collateralization
could also lead to negative return deviations in case of worse credit situations.
As both assumptions are reasonable, we take both scenarios into account and
test the effect in the following analyses (H9).
5.4.9 Regression model
In order to test the different hypotheses simultaneously, we estimate a multiple
linear regression model using ordinary least squares (OLS) for each of the five
different dependent variables PEVOL, PEMAD, PEMAX, PEMADD, and PEMAXD.
Out data set comprises products from six different issuers, whose dummy
variables are used as control variables. The issuer with the highest AUM value
is used as reference category. Moreover, we also control for the commodity
sector and set cross-sectional as reference category, i.e. those ETCs that track price
changes across all commodity sectors.
The regression equation for each dependent variable Y ∈ {PEVOL , PEMAD ,
82
Chapter 5. The pricing efficiency of exchange-traded commodities
PEMADD , PEMAX , PEMAXD} takes the following form:
Yj  β0 + β1 · Fee j + β2 · Spread j + β3 ·AUM j + β4 ·Age j
+ β5 · Issuer j + β6 · Sector j + β7 · Single-commodity j
+ β8 · Strategy j + β9 · Replication j + β10 · Collateralization j
+  j ,
(5.3)
for ETC number j ∈ {1, . . . , 237}.
To test the significance of the regressors we use t-statistics adjusted for
heteroskedasticity by White (1980).
5.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we first present the results of the PD analysis as well as the
quadratic and linear pricing analysis, from which we deduce the pricing effi-
ciency of ETCs in the Germanmarket. In particular, the analysis of the quadratic
and linear pricing measures plays a substantial role for the subsequent investiga-
tion of potential factors influencing the price deviations of ETCs and is therefore
considered in more detail.
5.5.1 Premium/discount analysis
Table 5.3 reports upon the summary statistics for the PD analysis using daily
figures of the data sample of 237 ETCs during the investigation period from 04
November 2006 to 25 July 2012. For each ETC, we calculate the mean of the price
deviations between the mid-prices and the NAVs according to eq. (5.1) as well
as its standard deviations using the entire available corresponding times series.
Then, we compute the fraction of days with premiums, i.e. positive deviations
over the entire data history of each ETC.
The mean price deviation of the data sample is 0.09% implying that the
ETCs on average trade at a premium. The maximum positive price deviation
is 4.69%while the maximum negative price deviation is −0.41%. On average,
the standard deviation of all ETCs is 0.95%which ranges from 0.15% to 3.78%,
implying relatively large and greatly fluctuating price deviations. These results
Table 5.3: Results of PD analysis. The table presents brief summary statistics on the
average price deviations, the standard deviations (SD) of the price deviation
as well as the shares of premium and discount observations for all of the 237
investigated ETCs’ times series. Min is the minimum, Max the maximum
value.
Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max SD
Average price deviation / % −0.41 −0.03 0.02 0.09 0.10 4.69 0.36
SD of price deviation / % 0.15 0.59 0.78 0.95 1.14 3.78 0.59
Share of premium obs. / % 41.10 48.10 51.09 53.72 56.00 99.33 9.37
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Table 5.4: Results of the quadratic and linear pricing methods. The table summarizes
the descriptive statistics of the quadratic PEVOL and linear pricing methods
PEMAD, PEMADD, PEMAX, and PEMAXD based on daily data. The data period
is from the inception of each ETC, the earliest being from 04 November 2006
to 25 July 2012. SD is the standard deviation, Min the minimum, and Max
the maximum of all PE results. The dataset consists of 237 ETCs, for each of
which the five PE measures are calculated.
Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max SD
PEVOL / % 0.21 0.75 1.03 1.29 1.50 5.54 0.86
PEMAD / % 0.17 0.50 0.69 0.90 1.03 4.01 0.62
PEMADD / % 0.16 0.50 0.70 0.91 1.02 4.74 0.65
PEMAX / % 0.59 4.06 6.04 6.98 8.43 23.90 4.40
PEMAXD / % 0.46 3.40 5.45 6.29 7.96 23.90 4.07
are only in part consistent with those of the previous literature on ETPs. Charu-
pat and Miu (2011) suggest the existence of large price deviations and price
volatilities based on higher results in their analysis of eight ETFs. However,
Kayali and Ozkan (2012) determines, in his analysis, an average price deviation
of −0.8%whereas Elton et al. (2002) note a mean discount of −0.018%. We find
that half of the ETCs traded at a premium over their NAVs for at least 53.7% of
the time. This is consistent with the life cycle argumentation of Wilkens et al.
(2003) (see also subsection 5.4.4).
5.5.2 Quadratic and linear pricing efficiency measures
Next, we calculate the quadratic and linear pricing error measures introduced
above. Table 5.4 displays the summary statistics for the whole sample of 237
ETCs measured over the whole investigation period. It provides the mean, the
standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum pricing error size.
For PEVOL, the mean of the pricing error of the sample is 1.29% with a
standard deviation of 0.86%. Considering the range of the sample, we detect
significant differences as the minimum within the sample is 0.21% and the
maximum is 5.54%. The mean absolute deviation PEMAD shows a lower mean
pricing error of 0.90% with a standard deviation of 0.62%. In addition, the
pricing deviations vary from a minimum of 0.17% and a maximum of 4.01%,
indicating a tighter range within the sample. Considering PEMAX as extreme
value analysis, the sample average of all maximum deviations between the price
and the NAV is 6.98% and a standard deviation of 4.40%, whereby the extreme
values fluctuate between a minimum of 0.59% and a maximum of 23.90% in
the sample.
A comparison of the preliminary results shows that the lowest values occur
with PEMAD followed by PEVOL and PEMAX as previously expected. The results
for PEMADD, depicting restriction to negative price deviations reveals a great
similarity to the findings of PEMAD. Only the maximum value of 4.74% is
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slightly higher. From this, we can infer that a multitude of ETCs are likely to
trade at negative pricingdeviations from theirNAVs. This view is consistentwith
Tzvetkova (2005) and Kayali and Ozkan (2012) who also report similar results
in their analysis of ETFs. When looking at PEMAXD, the daily pricing errors for
the PEMAXD are comparatively lower than those of the PEMAX. Furthermore, all
results are statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
In summary, we state that the pricing of ETCs in the German market is far
from being efficient according to the different PE measurement concepts.
Table 5.5 provides detailed results of the five pricing error measurement
concepts in differentiation of various product characteristics, such as issuers,
commodity sectors, single-commodity versus broad-commodity, investment
strategies, replication methods and collateralization. We conduct an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) by the F-test of Welch (1951) in order to test the differences
between two or more means of the analyzed characteristics.
The results of PEVOL are almost identical to PEMAD and PEMADD when scaled
appropriately. To make the remaining differences between them visible, we in-
clude a version of the PEMAD means scaled by x Mean(PEMAD)/Mean(PEVOL)
 0.70. Furthermore, due to the similarities among the measures, we focus on
the differences between MeMs and MaMs—as introduced on Page 76.
In the issuer category we determine differences between the means of the
six institutions issuing ETCs at the 0.1% level for all measures. Furthermore,
all measures give consistent results, with Issuers 1 and 6 showing the highest
errors throughout. The MaMs are higher and show smaller relative differences
between the issuers—as is expected.
When differentiating between commodity sectors, all measures show almost
identical order. The lowest pricing error is found for cross-sectional ETCs, the
highest being energy for MeMs and agriculture for MaMs. The differences in the
group means for the different sectors are again highly significantly different at
the 0.1% level, with the exception of PEMAX at 1% and PEMAXD at 5%.
The differences between issuers and sectors underline the importance of
including them as control variables in our regression model.
In view of single-commodity or broad-commodity ETCs, we note higher pricing
errors for single-commodity ETCs than for broad-commodity ETCs under all five
measures at the 0.1% significance level. This result provides further insights on
our hypothesis H6 regarding the direction of the influence of the variable and is
consistent with the fact that cross-sectional ETCs—which are by definition broad-
commodity—also show the lowest errors.
Considering investment strategies, lower price deviations occur for short, long
andwith a certain gap for leveraged long followed by leveraged short. These results
are consistent over all five measures and are further supported by the applied
ANOVA,which indicates a systematic difference between the groupmean values
of the various investment strategies at the 0.1% level. This can be viewed as
first supporting evidence in favor of H7, but only for the leveraged strategies.
Synthetic replication has lower pricing errors than physical replication for all
pricing methods except for PEMAXD. While the results are in line with our
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hypothesis H8, the differences of the means are not statistically significant.
With regard to the type of collateralization, all measures induce a similar
ranking, where no collateralization shows the smallest pricing errors. TheANOVA
analysis indicates significant differences among the group means at the 0.1%
level. This gives support to our hypothesis H9, that cost savings due to a lack of
collateralization improves pricing efficiency.
Overall, these results show that all five measures give qualitatively similar
answers that are consistent with our hypotheses, except in the case of single-
commodity ETCs.
5.5.3 Regression analysis
The main findings of our analysis can be found in Table 5.6, which presents the
results of the OLS regression models based on eq. (5.3). It shows the determi-
nants of the pricing efficiency of ETCs in the German market and is used in the
following to assess the hypotheses of section 5.4. The dependent variables of
the five different regression models are the quadratic and linear pricing mea-
sures of the dataset, while the independent variables are the different product
characteristics described above.9 The significance of the independent variables
is tested by t-statistics adjusted for heteroskedasticity by White (1980).
The overall explanatory power is satisfactory, with adjustedR2 in the range of
45% to 61%, and is the highest for PEMAD, PEMADD, closely followed by PEVOL
and then PEMAXD and PEMAX. This order is to be expected for the outlier-driven
MaMs. As in the previous section all measures show comparable results and
Table 5.6 again includes a scaled version of PEMAD for better comparison with
PEVOL.
Corroborating the hypothesis H1, the management fee has a positive effect
and is significant at the 1% level onMeMs andonly at the 10% level forMaMs. In
the case of PEVOL, a coefficient of 0.91 implies that a 1 bps change inmanagement
fees will lead to an almost equal change in the pricing error volatility. This is in
accordance with the findings from Chu (2011) and Rompotis (2011b).
As was expected by H2 and also seen by Delcoure and Zhong (2007), the
bid-ask spread shows a 0.1%-significant influence across all five dependent
variables, with coefficients around 0.2 for MeMs and between 1.1 and 1.5 for
MaMs.
The expected dependence on the AUM market share (H3) is also observed,
in accordance with the results of Buetow and Henderson (2012) and Chu (2011).
The coefficients are significant at the 1% level, expect for for PEMAD and PEMADD,
whose coefficients are closer to zero and do not follow the usual linear rela-
tionship with PEVOL. For MaMs the coefficients are below −17, indicating a
strong dampening effect of outliers for large ETCs. For example, the largest
ETC’s market share of 23% explains the 4.3p.p. increase in pricing efficiency
measures by PEMAX when compared to the smallest ETCs.
9The independent variable ’Issuer 3’ was excluded from the model for it is identical to the
variable ’no collateralization’.
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The positive coefficient of the variable age does not confirm our expectation
(H4) and thus also deviates from the life cycle hypothesis and results of Wilkens
et al. (2003). The positive coefficient indicates that newer products have a better
pricing efficiency than older ones. This may be attributed to the fact that newer
products have to cope with great market competition and, thus, try to perfectly
replicate the NAVs in their pricing. It should, however, be noted that it is not
significantly different from zero for PEMAD and PEMADD and only at a 5% level
for PEVOL.
Our hypothesis H5 conjecturing a positive coefficient for the variable age for
MaMs can be confirmed at the 0.1% significance level. The magnitude of the
highest observed pricing error grows 0.86p.p. per year on average. It should be
noted, however, that this effect might be offset by growing AUM.
HypothesisH6 canbe confirmed. As in theprevious section, single-commodity
ETCs have higher pricing errors compared to broad-commodity ETCs—in analogy
to the results of Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005). Except for PEMAD, this effect is
significant at or below the 1% level.
The results of the regression analysis evidence the same effect as in Leung
and Ward (2015), and thus confirm our hypothesis H7 concerning leveraged
investment strategies. However, no significant effect can be found for short, which
suggests that it is the leverage effect which causes price deviations.
Hypothesis H8 is supported only for MeMs and only at the 5% level. The
PEMADD measure has a coefficient closer to zero, while beingmore significant (at
the 1% level). This indicates that when only negative deviations are considered,
synthetic replication exhibits consistently higher pricing efficiency than physical
replication. This result confirms the expected increase in explanatory power
over the results of Fassas (2014), who did not find statistical evidence for the
hypothesis, possibly due to a smaller sample size.
A negative coefficient for the variable collateralization by securities confirms
hypothesis H9 at the 1% level. The pricing efficiency benefits through reduced
risk seems to dominate the higher costs associated with collateralization by
liquid securities with highest credit quality.
The control variables show significant effects on both groups of measures,
except for the sector, which has no significant effects on the MaMs. As one
example take Issuer 6, whose ETCs have on average more than one additional
percentage point of pricing error volatility compared to ETCs from Issuer 1.
Further research is needed to identify drivers of these effects which are not
explained by our hypotheses.
Compared to the reference category of cross-sectional ETCs, which were the
clear leader in the previous section, the other sectors now show both positive
and negative coefficients. The higher pricing efficiency visible in Table 5.5 now
seems to be explained by the broad-commodity variable, as conjectured above.
Summarizing the differences between MeMs and MaMs, the results show
the expected age dependence of the MaMs, some effects are missing in the sector
and the replication coefficients are quite significant for the MeMs.
The regression results corroborate seven of our nine hypothesis and only
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partly our hypothesis on the effect of investment strategy (H6). They can not
confirm our hypothesis on the effect of age (H4).
5.5.4 Robustness test
In order to test the robustness of the regression results, we split up the observa-
tion period into two sub-periods before and after the 1October 2010, respectively.
Then, for each of the two sub-periods, we perform regression analyses for the
five pricing efficiency measures, based on the subset of prices and NAV values
from the respective date range. ETCs that have no valid data reported within a
sub-period are excluded from that sub-sample’s regression.
The regression results for the first period are given in Table 5.7. It shows
consistent results among the five measures and deviates from the full range
regressions only moderately. To be more precise the following can be stated:
Management fee shows no significant effect. The control variables issuer, and
sector show differing significant effects, except for energy, which again has a
significantly positive coefficient. The effect of synthetic replication is missing,
instead there is a significantly positive coefficient for physical collateralization.
Adjusted R2 is slightly smaller, e.g. at 0.52 compared to 0.57 for PEVOL. These
differences can be explained by the fact that there are 64 ETCs missing that were
present in the full regression, including all ETCs of issuer 6 and all leveraged short
ETCs.
The second sub-period (cf. Table 5.8), which includes 231 ETCs, gives results
that are much closer to the full range regressions. They differ only in the
following item: The positive coefficient for age is now significant and AUM
market share is no longer significant, except for PEMAX. The coefficient of issuer
5 is now also significantly different from zero and the effects concerning the
investment strategy are now less significant. For this sub-period, the adjusted R2
is even higher, e.g. to 0.59 for PEVOL.
All other effects as well as the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are
reproduced in the sub-periods. Consequently, this test confirms the robustness
of our main findings.
5.6 Summary and conclusion
This study investigates ETCs, a very successful recent financial innovation, from
an empirical perspective. ETCs are an important exchange-traded product
enabling all kinds of investors to participate in commodity markets and have
experienced considerable growth in both popularity and assets under manage-
ment since their inception. However, as the field is still under-researched, this is
the first examination of ETCs and their pricing efficiency in the euromarketplace
with a special focus on the German market, which is the biggest ETC market in
terms of product availability, assets under management, and turnover.
Our empirical examination of the pricing efficiency of 237 ETCs listed in
the German market utilizes different measures. This study is not only unique
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concerning its focus on the German, or more generally the euro market, but also
in the size of our dataset which is by far the largest in the ETP literature so far
and allows a representative analysis since the start of the German ETC trading.
We concentrate on the daily pricing deviations between the mid-prices of ask
and bid prices and the theoretical fair values in form of the net asset values
calculated in euro.
The measures employed include the premium/discount analysis based
on prices and the pricing errors based on returns and result in the following
findings: First, the ETCs incur, on average, pricing deviations in their daily
trading. They are also more likely to trade at a premium from their theoretical
fair prices. These outcomes are also supported by the five symmetrical pricing
error measures, which provide deeper insight in the magnitude of deviation by
alternate interpretation models.
Second, we use the pricing error measures as dependent variables in our
regression analysis to find potential contributors to the pricing errors of ETCs.
The results imply that a set of several variables influences pricing efficiency
and thereby confirm seven out of nine of our hypotheses, namely those on
management fee, spread, AUM market share, single- vs. broad-commodity,
replication and collateralization. Mixed significance is found for investment
strategy. No significant effects are found for our hypothesis on age.
Both the mean-based and the outlier driven maximum-based measures give
comparable results. However, the observable and expected differences imply
that the former is slightly better suited to assess the pricing efficiency of ETCs
in the German market and slightly better explainable by economically relevant
determinants.
ETCs as a passive, simple, and cost-effective financial innovation are likely
to grow in investors’ interests. For example, they are likely to play an important
role in private pension plans due to their advantageous characteristics. However,
the prosperous outlook of ETC investing is limited by the potential systemic risks
arising from extensive passive investing and its influence on the commodity
markets, the stock markets, and the whole economy.
Hence, the ETC pricing problem is of considerable importance and interest
to private and institutional investors and may be extended in a global anal-
ysis. Another potential extension of our study is to derive concrete trading
opportunities to exploit the existing pricing deviations.
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Short
0.86
2.40**
0.84
0.59
2.26**
0.85
2.99***
4.44
3.08***
5.92
4.59****
Synthetic
replication
−0.59
−2.31**
−0.70
−0.49
−2.60***
−0.50
−2.69***
−1.96
−1.45
−1.03
−0.94
C
oll.by
securities
−0.56
−3.94****
−0.54
−0.38
−4.11****
−0.38
−4.14****
−3.00
−4.63****
−2.49
−3.66****
Physicalcoll.
−0.08
−0.38
−0.14
−0.10
−0.65
−0.10
−0.65
0.40
0.34
0.15
0.15
Third
party
coll.
−0.24
−1.59
−0.22
−0.16
−1.58
−0.17
−1.78*
1.05
1.23
0.56
0.66
R
2
0.63
0.66
0.66
0.52
0.54
A
djusted
R
2
0.59
0.62
0.63
0.48
0.49
F-statistic
16.71****
19.11****
19.49****
10.95****
11.67****
N
231
231
231
231
231
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6
ADDENDUM: PRICING AND HEDGING THE
SANDBOX OPTION
The initial research questions of this dissertation were positioned around a
new variant of option on the proceeds of the holder’s trading activity, called
the sandbox option. However, when it became clear that the literature lacks the
appropriate tools to answer these questions, the focus of this dissertation shifted
to developing such tools. After this detour, the following text now returns to
the original questions and demonstrates how the results of chapters 2 and 3 can
be used to answer them.
Remark 6.1. All quantities represent discounted values.
A sandbox option gives its holder the right to buy at expirationT the proceeds
of their trading activity for the strike price M. During the live of the option,
they are allowed to buy and sell from a predefined set of assets at market prices
described by an N-dimensional process X. Trades are settled against a money
market account with initial balance Y0. The account accrues interest at the
risk-free rate and borrowing is not allowed. Yt(ψ) denotes the portfolio value at
time t for a given N-dimensional trading strategy ψ, representing the number
of shares held of each asset at each time. The option’s payoff is then given by
f  (YT −M)+.
At first, we solve the frictionless case, whereYt(ψ) ≡
∫ t
0 ψs·dXs +Y0 is defined
using the stochastic integral.
We work in the setting of subsection 2.4.3 and only extend the defining equa-
tion for the hedger’s acceptance setA to also include conservative acceptance
of the holder’s decisions:{
f + H
 f ∈ A}  { f  f ≥ 0}∃S ∀R ,
with the newly introduced set of admissible trading strategies by the holder, R.
With the help of Theorems 2.2 and 2.4 we can directly state the formula for the
ask price (cf. Remark 3.2):
− P[A](− f )  sup
ψ∈R
sup
Q∈M
Q
[(YT(ψ) −M)+] (6.1)
In a simple market, the following theorem provides an explicit solution to this
optimization problem.
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Theorem 6.1 (Complete market with constant volatilities). Assume, that X is a
complete market, given by a vector of N geometric Brownian motions with covariance
matrix Σ, defined by
dX it dX
j
t  X
i
t X
j
t Σ
i j dt , for all 1 ≤ i , j ≤ n.
Let Xk be the asset with the highest volatility and define n : Y0/Xk0 . Then,
(1) the price in eq. (6.1) equals the price of n calls on Xk with moneyness M/n and
expiration T.
(2) The pessimal (for the writer) trading strategy of the holder is to buy and hold n
shares of Xk .
(3) The writer’s super-replicating strategy is to hold the same position as the holder
multiplied by the Black-Scholes delta of the call option from (1).
Proof. As the market is complete there is a unique sigma-martingale measure
M  {Q}, which removes the second supremum in eq. (6.1).
Define the vector of portfolio weights at time t using the component-wise
product of two vectors: qt ≡ ψt*Xt/Yt(ψ). The option’s specifications restrict
the set of allowed weights to
J ≡ {q ∈ [0,∞〉N  ∑Ni q i ≤ 1}. (6.2)
We will need the following trivial properties of dYt :
dYt  Yt
N∑
i
q it
dX it
X it
, Q[dYt]  0, and (dYt)2  Y2t qTΣq dt .
Results on stochastic control (e.g. Pham 2009) entail that there exists a value func-
tion v, with v(0,Y0)  supψ∈R Q
[(YT(ψ) −M)+] , that satisfies the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. For all t ∈ [0, T〉 and y ∈ [0,∞〉,
∂v
∂t
+ y2 sup
q∈ J
1
2
∂2v
∂y2
qTΣq  0, v(T, y)  (y −M)+.
To prove the first statement of the theorem, we show that
v(t , y) ≡ nQ
[(
XkT −M/n
)+Xkt  y/n]
satisfies the HJB equation. The terminal condition is trivial. To prove the
differential equation, we subtract from it the Feynman-Kac equation for v,
yielding:
sup
q∈ J
∂2v
∂y2
qTΣq 
∂2v
∂y2
Σkk
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The covariance matrix Σ is positive semi-definite and due to the convexity of
the call price, it holds 0 ≤ ∂2v
∂y2 . Therefore, the quadratic form on the l.h.s is
convex (Rockafellar 1970, Theorem 4.5) and bounded on any bounded set. By
Rockafellar (ibid., Corollary 32.3.4 and Theorem 19.1) the supremum is attained
at one of J’s extreme points. Consequently, it is given by the largest diagonal
element of Σ, i.e. Σkk . This also proves the second statement of the theorem.
For the third statement it is enough to look at the random part of the differ-
ential of the price:
dv(t ,Yt(ψ)) + O(dt)  ∂v∂y dYt 
∂
∂x
Q
[(
XkT −M/n
)+Xkt  x] ψt ·dXt

Real-world hedging always incurs transaction costs. As the hedger has to
hold a scaled down version of the holder’s position, it is obvious that frequent
rebalancings by the holder will accumulate large sums of transaction costs for
the hedger. Not so obvious are the answers the following questions:
What exactly is the pessimal trading strategy of the holder? How much
larger will the ask price be? Do transaction costs render this contract useless
by making it too expensive? Is there a qualitative difference between the cases
N  1 and N > 1? Can this problem be avoided by imposing similar transaction
costs on the holder’s trading?
Except for the derivation of eq. (6.1), the analysis of the frictionless case
above utilized standard methods; the same methods that were used to derive
prices for similar options (e.g. for the passport option, see Hyer et al. 1997; Ahn
et al. 1999). However, they cannot be adjusted to answer the above questions.
The methods developed in chapter 3 fill this gap and make answering these
questions straight forward. Working in the setting of section 3.4, we will derive
a pricing formula for the optimally hedged sandbox option. In the following
we setup only those quantities that are missing or different from section 3.4 and
then state the result.
The holder’s portfolio value is defined analogously to the result of the
hedging activity in eq. (3.4). At time t ∈ (si−1 , si] it is given by:
Yt(ψ) ≡ Y0 +
i∑
j1
ψs j−1 ·
(
Xmin{s j ,t} − Xs j−1
)
(6.3)
Furthermore, we assume there exists a pricing function pxt : L∞ → R with
−pit(−w)  pXtt (w) for any w that is a function of present and future market
prices. This assumption is satisfied e.g. if pi is built from conditional expectations.
We require the hedging decisions to take values in some countable1 set
W ⊂ RN . The holder’s positions have to stay within the contractually specified
limits, i.e. ψt*Xt/Yt(ψ) ∈ J, with J from eq. (6.2).
1Note, that countability is no restriction of practical applications.
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Theorem6.2 (Realistic case). In the setting outlined above, the ask price of an optimally
hedged sandbox option at time τi , for market price vector x, holder’s portfolio value y
and a hedger with current hedging position h, is given by gi(h , x , y), which is defined
by the following recurrence relation:
gn+1(h , x , y) :(y −M)+ + cn+1(h , 0, x) (6.4)
gi(h , x , y) : sup
q∈ J
inf
h′∈W
pxτi
(
gi+1(h′,Xτi+1 , y
(
1 + q ·δiX
)) − h′ · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) )
+ ci(h , h′, x) (6.5)
Here, (δiX) j : X jτi+1/X jτi − 1 is the vector of asset returns, ci(h , h′, x) are the trans-
action costs for changing the position from h to h′ at a current price of x at time τi and
q is the holder’s vector of portfolio weights.
Proof. Abbreviate the ask price at time si−1 with ui ≡ supψ∈Si−1 −ητi
(− f ) [ψ]
and show:
un+1  f + Cn+1 (6.6)
ui  sup
ψ∈Si−1
− sup
ϕ∈Ri
(
piτi
(
inf
ρ∈Si
ητi+1
(− f ) [ρ] [ψ] [ϕ] + ϕτi · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) ) − Ci [ϕ] )
 sup
ψ∈Si−1
inf
ϕ∈Ri
− piτi
(−ui+1 [ψ] [ϕ] + ϕτi · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) ) + Ci [ϕ] (6.7)
The first two equations is follow from Theorem 3.1 and eq. (3.13). The third
follows from the inf/sup-duality and the definition of ui+1. After applying
Lemma 3.2 to both decisions in eq. (6.7), it can be easily checked by compar-
ing the right hand sides of eqs. (6.6) and (6.7) with eqs. (6.4) and (6.5) that
gi(h ,Xτi ,Yτi (ψ))  ui
[
τi−1 7→ h
](ψ). 
If a pricing function pxt is provided—e.g. some monetary utility function
or indifference price—then this theorem gives (at least numerically) the price,
optimal writer and pessimal holder strategy and thus the answers to the above
questions.
To answer the last question, an analogous derivation has to be performed
with a modified version of eq. (6.3) that includes transaction costs.
If transaction costs are of the form of eq. (3.16) and pxt does not depend on x,
then the price can be calculated using a simpler function g˜, with gi(h , x , y) 
g˜i(hx , y). This reduction in the complexity of the calculation is thinkable e.g.
in cases where δiX is independent from Xτi , such as in models with constant
volatility.
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CONCLUSION
The results of the previous chapters have several theoretical and practical impli-
cations. The following summarizes the contributions of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides a characterization of the implicit assumptions underlying
existing approaches to decisions embedded within derivative contracts. Known
results can be replicated within our framework under the assumption of time-
consistent conservative acceptance. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates
that complex combinations of a wide array of decisions can be handled in a
consistent manner, independent from the market model and pricing function.
Future research can leverage our framework to formally eliminate decisions
from all kinds of pricing problems with minimal argumentative effort.
Our findings provide the ground for further research that explores the
limits of conservative acceptance and its possible extensions—as motivated by
Example 2.1.
Chapter 3 demonstrates how a unified approach to decisions makes hitherto
unsolved problems accessible and that new results can be obtained by straight-
forward application of our methods. The model- and contract-independent
hedging principle derived in this chapter can be used to solve future theoretical
and practical hedging problems. The chapter also provides a first example of
such an application with the following result: optimal hedging of American
options is possible, constitutes a significant improvement over delta hedging
and thus should be implemented in practice.
A second example is given in chapter 6. Here, the general hedging principle
is applied to the problem of realistically pricing and hedging a new variant of
option on the proceeds of the holder’s trading activity, called the sandbox option.
To fully carry out the pricing procedures derived in chapters 2 and 3, a
classical pricing function for derivatives without decisions is required. Finding
utility-based candidates—analogously to the discussion in subsection 3.5.1—
that do not suffer from the shortcomings encountered in chapter 4 is a challenge
left to future research.
Chapter 4 has two implications for the use of utility functions that fall “too
fast” as the wealth approaches negative infinity. Firstly, indifference or utility-
based prices and their hedging strategies derived for such utility functions lead
to far from optimal behavior when approximated using discrete, i.e. practicable,
99
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
strategies. Secondly, there exists no simple solution or workaround that would
mitigate the problem. Its root lies in the fact that such utility functions forbid
any asymptotic short exposure in the underlying asset and thus do not represent
the behavior of realistic hedgers.
These findings should encourage future research to devise utility functions
that carry over many of the mathematically elegant results from the indifference
pricing literature without compromising practical applicability. Chapter 4
discusses a sufficient condition and an example to spur further explorations.
Chapter 5 provides evidence that prices of ETCs in the German market
between 2002 and 2012 significantly deviate from the ETCs’ fair prices. On
average, ETCs traded at a premiumover theirNAVs. The results of the regression
analysis corroborate the hypotheses about the influence of the following factors
on the pricing efficiency of ETCs: management fee, relative bid-ask spread,
AUMmarket share, single- vs. broad-commodity, type of replication, type of
collateralization and leverage factor. No evidence is found for an effect of the
ETC’s age.
These findings are important to investors seeking ETCs to track certain
individual or baskets of commodities. First, they show that investors cannot
blindly rely on the advertised tracking properties of ETCs. Secondly, they can
be used to select efficiently priced ETCs, thereby helping to achieve the desired
investment strategy and diversification.
The model used in the regression analysis includes control variables for each
ETC’s issuer and sector. Several of these variables are found to have significant
effects onpricing efficiency; effectswhich are not explained by the other variables.
Identifying the mechanism behind these unexplained effects is left to future
research.
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proofs
DefinitionA.1 (Time t-acceptablepremiums). K [A , f ]  {x ∈ L−t  f − x ∈ A}
A.1.1 Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. Equation (2.2) from Definition 2.4 follows directly from Axiom 2.1 and
the definition ofA.
To prove t-compatibility assume
(
αt
(
fn
) )
 1 and therefore
(
αt
(
fn
) Bn ) 
1 for all n ∈ N. Take any x ∈ Vt and define h ≡ x + ∑n fn1Bn . Due to Bn’s
disjointness we have h Bn fn + x and thus by the “⇒” direction of Axiom 2.1,
(αt(h)|Bn)  1 and furthermore by Corollary A.2.3 (αt(h))  1. Using the
“⇐” direction of Axiom 2.1 yields (αt (∑n fn1Bn ) )  1. 
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
This proof requires the following lemmata:
LemmaA.1. Given h ∈ Xt , C ∈ F∞ and a non-empty set of payoffsY ⊂ XtT , such that
h
C
< supY, a sequence (gn) ⊆ Y exists as well as mutually disjoint events {Bn} ∈ Ft ,
such that Bn ⊆ {gn > h} ∪ C and (⋃n Bn)  1.
Proof. By Theorem A.1 and Y , Ø a sequence (gn) ⊆ Y exists with pointwise
supremum g(ω) ≡ supn gn(ω) such that g  supY. Define Dn ≡ {h < gn} ∪ C
and Bn ≡ Dn \⋃n−1m1 Bm . Disjointedness and Bn ⊆ {h < gn} ∪ C follow trivially.
Next, show:⋃
n
Bn  C∪
⋃
n
{h < gn}  C∪{∃n : h < gn}  C∪{h < g}  C∪({h < g}∩C)
(A.1)
The fourth from the least upper bound property of the supremum. By the
hypothesis of the lemma we have 
({h < g} ∩ C)  (C). Together with ’s
additivity for disjoint events, eq. (A.1) proves (⋃n Bn)  1 
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Lemma A.2. ∞ ∈ A and −∞ ∈ K [A , f ] for any proper t-acceptance set A and
f ∈ X[t ,∞〉.
Proof. Due to A’s t-compatibility some g ∈ A exists. By eq. (2.2) from Def-
inition 2.4 and ∞ ∈ Vt we can follow g + ∞  ∞  f − (−∞) ∈ A. i.e.
−∞ ∈ K [A , f ] . 
Lemma A.3. For any proper t-acceptance setA and f ∈ X[t ,∞〉:
0 < P[A]( f ) ⇒ f ∈ A
Proof. By Lemma A.2 we can apply Lemma A.1 with h  0, Y  K [A , f ]
and C  Ω and get a sequence (gn) ∈ K
[A , f ] and a sequence (Bn) with
Bn ⊆ {0 < gn < ∞} for any n ∈ N. Define x  ∑n gn1Bn . By f − gn ∈ A, the
other properties of Bn and t-compatibility we have
∑
n( f − gn)1Bn  f − x ∈ A.
Furthermore, due to x > 0 and x ∈ Lt , we have f  ( f − x) + x and thus by
eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4: f ∈ A. 
Lemma A.4. For every cash invariant t-pricing function pi and B ∈ Ft , it holds:
pi
(
f +∞ · 1B
)
 pi
(
g +∞ · 1B
)
⇒ pi ( f ) B pi (g)
Proof.
pi
(
f
) B
 pi
(
f
)
+∞ · 1B  pi
(
f +∞ · 1B
)
 pi
(
g +∞ · 1B
)
 pi
(
g
)
+∞ · 1B
B
 pi
(
g
)
The second and fourth equation follow from cash invariance (Definition 2.8)
and∞ · 1B ∈ L+t . 
Proof of Theorem 2.1.1. First we show t-compatibility. A[pi] is not empty due to
pi(∞) ≥ 0, which follows from 0 ∈ X[t ,∞〉,∞ ∈ L+t , cash invariance of pi and the
convention from Definition 2.1: pi(∞)  pi(0) +∞  ∞ ≥ 0.
For t-compatibility, take a sequence fn with pi
(
fn
) ≥ 0, mutually disjoint
{Bn} ⊆ Ft with (⋃n Bn)  1 and define g ≡ ∑∞n fn1Bn . We need to prove
pi
(
g
) ≥ 0. Using Corollary A.1.2 it remains to show pi (g) Bn≥ 0 for any n: The
two functions fn +∞ · 1Bn and g +∞ · 1Bn are identical and thus Lemma A.4
can be applied to prove pi
(
g
) Bn
 pi
(
fn
) ≥ 0.
Now prove the “⊆”-direction in eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4. For any f with
0 ≤ pi ( f ) , g ∈ X[t ,∞〉 and x ∈ Vt with g  f + x (pointwise) it holds:
0 ≤ pi ( f ) ≤ pi ( f ) + x  pi ( f + x)  pi (g)
The first equality uses pi’s cash invariance (Definition 2.8).
For the “⊇”-direction: Assume for each n ∈ N it holds f + 1n ∈ A[pi], thus
0 ≤ pi ( f + 1n ) and by pi’s cash invariance 0 ≤ pi ( f ) + 1n . By taking the limit
n →∞ yields the result: f ∈ A[pi]. 
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Proof of Theorem 2.1.2. Take any f ∈ X[t ,∞〉 and show:
P[A[pi]]( f ) sup{x ∈ L−t  f − x ∈ A[pi]}  sup{x ∈ L−t  pit ( f − x) ≥ 0}
sup
{
x ∈ L−t
 pit ( f ) ≥ x}  pit ( f )
The first two equations are A’s and P’s definitions and the second uses cash
invariance (Definition 2.8) of pi and the convention from Definition 2.1. The
last equation: The upper bound property of pit
(
f
)
is trivial and to prove the
least upper bound property, assume h ∈ X[t ,∞〉 is another upper bound and
define the sequence gn ≡ min(n , pi
(
f
)). By definition of a t-pricing function,
we have pi
(
f
) ∈ L±t and thus gn ∈ L−t and furthermore pi ( f ) ≥ gn for any n ∈ N.
As an upper bound h fulfills h ≥ gn , which in the limit n → ∞ proves that
h ≥ pi ( f ) 
Proof of 2.1.3. It is a t-pricing function by Theorem A.1. It remains to show cash
invariance.
Due to Lemma A.2 the following proof can ignore the case of empty sets.
Take any x ∈ L+t and define g ≡ P[A]( f +x)  supK
[A , f + x] , h ≡ P[A]( f ) 
supK [A , f ] , and the set B ≡ {x  ∞}.
1) h + x
B≤ g: By taking into account the convention from Definition 2.1, it
is easy to see that for any n ∈ N it holds f + x − (n − ∞ · 1B)  ∞, which is
element ofA by Lemma A.2. Consequently, n −∞ · 1B ∈ K
[A , f + x] and the
upper bound property of the supremum g directly implies n
B≤ g and in the
limit g B ∞ B≥ h + x.
2) h + x
B≤ g: Take any y ∈ K [A , f ] and define z ≡ y + x · 1B ∈ L−t , such
that f + x − z  ( f − y) · 1B +∞ · 1B . From f − y ∈ A,∞ ∈ A (by Lemma A.2)
and t-compatibility we derive f + x − z ∈ A, i.e. z ∈ K [A , f + x] . The upper
bound property of the supremum g and z’s definition yield g − x B≥ y. Together
with the previous result g B ∞ we get g − x ≥ y and thus g − x is an upper
bound ofK [A , f ] . By its definition, h has to be the least upper bound of this
set, thus h ≤ g − x, which proves the remaining h + x B≤ g.
3) g ≤ h+ x: For any y ∈ K [A , f + x] it holds f −(y− x)  f + x− y (taking
into account the convention from Definition 2.1).Thus due to f + x − y ∈ A we
have y − x ∈ K [A , f ] . The upper bound property of the supremum h entails
y − x ≤ h. Or in other words, h + x is an upper bound of the setK [A , f + x] .
By its definition, g has to be the least upper bound of the assertion follows. 
Proof of “⊇” in Theorem 2.1.4. Take any f ∈ A. It directly follows that 0 ∈
K [A , f ] , andby theupper boundproperty of the supremumwehaveP[A]( f ) ≥
0. The assertion follows from Definition 2.9 of A[P[A]]. 
Proof of “⊆” in Theorem 2.1.4. Take any f ∈ A[P[A]]. By Definition 2.9 this
implies 0 ≤ P[A]( f ). For any x ∈ Vt , P[A]’s cash invariance ensures 0 < x ≤
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x+P[A]( f )  P[A]( f + x). Now, LemmaA.3 implies f + x ∈ A. Using eq. (2.2)
from Definition 2.4 we arrive at f ∈ A. 
A.1.3 Proof of Corollary 2.2
Proof. Define pi ≡ P[A]. We have to show that supK [A , f ] ∈ K [A , f ] , i.e.
pi
(
f
) ∈ L−t and f − pi ( f ) ∈ A. The first statements follows from Theorem A.1
and the hypotheses pi
(
f
)
< ∞. Now, prove the second statement using
pi
(
f − pi ( f ) )  pi ( f ) − pi ( f ) ≥ 0 ⇒ f − pi ( f ) ∈ A[P[A]]  A ,
which follows from cash invariance, Definition 2.9 and Theorem 2.1.4. 
A.1.4 Proof of Corollary 2.3
Proof. Assume B ∈ Ft , f , g ∈ X and f B g and define f ′  f + ∞ · 1B and
g′  g +∞ · 1B. By Lemma A.4 it remains to show pi
(
f ′
)
 pi
(
g′
)
, which by
cash invariance and Theorem 2.1.2 follows from
f ′ − x ∈ A[pi] ⇔ g′ − x ∈ A[pi].
We prove the “⇒”-direction of this equation, the other follows analogously.
Assume f ′ − x ∈ A[pi]. It holds for every y ∈ Vt and h  (g′ − x) + y, that
h  ( f ′ − x) + y and thus by Theorem 2.1.1 and eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4,
h ∈ A[pi], which by the other direction of eq. (2.2) from Definition 2.4 proves
g′ − x ∈ A[pi]. 
A.1.5 Properties of inf and sup
Lemma A.5. The following two mappings inherit pi’s cash invariance:
f 7→ sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
(only if S , Ø) and f 7→ inf
ϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
Proof of the sup-version. By Definition 2.8, we need to show for any x ∈ L+t and
f ∈ X[t ,∞〉:
sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(( f + x)[ϕ] )  sup
ϕ∈S
(
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
+ x
)
 x + sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
The first equation follows from the facts that fixation commutes with addition
(trivially by Definition 2.3), x
[
ϕ
]
 x (by Remark 2.4), and finally from cash
invariance of pi.
For the second equation we need S , Ø and Theorem A.1, together
ensuring the existence of a sequence (ϕn)n∈N ⊆ S, such that g(ω) ≡
supϕ∈S
(
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )(ω) + x(ω)) and g  supn∈N(pi ( f [ϕn] ) + x). It remains to
show for all ω ∈ Ω:
g(ω)  x(ω) + sup
n∈N
(pi ( f [ϕn] )(ω)) (A.2)
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For all ω with x(ω)  ∞, this follows directly from the convention introduced
in Definition 2.1. For all other ω’s, we have x(ω) − x(ω)  0 and thus eq. (A.2)
follows from translational invariance of the supremum.

Proof of the inf-version. This prove is completely analogous with the only dif-
ference being that the S can be empty. However, in this case the assertion
follows directly from the convention infØ  ∞ and the one introduced in
Definition 2.1. 
Lemma A.6. For any f ∈ X[t ,∞〉, h , g ∈ L±t , local (Corollary 2.3) t-pricing function
pi, t-compatible S and x ∈ Vt it holds:
If h < ∞ and h ≤ supϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
, then a ψ ∈ S exists with h ≤ pi ( f [ψ] ) + x.
If −∞ < g and infϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) ≤ g, then a ψ ∈ S exists with pi ( f [ψ] ) ≤ g + x.
Proof of the inf-version. As locality is invariant under a pi 7→ −pi substitution
an inf-version of Lemma A.6 can be derived from it using the inf/sup-duality,
− supA  inf(−A). This derivation also relies on x ∈ L+t . 
Proof of the sup-version. Using cash invariance (Lemma A.5) and h < ∞we have
h
C
< supϕ∈S pi
(( f + x)[ϕ] ) with C ≡ {−∞ < h}. Let {Bn} be as in Lemma A.1
with gn  pi
(
f [an] + x) for some sequence {an}n∈N ⊆ S.
Define b 
∑∞
n an1Bn . By the hypothesis of our lemma that S is t-compatible
(Definition 2.5) and Bn ’s properties we have b ∈ S. By ∑∞n an1Bn Bn an and Defi-
nitions 2.2 and 2.3 we have f [b] Bn f [an] and locality yields gn Bn pi
(
f
[
b
]
+ x
)
.
From Bn ⊆ {gn > h}∪{h  −∞} and cash invariancewe obtain h
Bn≤ pi ( f [b] )+x
and the lemma now follows from (⋃n Bn)  1 and Corollary A.1.2. 
A.1.6 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. Define pi ≡ P[A] and prove for any f ∈ X[t ,∞〉:
0 ≤ inf
ϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) ⇐⇒ (∀a ∈ S : 0 ≤ pi ( f [a] ) ) ⇐⇒ (∀a ∈ S : f [a] ∈ A)
(A.3)
The first equality follows from the infimum’s defining greatest lower bound
property and the second from Theorem 2.1.4 andA’s properness.
Furthermore, by Theorem 2.1.3 we follow that pi is cash invariant and thus
by Lemma A.5 (appendix A.1.5) the inf-pricing function is also cash invariant.
Equation (A.3) shows that its dual acceptance set, which is automatically proper
by Theorem 2.1.1, equalsA∀S.
The first sentence of the second paragraph follows directly from the lower
bound property of the supremum and the last senctence from Lemma A.6 (with
g → infϕ∈S pi ( f [ϕ] )). 
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A.1.7 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof of Theorem 2.3. The proof follows in analogy to the proof of Theorem 2.2
(appendix A.1.6). We are required to show for any f ∈ X[t ,∞〉:
0 ≤ sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ Vt : ∃a ∈ S : f [a] + x ∈ A)
To prove “⇐”, note that for any n ∈ N an an ∈ S with f
[
an
]
+
1
n ∈ A exists.
Theorem 2.1.4, pi’s cash invariance (by Theorem 2.1.3) and the upper bound
property of the supremum imply 0 ≤ pi ( f [an] + 1n ) ≤ 1n + supϕ∈S pi ( f [ϕ] ) .
The assertion then follows after taking the limit n →∞.
For the other direction, due to cash invariance and locality (Corollary 2.3)
we can apply Lemma A.6 with h  0. It shows that for any x ∈ Vt an a ∈ S such
that 0 ≤ pi ( f [a] ) + x exists and thus by cash invariance and Theorem 2.1.4 we
have f
[
a
]
+ x ∈ A.
If the supremum is finite, the upper bound property of the supremum and
Lemma A.6 (with h → supϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
) ensure, that for any finite x ∈ Vt , there
exists some ψ ∈ S with:
sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) − x ≤ pi ( f [ψ] ) ≤ sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
This proves the last statement of the theorem. 
A.1.8 Proof of Theorem 2.4
This proof uses the abbreviation ϕ · X  ∫ ∞0 ϕt · dXt .
Proof. Take any f ∈ L∞ bounded from above by some z ∈ R, define C ≡
K [A , f ] (Definition A.1) and show:
C 
{
x ∈ L−0
 f − x + H ∈ {gg ≥ 0}∃S}

{
x ∈ L−0
 ∀y ∈ V0 , ∃ϕ ∈ S : f − x + ϕ · X + y ≥ 0} (A.4)
The first equation follows from the definition of A. The second uses Defini-
tion 2.11 and H’s definition.
Now, defineD  {x ∈ L−0  ∃ϕ ∈ S : f + ϕ · X ≥ x} and show
supD  supC (A.5)
The “≤” inequality follows directly from the trivialD ⊆ C. To prove the reverse
equality by supC’s least upper bound property, it remains shown that supD is
an upper bound of C: For any x ∈ C and n ∈ N it follows from eq. (A.4) that
there exists a ϕ in S, such that f + ϕ · X ≥ x − 1n . Consequently, x − 1n ∈ D and
thus x − 1n ≤ supD, which also holds in the limit n →∞.
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We can complete the proof:
pi
(
f
)
 supC  supD  inf
Q∈M
Q
[
f
]
The first equations uses Definition 2.6 of the pricing function, the second uses
eq. (A.5), and the thrid Theorem 5.12 of Delbaen and Schachermayer (1998, p.
246) with the substitution g → − f and the infimum-supremum duality. 
A.1.9 Proof of Theorem 2.5
This proof requires the following lemma
Lemma A.7. Given a proper A0 with its dual pricing function pi0, it holds for all
f ∈ XØ and t-acceptance setsA withA ∩XØ  A0
P[A]( f )  pi0 ( f ) .
Proof. By Definition 2.6 and A ∩ XØ  A0 it remains to show K
[A , f ] 
K [A ∩XØ , f ] for any f ∈ XØ, which follows from
f − x ∈ XØ for all x ∈ L−t , f ∈ XØ.

Proof of Theorem 2.5. By Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 it holds for any i with τi ∈ Tc and
f ∈ X[t ,∞〉:
P[Di]( f )  inf
ai∈Si
sup
ai+1∈Si+1
P[Di+2]( f [ai] [ai+1] )
We can use this relation recursively until we reach P[Dn+1]
(
g
)
 P[A0](g) ,
with g ≡ f [a1] . . . [an]. By Definition 2.3 it is easy to see that g ∈ XØ and thus
usingA0 ⊆ XØ and Lemma A.7 we have P[A0](g)  pi0 (g) . 
A.1.10 Proof of Corollary 2.4
Proof of the “if”. Define g  pis
(
f
) − pis(0) and B ≡ {pis ( f ) > −∞} (B  {g >
−∞} due to |pi•(0)| < ∞). Assuming eq. (2.5) we can prove Definition 2.13 by
showing
pis
(
g
)
 pis
(
f
)
.
1) We have
pis
(
g
) B
 pis
(
0 + g · 1B
) B
 pis(0) + pis
(
f
) − pis(0)  pis ( f )
The first equation uses locality (by Corollary 2.3), the second cash invariance
and g · 1B ∈ L+t and the third |pi•(0)| < ∞.
2) pis
(
g
) B≥ pis ( f ) is trivial.
3) Note that g ≤ ∞·1B−n for all n ∈ N. Usingmonotonicity and cash invariance
we have pis
(
g
) ≤ ∞ · 1B − n + pis(0) for any n and therefore due to |pi•(0)| < ∞:
pis
(
g
) B≤ −∞ B pis ( f ) 
107
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
Proof of the “only if”. Assume pi• satisfies Definition 2.13 and show
pis
(
f
) ≥ pis (g) ⇒ pit (pis ( f ) ) ≥ pit (pis (g) ) ⇒ pit ( f ) ≥ pit (g)
The first implication follows from monotonicity of pit and the second from time
consistency. 
A.1.11 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. The first statement follows directly from the lemma below. To prove
eq. (2.4), take any ϕ ∈ Φ and show:
pi
(
f + g
)(ϕ)  pi (( f + g)[ϕ〈−∞,t〉] )  (pi ( f ) + g)(ϕ)
The second equality follows from cash invariance of pi, g ∈ X〈−∞,t〉 and g(ϕ) ∈
L+t . 
Lemma A.8. For any f ∈ XT and cash invariant t-pricing function pi, the mapping
ϕ 7→ pi
(
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ) is an element of XtT∩〈−∞,t〉.
Proof. That pi
(
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ) is well-defined an Ft-measurable, follows from the
definition of a t-pricing function in subsection 2.3.2.
To prove the remaining properties in Definition 2.2 take B ∈ Ft and ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ
with ψs
B
 ϕs for all s ∈ T ∩ 〈−∞, t〉 ∩ Td . The required equation
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ) B pi ( f [ψ〈−∞,t〉] )
follows directly from locality (Corollary 2.3) and
f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉](ρ) B f [ψ〈−∞,t〉](ρ), for any ρ ∈ Φ ,
which in turn follows from f ∈ XT and Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. 
A.1.12 Proof of Theorem 2.6
Proof of time consistency of P[A•]. Define pi• ≡ P[A•]. By Lemma A.8 we have
pis
(
f
) ∈ X[t ,s〉 ⊆ X[t ,∞〉 and thus byDefinition 2.6 it remains to showK [At , f ] 
K [At , pis ( f ) − pis(0)] . Take any x ∈ L−t and prove:
f − x ∈ At ⇐⇒ pis ( f − x) − pis(0) ∈ At ⇐⇒ (pis ( f ) − pis(0)) − x ∈ At
The two equivalences follow from eq. (2.6) and cash invariance (Theorem 2.1.3
and Definition 2.8). 
Proof of time consistency of A[pi•]. DefineA• ≡ A[pi•] and show:
f ∈ At ⇐⇒ pit ( f ) ≥ 0⇐⇒ pit (pis ( f ) − pis(0)) ≥ 0⇐⇒ pis ( f ) − pis(0) ∈ At
The first and third equivalences follow from Definition 2.9. The second from
pi’s time consistency. 
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A.1.13 Proof of Theorem 2.7
This proof requires the following lemma
Lemma A.9. Take a properA0• with dual pi0• and someA• with dual pi• that satisfies
A• ∩ XØ  A0• . Taking into account Lemma 2.1, it holds pit
(
f
)
 pi0t
(
f
)
for any
payoff with no decisions at or after time t.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 2.1 and A.7 and f
[
ϕ
〈−∞,t〉] ∈ XØ for
all ϕ ∈ Φ. 
Proof of Theorem 2.7. Define pi• ≡ P[A•]. Show for all j ∈ {i , . . . , n}with τ j ∈ Ta ,
τ j−1 < s ≤ τ j and g ∈ X or s  τ j−1 and g ∈ XT\{s}:
pis
(
g
)
 pis
(
piτ j
(
g
) )
 pi0s
(
piτ j
(
g
) )
 pi0s
(
inf
a j∈S j
piτ j
(
g
[
a j
] ))
The first equation follows fromA•’s time consistency, pi0• ’s normalization and
Theorem 2.6. The second follows from Lemma A.9 with piτ j
(
g
) ∈ X〈−∞,s〉 (by
Lemma A.8). And the third from Remark 2.5, eq. (2.7) and Theorem 2.3.
For j with τ j ∈ Tc , Theorem 2.2 would be needed instead of Theorem 2.3
and inf instead of sup.
To prove the theorem we start with s → t and g → f . Then we can apply
this equation recursively with j → j + 1, s → τ j due to g
[
a j
] ∈ XT\{τ j}. 
A.2 Mathematical theorems
Theorem A.1 (Existence of the essential supremum). Suppose that the measure
space (Ω, F , µ) is σ-finite. Then the essential supremum of a collectionS of measurable
functions into the set R exists. Furthermore, if S is nonempty then a sequence ( fn)n∈N
in S exists such that its pointwise supremum equals (almost surely) the essential
supremum of S.
Proof. See Chapter V.18 in Doob (1994). 
Corollary A.1 (Properties of conditionally almost sure). Let D be a countable
collection of sets with positive probability and A, B ∈ D.
(1) (B \ C)  0⇐⇒ (C |B)  1
(2) (∀A ∈ D : (C |A)  1) ⇒ (C |⋃D)  1
(3) (B |A)  (C |B)  1 ⇒ (C |A)  1
Proof of Corollary A.1.1. The statement follows from:
(B)  ((B \ C) ∪ (B ∩ C))  (B \ C) + (C ∩ B)  (B \ C) + (C |B)(B)
Using Corollaries A.2.1 and A.2.2, additivity of  for disjoint sets and the
definition of conditional probability. 
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Proof of Corollary A.1.2. By Corollary A.1.1 it follows from the antecedent for
any A ∈ D: (A \ C)  0. By using Corollary A.2.3 with subadditivity of 
we can follow ((⋃D) \ C)  0, which again with Corollary A.1.1 yields the
result. 
Proof of Corollary A.1.3. Using Corollary A.1.1 we can follow from the assump-
tion: (A \ B)  (B \ C)  0. By using Corollary A.2.4 with monotonicity and
subadditivity of , it follows (A \ C)  0, which again with Corollary A.1.1
yields the result. 
Corollary A.2 (Properties of sets). For all sets A, B, C and collections of setsD, it
holds: (1) (A\B)∩(A∩B)  Ø, (2) (A\B)∪(A∩B)  A, (3)⋃E∈D(E\A)  (⋃D)\A,
and (4) A \ C ⊆ (A \ B) ∪ (B \ C).
The proofs are left to the reader. 
Corollary A.3 (Convergence in probability preserves equality almost surely).
For any set B ∈ F∞ and two sequences of random variables ( fn)n∈N and (gn)n∈N that
converge in probability to f and g, respectively, it holds f B g, if B ⊆ { fn  gn}.
Proof. Simple set manipulations yield:
B \ { f  g}  B ∩ {∃m ∈ N : | f − g | > 1m } 
⋃
m∈N
B ∩ {| f − g | > 1m }
Consequently, by Corollary A.1.1 and monotonicity of , f B g is equivalent to

(
B ∩ {| f − g | > 1m }
)
 0 for all m ∈ N (A.6)
We prove eq. (A.6) in two steps. First show for any m , n ∈ N:
B ∩ {| f − g | > 1m } ⊆ {| f − fn | + |g − gn | > 1m } ⊆
{| f − fn | > 12m } ∪ {|g − gn | > 12m }
The first “⊆” uses B ⊆ { f − g  ( f − fn) − (g − gn)}, together with the triangle
inequality. By definition of convergence in probability we can then prove:

(
B ∩ {| f − g | > 1m }
) ≤ ({| f − fn | > 12m }) + ({|g − gn | > 12m }) → 0

Corollary A.4 (Integration preserves equality almost surely). For any set B ∈ F∞,
integrator X and integrands a1 , b2, it holds
∫
a1 dX
B

∫
a2 dX, if B ⊆ {a1  a2}.
Proof. Let (ani )n<∞ be a sequence of simple integrands approximating ai . We
can choose them such that an1  a
n
2 on B for all n. Define Ai ≡
∫ T
t aidX ≡
plimn→∞ Ani (limit in probability) withA
n
i ≡
∫ T
t a
n
i dX. These integrals of simple
integrands are defined path-wise and thus B ⊆ {An1  An2 } for each n. By
Corollary A.3 it holds P(A1  A2 |B)  1. 
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B.1 Pointwise defined payoffs
Corollary B.1. Given a function g : Ω ×RN → R and a sequence of times (τi)i∈N,
define f :
f (ϕ)(ω)  g (ω, (ϕτi (ω)) i∈N) , for all ϕ ∈ Φ and ω ∈ Ω (B.1)
If f (ϕ) is F∞-measurable for all ϕ ∈ Φ, then f ∈ X{τi}i∈N .
Proof. As in Definition 3.1, we assume some set B ∈ F∞ and two decision
procedures with ψτi
B
 ϕτi for all i. As a direct consequence of eq. (B.1) we have⋂
i∈N{ϕτi  ψτi } ⊆ { f (ϕ)  f (ψ)} and applying basic set operations yields:
B \ { f (ϕ)  f (ψ)} ⊆ B \
⋂
i∈N
{ϕτi  ψτi } 
⋃
i∈N
(
B \ {ϕτi  ψτi }
)
From monotonicity and sub-additivity of the probability measure we follow:

(
B \ { f (ϕ)  f (ψ)}) ≤∑
i∈N

(
B \ {ϕτi  ψτi }
)
Due to 
({ϕτi  ψτi }B)  1 for all i (by assumption) and Corollary B.3.1
both sides of this inequality are zero and thus by the same Corollary

({ f (ϕ)  f (ψ)}B)  1.

B.2 Proofs
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Take any ϕ ∈ Φ and show:
P[Bt(ϕ)]( f )(ϕ)  sup
{
x ∈ L−t
 f [ϕ〈−∞,t〉] − x ∈ Bt(ϕ)}
 sup
{
x ∈ L−t
 ( f + Hi ) [ϕ〈−∞,t〉] − x ∈ At}  pit ( f + Hi )(ϕ)
The first and third equation use the definition of P[A] (Definition 3.7). The
second uses the definition of Bt , cf. eq. (3.5). 
111
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. To prove eq. (3.7), we start with Lemma 3.1 and apply cash invariance
(Definition 3.5, applicable due to Hτn+1  −Cn+1 ∈ Xτn+1{τn} ).
To prove eq. (3.8), we define ∆ba ≡ Ha −Hb . By H’s definition in eq. (3.4) and
Axiom 3.1 we can infer for any τi < t ≤ τi+1 and ϕ ∈ Φ:
∆tτi (ϕ)  ϕτi ·
(
Xt − Xτi
) − Ci(ϕ) ∈ Lt
and thus ∆tτi ∈ X{τi−1 ,τi} (B.2)
A•’s time consistency (and pi•’s normalization) with Theorem B.3 implies pi•’s
time consistency. Now we can prove eq. (3.8) by eliminating the two decisions
at τi and si :
ητi
(
f
)
 piτi
(
f + Hτi+1 + ∆
τi+1
τi
)
 piτi
(
piτi+1
(
f + Hτi+1
)
+ ∆τi+1τi
)
 sup
ϕ∈Ri
piτi
( (
p + ∆τi+1τi
) [
ϕ
] )
 sup
ϕ∈Ri
piτi
(
inf
ψ∈Si
pisi
( (
p + ∆τi+1τi
) [
ϕ
] [
ψ
] ))
 sup
ϕ∈Ri
piτi
(
inf
ψ∈Si
pisi
(
p
[
ϕ
] [
ψ
]
+ ϕτi ·
(
Xτi+1 − Xτi
) ) ) − Ci [ϕ]
The first equation follows from Lemma 3.1 and ∆’s definition. The second
uses time consistency (Definition 3.8) to introduce piτi+1 and eq. (B.2) with cash
invariance to pull out ∆. The third applies Axiom 3.2 and Theorem B.2 to
introduce the supremum. Furthermore it applies Lemma 3.1 in reverse and
abbreviates p ≡ ητi+1
(
f
)
. The fourth uses again time consistency and applies
Axiom 3.2 and Theorem B.1 to introduce inf pisi . The fifth expands ∆ and pulls
out Ci
[
ϕ
]
using cash invariance. 
B.2.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof “≥”. Follows directly from monotonicity of the supremum1 and the fact
that t 7→ a ∈ S for any a ∈ Dt by Definition of S. 
Proof “≤”. Take any ϕ ∈ S. We have either Dt  {an}n∈N or Ω  {ωn}n∈N. In
the latter case define an ≡ ϕt(ωn) (∈ Dt by Definition of ΦT in eq. (3.1)). In
both cases define Bn ≡ {ϕt  an} for any n. It trivially holds ⋃n Bn  Ω. By
definition of S, ϕ is adapted and thus Bn ∈ Ft . By Definition 3.1 of X, we have
f
[
ϕ
] Bn
 f
[
t 7→ an
]
and thus from locality (by Corollary B.2) we can follow:
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) Bn
 pi
(
f
[
t 7→ an
] ) ≤ sup
a∈Dt
pi
(
f [t 7→ a])
1supA ≤ sup B, if A ⊆ B
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⋃
n Bn  Ω together with Corollary B.3.2 yields
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] ) ≤ sup
a∈Dt
pi
(
f [t 7→ a]) .
The assertion now follows from the least upper bound property of the supre-
mum.

B.2.4 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Equation (3.14) follows from Theorem 3.1 and eq. (3.7) due to fn+1  0
and pi’s normalization.
Now prove eq. (3.15). With p’s definition and Theorem 3.1 and eq. (3.8) we
get:
pi  − sup
ϕ∈Ri
piτi
(
inf
ψ∈Si
pisi
(
ητi+1
(− fi ) [ϕ] [ψ] + ϕτi · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) ) ) − Ci [ϕ]
 inf
ϕ∈Ri
−pi0τi
(
inf
ψ∈Si
ητi+1
(− fi ) [ϕ] [ψ] + ϕτi · (Xτi+1 − Xτi ) ) + Ci [ϕ]
The last equation uses the inf/sup-duality and eliminates pisi using eq. (3.13)
and pi’s cash invariance and normalization. Furthermore, as the argument of
the outer pricing function does not depend on any decision, we can replace the
outer pricing function by its versionwithout decisions (according to Lemma B.1).
It remains to show:
inf
ψ∈Si
ητi+1
(− fi ) [ψ] min{ητi+1 (−gsi ) , ητi+1 (− fi+1)}
 −max{gτi+1 − ητi+1(0), pi+1}
The first equation uses eq. (3.11) after an application of Lemma 3.2, possible due
to the explicit definition of S in eq. (3.12) and the fact that Dsi from eq. (3.9) is
finite. The second equation employs eq. (3.13), η•’s cash invariance, p’s definition
and themin/max-duality. 
B.3 Results from Gerer and Dorfleitner (2016b, referenced
hereafter as GD16)
LemmaB.1 (LemmaA.9 inGD16). Take aA0• with dual pi0• and someA• with dual pi•
that satisfiesA• ∩XØ  A0• . Taking into account Remark 3.3, it holds pit
(
f
)
 pi0t
(
f
)
for any payoff with no decisions at or after time t.
Definition B.1 (Locality, Corollary 3.3 in GD16). A t-pricing function pi is called
local, if
pi
(
f
) B
 pi
(
g
)
, for all B ∈ Ft and f B g
113
J. Gerer Essays on Derivatives Pricing
Corollary B.2 (Corollary 3.3 in GD16). Cash invariance implies locality.
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 4.1 in GD16). IfA is a proper t-acceptance set with price
pi, thenA∀S also is a proper t-acceptance set and its pricing function is given by
P[A∀S]( f )  inf
ϕ∈S pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉
The agent’s price for any actual decisions procedure followed by the counterparty is
always higher than this price. The agent can keep the difference in the form of his or
her own profit. However, the counterparty can make this profit arbitrarily small (if the
infimum is finite).
Theorem B.2 (Theorem 4.2 in GD16). If S is t-compatible and A is a proper t-
acceptance set with price pi, thenA∃S is also a proper t-acceptance set and its pricing
function is given by:
P[A∃S]( f )  sup
ϕ∈S
pi
(
f
[
ϕ
] )
for all f ∈ X[t ,∞〉
While this price can be higher than the price for an actually realized decision procedure
by the agent, he or she can make this loss arbitrarily small (if the supremum is finite).
Theorem B.3 (Theorem 5.1 in GD16). An acceptance family is time consistent (cf.
Definition 3.8) if and only if its dual pricing family is time consistent.
Corollary B.3 (Properties of conditionally almost sure, Corollary B.1 in GD16).
Let D be a countable collection of sets with positive probability and A, B ∈ D.
(1) (B \ C)  0⇐⇒ (C |B)  1
(2) (∀A ∈ D : (C |A)  1) ⇒ (C |⋃D)  1
(3) (B |A)  (C |B)  1 ⇒ (C |A)  1
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